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This study aim s to present a rhetorica l an a lysis of c a se s  
on free  speech  decided by the Supreme Court of the United States 
between 1897 and 1953. It is  concerned with determ ining the types 
of restr iction s on freedom  of exp ression  which the Supreme Court 
of the United States has upheld; and it seek s to d iscover from  these  
restr ic tio n s the sp ecific  rhetorical im plications that follow  their 
application. In addition, this study is  concerned with determ ining  
what d ifferences e x is t , if  any, between the Supreme Courtfs under* 
standing and exp ression  of rhetorical theory and that promulgated  
by the m em bers of the speech profession .
A definition is  given of rhetorical theory by setting forth  
traditional rhetorical princip les contained in c la s s ic  and modern 
speech textbooks. Attention is  f ir s t  devoted to a consideration  of 
approxim ately seventy c a se s  on free  speech which the Supreme 
Court of the United States has decided since 1897. This is  follow ed  
by an exam ination of restr ic tio n s on freedom  of exp ression  which 
relate to the tim e, place and manner of utterance. These r e s tr ic ­
tions are then treated on the b asis of their rhetorical e ffec ts . 
Following th is, an examination is  made of restr ic tio n s on the sub­
stance of expression . R estriction s on the substance of exp ression
iv
are those which are applied to the words of the speaker and to 
the nature of the ideas he p resen ts, L im itations on the substance 
of exp ression  are treated* also* on the b a sis  of their rhetorical 
im plications.
The final portion of this study is  devoted to a sum m ary  
of the conclusions which have been drawn from  the c a se s  and other 
m ateria l concerned in th is inquiry, A general outline of trends 
in free sp eech  decision s is  included; and a sum m ary of the 
rhetorica l im plications deriving therefrom  is  presented. F in ally , 
what has been determ ined to be the Supreme Court's expression  
and understanding of rhetorical theory is  se t out.
The legal interpretations of the c a ses  involved in this study 
are obtained from  the c a ses  th em selves and from  w riters in  the 
fie lds of governm ent and constitutional law. The original asp ect  
of this inquiry is  its  treatm ent of the lega l princip les concerned with 
the ca ses  under d iscu ssion  in a rhetorical context. A lso , the inquiry  
into the exp ression s of rhetorical theory by m em bers of the Supreme 
Court rep resen ts original research .
It has been determ ined in this study that princip les deriving  
from  Supreme Court decision s on free speech should be taken into 
account by the speaker in his choice and adaption of m ateria l, and 
in  the organization, sty le  and delivery of h is rem arks. It has been
evidenced, a lso , that the m em bers of the Supreme Court, for the 
m ost part, analyze the nature of a speech on the b asis of rhetorical 




Jerom e Hall* in an artic le  styled , "Police and Law in a
D em ocratic S o c ie ty ," m akes the following basic  postulate; "A
dem ocracy like a ll other so c ie tie s  needs order and security; but
it a lso  equally req uires c iv il lib erty . This com plexity of need
crea tes  difficult theoretica l and practica l problem s.
In m eeting such of these  problem s as have a r isen  during the
la st five y ea rs , referrin g  e sp ec ia lly  to those c a se s  in which freedom
of speech has been in is su e , the Supreme Court of the United States
has evidenced a growing concern for the protection of order and
secu rity . Whatever preferred  position freedom  of expression  may
2
have enjoyed over other lib erties  prior to 1947 in its protection
28 Indiana JL, J , , (W inter, 1953), at p, 162; see  P lato 's  
two dialogues, the Apology and the C rito, for a d iscu ssion  of 
Athenian secu rity  and c iv il lib erty  problem s in the 4th Century B.
C. For readers of th is study not acquainted with legal c itations, 
certain  of the case  and periodical referen ces may require explana­
tion. R eference to ca ses  are made in term s of sta te , fed eral or 
Supreme Court rep orts. Thus, 100 U .S . 250 would m ean volume 
one-hundred in the United States Reports at page 250, For p eriod i­
c a ls , a citation such as 25 Indiana L , J. 33 would mean volume 25 of 
the Indiana Law Journal at page 33.
2
See Douglas, J . , West V irginia Board of Education v. 
B arnette, 319 U .S . 624, 643-^44, (1943); Thomas v, C ollins, 323 
U .S . 516 (1945), *
1
under the F ir s t  Amendment o l the Constitution and the  due p ro c e s s
3clau se  of the Fourteenth Amendment, has been  qua lified , a t le a s t ,  
i f  not substantially  a ltered , by recent d ecision s of the Court*
The Executive Council o f the Speech A ssociation  of A m e ric a , 
noting the r is in g  danger to traditional A m erican free d o m  of sp eech  
as & resu lt of recent Court rulings and other p r e ssu re s , appointed 
a com m ittee to draw up a statem ent of P rin cip les and Code of E thics 
of F reedom  of Speech* The com m ittee deliberated  during the year 
1952, and on D ecem ber 28, 1952, presented resolu tions to the Ex* 
ecutive Council of the Speech A ssociation  of A m e ric a  at its  conven* 
tion in Cincinnati, The reso lu tion s w ere p assed  unanimously by the 
Executive Council on Decem ber 30, 1952, with the recom m endation  
that they be presented to the general b u sin ess m eeting of the A sso*  
elation . They w ere presented on D ecem ber 31, 1952, and approved 
unanim ously. T hese reso lu tion s read as followss 
Be it  herew ith resolved:
I. That we reaffirm  our b e lie f in the free  platform  and 
in  the free  exchange of ideas:
3
F ir s t  Amendment protection of freedom  of speech  f ir s t  held  
to be applicable to action by state governm ents in Gltlow v. New York, 
268 U .S . 652 (1925), ~
S . .  F einer v. New York. 340 U .S . 315(1951), e e p . , B lack, 
J . ,  dl»»«nt at p. 321~Dennis v . U nlt.d  S ta te .. 341 U .S . 494 (1951); 
B.auharnais v. UUnqla, 343 U .S . 250 (1952); Poulos v. State o l New  
H am pshire. 73 S. Ct. 760 (1953). “
3
II. That we condemn the increasing p ressu res  
which tend to intim idate free  exp ression  of convictions;
III. That we condemn loose  charges of guilt by 
associa tion , allegations of guilt without proof, the 
use of com m ittees to suggest guilt without proper 
tr ia l, and the r ev e rsa l of the A m erican tradition of 
the burden of proof wherein a person  accused  is  p re­
sum ed innocent until proved guilty;
IV. That we reaffirm  our b e lie f in  the p ro cesses  
of free  debate and d iscu ssion  and our b e lie f that the 
United States of A m erica  stands in present danger 
from  the suppression  of free  speech  rather than from  
the full use of a ll institutions which bring inform ation  
and honest b e lie f to the public forum . ®
In considering the v iew s exp ressed  in the resolutions above, 
p articu larly  those contained in R esolution IV, it  seem s proper to 
inquire here to what extent the p ro cesses  of free  debate and d is ­
cu ssion  have been affected by Supreme Court d ecision s which have 
dealt with free  speech . In such inquiry, how ever, teachers of 
speech  would be concerned not only with the broad contours of 
recent law affecting free  debate and d iscu ssion , but a lso  with any 
sp ecific  rhetorica l im plications which might be derived from  fr e e -  
speech c a se s . Indeed, for the carrying out of their pedagogic 
functions, p ro fessors of speech  m ust n ecessa r ily  understand what 
lim itation s, if  any, m ay have been placed on the speaker by the 
Court. This re fers  in general to restr iction s which may affect 
the ideas the speaker p resen ts, the types of proofs he m ay use
5
Reported in the Q uarterly Journal of Speech, February, 
1953, at p. 94.
4
to support them , the wording and sty le  of h is rem arks and the manner 
of h is  delivery*
F urther, for an inquiry of the type described , the speech pro­
fe ss io n  would need to investigate certa in  freedom  of speech ca ses  on 
the b a s is  of the law as it is  interpreted for sp ec ific  types of speeches  
in sp ec ific  response situations. This exam ination should be under­
taken in order to determ ine whether the Supreme Court and the speech  
teacher are in accord  not only as to term inology relating to the 
c la ss ifica tio n  of sp eech es and resp o n ses , but a lso  as to the under­
lying princip les affecting such c la ssifica tio n .
Indeed, in a certa in  c la s s  of c a se s , the Court has been con­
cerned with determ ining such relevant m atters as the speaker's in ­
tent, whether h is speech  could be characterised  as advocacy, opinion, 
d iscu ssion , incitem ent, or exposition , and whether the audience's 
resp onse to the speaker was to be im m ediate or delayed, overt or 
hidden, ^
In connection with the preceding introductory rem arks and the 
inquiry which it p o ses , this study seek s to answer the following q u es­
tions:
 ̂ For applicable c a se s , see  M usser v. Utah, 333 U ,S , 95,
102 (1948); United States v . D ennis, 341 U .S . 494 (1951); T erm iniello  
v, Chicago, 337 U .S , 1 (1949); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U .S . 652,
673 (1925); for com m ents see  John A. Gorfinkel and Julian Mack II, 
"Dennis v* United States and the Clear and P resen t Danger R ule, " 3 9  
Calif. U  Rev. 475, 490 (1952).
5
(1) What trends m ay be observed in d ecision s of the 
Supreme Court of the United States to date concerning  
the types of restr ic tio n s  which m ay be valid ly Invoked 
as lim itations on freedom  of exp ression ?
(2) What are the sp ecific  rhetorical im plications con* 
tained within these d ec is ion s?
(3) What d isagreem ent e x is ts , if any. between the 
Supreme Court's understanding and exp ression  of rh e ­
torica l theory and that prom ulgated by the m em bers of 
the speech  p rofession?
The procedure in  th is study w ill involve an investigation  
and an interpretation of approxim ately seventy ca ses  on free speech  
which the Supreme Court of the United States has decided since 1897* 
The investigation and interpretation of these c a se s  w ill be made by 
a reading of the c a se s  th em selves and by reference to textbooks and 
lega l period ica ls concerned with freedom  of exp ression  and co n sti­
tutional law. Certain c a se s  on freedom  of the p ress  w ill be included  
in th is study, but only to determ ine how they may bear on the related  
subject of freedom  of speech*
At the outset of this inquiry, a definition of rhetoric is  r e ­
quired. Rhetoric is  understood here to em brace, in general, those 
princip les of speaking enunciated in the rhetorical works of A risto tle , 
Cicero and Quintilian, and such an cillary  princip les as have been  
added in modern speech teaching.
R hetoric, to quote A risto tle , is  "the d iscovery  in the
6
particular case  what are the available m eans of persuasion . "
This involves a consideration by the speaker of lin es of argum ent,
form s of support, whether they be lo g ica l, em otional, or eth ical
app eals, and organisation, style*and delivery .
Another concept in A risto tle 's  Rhetoric was that A ristotle
"believed, and p ractica lly  a ll w riters since his tim e have concurred,
8that the audience determ ines the sp eech 's end and object. " "Im­
p lic it in th is idea, " say  Thonssen and Baird, "is the very core of a 
theory of rhetoric . It em braces the doctrine of speech as com m uni­
cation, purposiveness in  d iscou rse , soc ia l interaction, and rea liaa -
o
tion of an end or e ffect consistent with intention. " A ristotle  a lso  
c la s s if ie s  the types of sp eech es as being of three kinds, depending 
on the audience, the delib erative, the forensic  and the speech of 
praise  or b lam e, ca lled  ep id eictic . ^
After A r isto tle , according to the c la s s ic a l tradition rep re ­
sented by such w riters as C icero and Quintilian, rhetoric was
7 Lane Cooper, tran slator, The Rhetoric of A ristotle (New 
York: D. Appleton and Company, 1932), p. 7.
8
L ester Thonssen and A, Craig Baird, Speech C ritic ism  
(New York: The Ronald P r e ss  Company, 1948), p. 15.
9
^  Lane Cooper, p. 16.
7
divided into five parts: invention, d isposition , elocution, m em ory,
and d elivery . ** These canons of rhetoric can be described  as follow s:
(1) Invention --in c lu d es "the speaker's m otives, methods 
of preparation, basic assum ptions, lin es of argum ent, 
form s of support whether they be log ica l em otional, or 
eth ical appeals, and h is efforts to adapt h im self and his 
m ateria l to the speaking situation. "
£ i£ £ i® iii2 !l“‘‘re êre  to concept of organisation, 
of orderly  planning of the speech as a whole, "In som e 
tr e a t ise s , ancient and modern, invention and disposition  
are treated under a com m on head--the assum ption being 
that the orderly  arrangem ent of the m ateria ls constitutes 
an e ssen tia l part of the inventive p ro cess ,
E locu tion --r e fe r s  to sty le , which em b races, "the 
concept of exp ression  in language, resu ltin g , b asica lly , 
from  the choice of words and their arrangem ent or com ­
position . "
(4) M em ory-- th is  canon has practica lly  disappeared and 
w ill not be considered  in this study.
(5) D elivery  - -r e fe r s  to vocal and bodily action.
** See Thonssen and B aird, pp, 77-81 for a general d iscu s­
sion of the c la s s ic a l d iv isions of rhetoric.
12 Waldo W, Braden, "A R hetorical C ritic ism  of Invention 
of W illiam E. Borah's Senate Speeches on the League of Nations, 
1918-1920" (unpublished P h .D . d issertation , State U niversity of 
Iowa, 1942).
13
Thonssen and Baird, p. 79.
15 See B rom ley Sm ith, "Hippias and a L ost Canon of R hetoric, " 
Q uarterly Journal of Speech Education, 12:144 (June, 1926).
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In connection with th is study, c a se s  on free  speech  w ill be 
approached as to the manner in which they m ay bear on the canons 
of rhetoric  and the rhetorica l concepts of A risto tle . In addition, 
they w ill be investigated in their relation  to certa in  rhetorical 
fea tu res found in modern speech  teaching. For exam ple, while 
A risto tle  lis ted  only three types of sp eech es, modern speech texts  
have se t out sev era l other kinds, An illu stration  of this is  found in 
a recent and represen tative book by Gray and Braden, entitled  
Public Speaking; P rin c ip les and P ra ctice . In this text, following a 
developm ent which began with Campbell late in the eighteenth century, 
the authors have noted five types of speech goa ls, and these types 
are contained in a sum m ary chart, at page 245. ^  This chart is  
se t out as follow s;
Summary Chart
Methods of 
obtaining goals G eneral ends
Kind of 
















Convincing Mentalagreem ent Covert
Immediate 
or delayed Sustained




^  G iles W. Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public Speaking; P rin -  
c ip le s  and P ractice  (New Yorks Harper B rothers, 1951), p, 2 4 5 .
9
It is  to be noted that the live  types of sp eech es here listed  
are considered  as to their general ends and their response ch aracter­
is t ic s .  For purposes of this inquiry, the chart above w ill serve  as a 
guide in determ ining d ifferences which may be found in the examined  
c a se s  as to types of sp eech es, general ends and resp on ses. A lso , 
certa in  other rhetorical theory in the Gray and Braden textbook will 
be exam ined in connection with the c a ses  since it rep resen ts the modern 
extension of those princip les of speech  valid in the tim e of A ristotle .
The order of this study w ill be as follow s;
Chapter U, follow ing, w ill seek  to determ ine certain  
lega l princip les as found in a h istorica l survey of important United 
States Supreme Court d ec is ion s.
Chapter 111 w ill seek  to make certain  deductions as to 
lim itations on the speaker in resp ect to the form  of h is exp ression s.
This w ill include such considerations as tim e, p lace, and manner or 
mode of utterance.
Chapter IV w ill concern itse lf  with making practical 
rhetorical applications of the lega l doctrines em erging from  the ca ses  
that deal with the substance of expression . This w ill include a con­
sideration of the two broad c la s se s  of "protected" and "non-protected" 
speech .
Chapter V w ill attempt to represent the various con­
clu sions which are justified  by the m aterial previously  investigated
10




The F ir s t  Amendment to the Constitution provides: 
“C ongress shall make no law . , . abridging the freedom  of speech, 
or of the p ress; or the right of the people peaceably to assem ble •
♦ . . 11 * An absolutist interpretation of th is clause would mean 
that constitutional questions ra ised  by leg isla tion  affecting freedom  
of exp ression  would present no great difficulty. Under the traditional 
concept of judicial rev iew , a determ ination by the courts that a law  
of C ongress constituted abridgment of free  speech would resu lt in 
its  being held invalid. Such interdiction could a lso  be extended to 
state law s under the rule of the Gitlow case  decided by the Supreme 
Court in 1 9 25 ,^
In p ractice , how ever, freedom  of speech under the Consti­
tution is  not an absolute right but one which is  qualified by severa l 
competing in te re sts . One of th ese , of cou rse, is  the in terest in
* United States Constitution, Amendment 1,
 ̂ k*art)ury v « Madison, 1 Cranch. 137 (1803).
3 v* New York, 268 U .S . 652 (1925), Here it was
assum ed for the f ir s t  tim e that “due p r o c ess” in the Fourteenth  
Amendment included freedom  of speech under the F ir st Amendment.
11
12
the preservation  of the state through public order, As one w riter
has pointed out, “Indeed a m inimum of control [over communication]
m ay be n ecessa ry  to p reserve  public order, without which d iscu ssion
4could hardly go on, " * , ■
An approach to the is su e s  in free  speech c a ses  requires an
understanding that there is  a relationship between the use of language
and other types of conduct* som e of which may be declared crim inal
and thus constitutionally  prevented. The tw o-fold relationship between
language and other conduct has been described  as follow s:
♦ . . In the f ir s t  p lace, the form  which expression  
ta k es--th e  tim e, p lace, and manner of its  e x e r c is e - -  
m ay be a m atter of governm ental concern. There is  
therefore an area in which com plete freedom  of choice  
as to mode of exp ression  is  inconsistent with the norm al 
e x er c ise  of the sta te 's  police power. Secondly, the sub­
stance of the language used is  com m only intended and 
often lik ely  to effectuate a resu lt. To the extent that the 
resu lt m ay constitutionally be prevented, there ex ists  an 
area in which freedom  of choice as to the content of e x ­
p ressio n  is  incom patible with adequate protection against 
undesirable conduct.
4 Zechariah Chafee, Government and M ass Communications 
(Chicago: U niversity  of Chicago P r e s s ,  1947), 1, p, 60; see a lso  John 
Stuart M ill's E ssa y  on L iberty in THE MODERN READERS' SERIES 8 
(1926) in which a recognition of the practical problem s attending freedom  
of exp ression  is  shown by the following statement: "The practical ques­
tion, where to place the lim it--h ow  to make the fitting adjustment between  
individual independence and so c ia l co n tro l--is  a subject on which nearly  
everything rem ains to be done, "
5 N otes, 49 Columbia L .R . 363-364, M arch, 1949.
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In c a ses  where these conflicts have a r isen , the Court has 
made its  d ec is ion s based on interpretations of the F ir s t  and F our­
teenth Am endm ents which take into account competing policy factors.
To determ ine what these interpretations have been, an examination  
of the Supreme Court's leading fre e -sp e ec h  c a se s  is  required. A lso , 
som e data concerning the background of the passage of the F ir s t  
Amendment seem s desirab le  for a consideration of freedom  of 
utterance in its  h istor ica l persp ective .
After the feudal period in England, the fir s t  important
6v ictory  for freedom  of utterance was the overthrow of the Censor.
B lackstone, in fact, equated freedom  of the p ress  with an absence
7
of cen sorsh ip , or , "prior restra in t. " Upon expulsion of the Censor, 
the E nglish  P arliam ent passed  seditious libel law s. T hereafter, the 
p olitica l p ractices of the judges of the Crown in trying ca ses  under 
th ese  law s prompted reform  groups to advocate an increased jury  
participation in such c a se s . Their efforts were su ccessfu l and resu lted  
in the passage of F ox 's L ibel Act of 1792 (32 Geo. 3, c60 , 1792).
 ̂ Bernard A. P e tr ie , Com m ents, 50 Mich. L .R , 452,
January, 1952; see  a lso  Zechariah Chafee, J r . , F ree  Speech in the 
United States (Harvard U niversity P re ss :  Cambridge M a s s ,, 1941), 
p. 498, and M ilton's A reopagitica ( 1644).
7
Blackstone C om m entaries, p. 154 (Wendell 1854); see  Near 
v . M innesota, 283 U. S. ^96 (1931),
14
This Act provided that the jury should render a general verd ict in
sed itious lib el c a se s  and p ass on the seditious character of the
8utterance as w ell a s the m ere fact of its publication*
The F ir s t  Amendment to the A m erican Constitution was 
intended by the fram ers to lim it the power of C ongress to proscribe
sp eech  to narrow er boundaries than those of common law seditious
9
lib e l. H owever, passage by C ongress of the Sedition Act of 1798 
(1 Stat. L.* 596, 1798) made blam e of the government punishable; 
but its  constitutionality was never tested , and it expired under 
Jefferson  in 1800, Thereupon, the doctrine of laisse%- faire pervaded  
the fie ld  of speech in the 19th Century, and during this period there
was litt le  conceptual developm ent of the lim its of the F ir s t  Amend-
10
m ent.
Chief Justice Vinson points out in his opinion in the recent 
Dennis case  that no important case  involving free  speech was decided  
by the Supreme Court until 1919# in Schenk v. United States (249 U ,S , 
247).** The Schenk case  involved a conviction under the Criminal
® P etr ie , p. 453; see  Chafee, F ree  Speech in the United 
S tates, pp, 500-501,
9
Chafee, F ree  Speech in the United States, pp, 19-21; see  
Abram s v. United States, 250 U, S, 616, at p. 630 (1919).
P e tr ie , p. 453.
11 71 S. Ct. 864 (1951).
15
Espionage A ct (40 Stat. D. 2X7) of 1917. There began an important 
concept for determ ining under an Act of this type the p erm issib le  
bounds of sed itious utterance. Supreme Court c a se s  related  to the 
is su e s  in the Schenk c a se , and five other types of c a se s  dealing with 
con flicts between speech  and competing in terests  w ill be considered  
at this point.
II.
A . C ases involving statutes prohibiting speech because of its  
tendency to lead to crim inal acts.
The subject-m atter in th is section  may be made c learer  by 
a few introductory rem arks concerning crim inal law in general as it 
re la tes  to u tterances. In addition to a few c la s se s  of words (the 
obscene, the profane and the libelous) the use of which may be punished 
because they are considered  to inflict im m ediate injury (these types 
w ill be considered in a later section  of this chapter), there is  a c la ss  
of words which are punished because of their c lo se  relation to 
specified  crim inal a c ts . Under the crim inal law of attem pts and 
so lic ita tion , the rule is  that for crim inal responsib ility  to attach to 
w ords, they m ust constitute a dangerous link in the p rogress toward 
a crim in al act or its  attem pt, and must amount to procurem ent, 
counsel or command to com m it the forbidden act (B lackstonefs 
C om m entaries IV, p. 36). D ifficulty a r ises  in determ ining at law
16
the proxim ate e ffect of u tterances, that is, whether they amount to
'’p rocu rem en t," ’’counsel" or "command, ” This is  particu larly  true
w here the words u ttered  concern the propagation of ideas that are
favorable to a c tiv itie s  considered  seditious* Most of the c a ses  here
w ill involve these types of utterances*
The f ir s t  tim e the Supreme Court considered a case  involving
12words which encouraged breach of law was in Fox v, Washington*
A Washington statute of 1909 made it crim inal to circu late any document 
having a tendency to encourage the com m ission  of any breach of the 
peace or d isresp ec t for law or any court (Wash* Laws, 1909, c* 249, 
#311-316)* The Court held that the 14th Amendment did not prohibit 
conviction under the Act for one's encouraging d isresp ect for law by 
an a r tic le , "The Nude and the P rudes, " declaring bathing su its  
superfluous* The Court said  that the statute "lays hold of encourage­
m ents that, apart from  statute, if d irected to a particular person 's  
conduct, generally  would make him  who uttered them  guilty of a 
m isdem eanor if  not an accom plice or a principal in the crim e encouraged,
and deals with the publication of them  to a wider and le s s  se lected  
13
audience*"
Mr* Justice Frankfurter points out in the Dennis case  that
12 236 U .S . 273 (1915).
13 236 U .S . 273 at 277-278.
17
w hile the F ox d ec ision  preceded the exp lic it absorption o£ the sub­
stance of the F ir s t  Amendment in the Fourteenth, subsequent ca ses
14extended the F ox princip le to Iree -sp eech  situations. The f ir s t  
im portant application of th is princip le was made in s ix  c a se s  arising  
under the Crim inal Espionage Act of 1917, A b rief background of 
that Act is  given h ere.
C ongress declared  war against Germany on April 6, 1917.
On May 18, 1917, it  p assed  the Selective Service Act to ra ise  a 
national arm y. In addition to the m ilitary  and c iv ilian  organization  
for reaching the men who w ere liab le to reg istration  and subsequent 
induction into se rv ic e , the governm ent had at its  d isposal severa l 
crim inal statutes enacted during the Civil War* These could be used  
to punish con sp iracies of those aim ing to r e s is t  recruiting and con­
scrip tion  by r io ts and other forcib le m eans, or seeking by speeches
15and publications to induce men to evade the draft. The Civil War
statutes w ere fe lt  by the Departm ent of Justice to be incom plete sin ce ,
(1) it  was not a crim e to persuade a man not to en list voluntarily,
and (2) because one man cannot constitute a conspiracy by h im self,
a deliberate attem pt by a single individual to obstruct the draft, if
u n su ccessfu l, was beyond the reach of the law, except when h is conduct
16was sufficiently  seriou s to amount to treason .
14 71 S. Ct. 864 at p. 879.
T hese statutes are now 18 U. S. C. A. (1926). See a lso  
Chafee, F ree  Speech in the United States, p. 37.
16 Chafee. F ree  Speech in the United States, p. 38.
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The third section  of T itle I of the Espionage Act, enacted  
June 15, 1917, estab lish ed  three new offen ses to m eet the needs above:
[1] W hoever, when the United States is  at w ar, shall 
w illfu lly  make or convey fa lse  reports or fa lse  statem ents 
with Intent to in terfere with the operation or su ccess  of 
the m ilitary  or naval forces of the United States or to 
prom ote the su cc ess  of its  enem ies [Z] and whoever, when 
the United States is  at w ar, shall w illfu lly  cause or attempt 
to cause insubordination, d isloyalty , mutiny, or refusa l of 
duty, in  the m ilitary  or naval forces of the United States,
[3] or sh all w illfu lly  obstruct the recruiting or enlistm ent 
serv ice  of the United States, to the injury of the serv ice  or 
of the United S ta tes, shall be punished by a fine of not 
m ore than $10 ,000  or im prisonm ent for not m ore than 
twenty y e a rs , or both,
E leven  months later the Espionage Act was expanded by a
18
second statute. The amendment of May 16, 1918 (repealed in 1921), 
som etim es ca lled  the Sedition A ct, inserted  “attem pts to obstruct'1 in 
the third of the original o ffen ses, and added nine m ore offenses as 
follow s:
[4] saying or doing anything with intent to obstruct the 
sa le  of United States bonds, except by way of bona fide  
and not d isloyal advice: [5] uttering, printing, writing, 
or publishing any d isloya l, profane, scu rrilou s, or 
abusive language, or language intended to cause con* 
tem pt, scorn , contum ely or disrepute as regards the 
form  of governm ent of the United States; [6] or the Con* 
stitution; [7] or the flag; [8] or the uniform of the Arm y  
or Navy; [9] or any language intended to incite resistan ce  
to the United States or promote the cause of its enem ies;
^  Act of June 15, 1917, c . 30, Title I, #3, now 50 U ,S .C . A,
(1926), #33,
18 40 Stat. 553 (1918). Fop repeal, see  41 Stat. 1359-1360.
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[ 10} urging any curtailm ent of production of any things 
n ecessa ry  to the prosecution of the war with intent to  
hinder its  prosecution; [11] advocating, teaching, defend­
ing, or suggesting the doing of any of these acts; and 
[12] words or acts supporting or favoring the cause of 
any country at war with u s , or opposing the cause of the 
United States therein . Whoever com m itted any one of 
these o ffenses during the war was liab le to the maximum  
penalty of the original A ct, $10,000 fine or twenty years* 
im prisonm ent, or both, ^
The 1918 amendment was repealed on March 3, 1921, The
orig inal Espionage A ct of 1917 was le ft in fo rce , and was operative
during the second World War, The 1918 Amendment cam e so late
in World War 1 that a ll noted c a se s , except the Abram s prosecution,
turned on the meaning of the three original o ffenses of the 1917 Act
or on "attempts to obstruct, "
The f ir s t  decision  under the 1917 Act, and the m ost influential
20upon the la ter  developm ent of constitutional law , was Schenk v . U ,S , 
This prosecution was under the section  of the Act against incitem ent 
to r e s is t  the draft. The defendant had m ailed I S ,000 c ircu lars to 
m en ca lled  for the draft, which not only declared conscription to be 
unconstitutional despotism , but urged the recip ients in Mim passioned1' 
language to a sse r t  their rights to oppose the draft, Mr, Justice  
H olm es, speaking for a unanimous court, laid  down the following 
general te s t  to be applied in the instant case  for determ ining the
19 Chafee, F ree  Speech in the United S tates, pp. 40-41 ,
20 249 U .S . 47 (1919).
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scope of the F ir s t  Amendment:
"We admit that in  many p laces and in ordinary tim es  
the defendants in saying a ll that was said  in the circu lar  
would have been within their constitutional r igh ts. But 
the character of every  act depends upon the circum stan-  
c e s  in which it  is  done, , , * The question in every  case  
is  whether the words used are used in such circum stances  
and are of such a nature a s to create a c lear  and present 
danger that they w ill bring about the substantive ev ils  that 
C ongress has a right to prevent. It is  a question of prox-  
im ity  and degree* When a nation is  at war many things 
that might be sa id  in tim e of peace are such a hindrance 
to its  effort that their utterance w ill not be endured so 
long as m en fight and that no court could regard them as  
protected by any constitutional right*
A s Chafee points out, "Although the Substantive e v ils *are
not sp ec ifica lly  definedt they m ean su ccessfu l interference with the
particular power of C ongress that is  in question**-in th is instance*
the war power* • « • In order to give force to the F ir s t  Amendment,
H olm es draws the boundary line c lo se  to the te st  of incitem ent at
com m on law and m akes the punishment of words for their rem ote bad
22tendency im possible* ” The c lo se  relation between freedom  of 
speech  and crim inal attem pts is  shown by H olm es in citing above a 
phrase from  his opinion in a M assachusetts attem pts c a se , "It is  a 
question of degree* And though h is opinion would allow  conviction  
for exp ression s uttered with a bad intention, it a lso  requires that the 
words constitute "a clear and present d a n g er ," h ere, of injury to 
the ra isin g  of the arm ed forces*
2^ 249 U .S . 47 at p. 52; (em phasis supplied).
22 Chafee, F ree  Speech in the United S tates, pp. 81-82.
23 249 U .S . 52; see  Commonwealth v. F e a s le r , 177 M ass, 267, 
272 (1901). ~
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24In Frohwerk v , U ,S , , the second ca se  under the 1917 
Espionage A ct, the defendant w as convicted on a showing that he had 
consp ired  to publish in a new spaper, the Mis sour i -Staatsze itung, 
tw elve a r tic le s  describ ing the sufferings of A m erican troops, on the 
constitutionality  and m er its  of the draft, and on the purposes of the 
w ar. Justice H olm es said  that there might have been cause for re*  
v ersa l of conviction, if  m ore evidence had been presented on the 
record ,
. , , But we m ust take the case  on the record  as it
i s ,  and of that record  it i s  im possib le to say that it 
m ight not have been found that the circu lation of the 
paper was in quarters where a little  breath would be 
enough to kindle a flam e and that the fact w as know^g 
and was re lied  on by those who sent that paper out.
In the third of the ea r lier  d ec is ion s, Eugene V, Debs was
26convicted and im prisoned under the Espionage Act, He was 
prosecuted  for an attempt to cause insubordination in the arm y and 
obstruct recru iting . His indictm ent charged that the defendant had 
delivered  a public speech  expounding soc ia lism  andpraising so c ia lis ts  
who had been convicted of abetting violation of the draft law s.
H olm es accepted the jury's verd ict as proof that actual interference
24 249 U .S . 204 (1919).
25 249 U. S. 204 at p. 209.
26 249 U .S . 211 (1919), Debs v. U .S .
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with the war was intended and was the proxim ate e ffect of the words 
27used . One author sa y s , "It is  regrettable that he [Justice H olm es] 
fe lt  unable to go behind the verdict* Judge Wes ter haven's charge 
gave the jury such a wide scope that Debs was probably convicted for 
an exposition  of so c ia lism , m erely  because the jury thought h is speech  
had som e tendency to bring about resistan ce  to the draft. " On this 
point, it  should be noted that there was no proof introduced at the 
tr ia l to show that anyone w as provoked to r e s is t  the draft as a resu lt  
of D ebs' speech .
In three succeeding c a se s . Justices H olm es and Brandeis 
dissented  from  judgments of the Court affirm ing convictions. The 
indictm ent in Abram s v. U .S . ,  250 U .S . 616 (1919), was made 
under the provisions of the 1918 amendment to the Espionage A ct, ^  
which prohibited con sp iracies to advocate curtailm ent of production of 
m ateria l n ecessa ry  for the prosecution of the w ar, with the intent 
thereby to hinder the United States in prosecution of the war. It ap­
peared that the defendants w ere anarchists who had printed circu lars  
and distributed them  in New York City, The lea flets  repeated certain  
M arxist slogan s, condemned A m erican intervention in R u ssia , and
27 249 U .S . 211 at 214.
Chafee, F ree  Speech in the United S tates, p. 84,
29 See T .R . P ow ell, "Constitutional Law in 1919-1920,"
19 Mich. L. R. 283, 288 «  (1921).
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30ca lled  lor  a general strike in protest*
In Schaefer v , U .S . , 251 U .S*468 (1920), the ed itors of a 
G erm an language newspaper in Philadelphia w ere charged with 
obstructing the recru iting serv ice  and with w illfu lly  publishing fa lse  
reports with the intention to promote the su ccess  of the enem ies of 
the United States* The evidence showed publication of a r tic les  which 
accused  A m erican troops of w eakness and m endacity and in one 
instance m isquoted or m istranslated  a Senator's speech. (See U .S . 
v. W erner, 247 Fed* 708, 1918). The indictm ent in P ierce  v. U .S . ,
252 U.S* 239 (1920), charged that the defendants had attempted to 
cause insubordination in the arm ed forces with intent to interfere  
with m ilitary  operations. Conviction was based on circu lation of a 
pamphlet which belittled  a llied  war aim s and cr itic ised  conscription  
in strong term s.
In each of the three c a ses  above, the m ajority and the d is ­
senting opinions re lied  on the rule of the Schenk c a se , supra* The 
m em bers of the Court disagreed as to the evidence* The m ajority  
held that the jury could infer the required intent and the probable effect
of the a r tic le s  from  their content. H olm es and Brandeis thought that
31only "expressions of opinion and exhortations" were involved, that
30 250 U.S* 616, (1919).
31 250 U .S . 616, 631 (1919).
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they w ere Mpuny anonym ities, impotent to produce the ev il against 
which the statute aim ed, ** and that from  them  the sp ecific  intent 
required by the statute could not reasonably be inferred* The Court 
agreed that an incitem ent to d isobey the draft statute could constitu­
tionally  be punished. It d isagreed  over the proof required to show  
such incitem ent* or the intent to produce such incitem ent.
The next im portant free  speech case  to be decided was 
Gitlow y. New York* 268 U .S . 652 (1925), which involved a conviction  
under a state statute. The New York L egislature had declared that 
the advocacy of anarchy or crim inal syndicalism  presented an im m i­
nent danger to the sta te . The statute punished any advocacy of 
crim in al anarchy, which was defined as "the doctrine that organised  
governm ent should be overthrown by force or v io lence, or by
assassin a tion  of the executive head of any of the executive offic ia ls
33
of governm ent, or by any unlawful m eans, " The evidence showed 
that the defendant was an officia l of the Left Wing Section of the 
S ocia list P arty , and that he was responsib le for publication of a Left 
Wing M anifesto, This document repudiated "moderate so c ia lism , " 
and urged the n e c e ss ity  of a m ilitant ''revolutionary so c ia lism , "
32 251 U .S .468, 476 (1920).
33 N. Y. Penal Law #160-166, (1902), Sim ilar "sedition" 
statutes w ere put on the books of other states early  in the century, 
and severa l p e r s is t  today,. The federal government avoided p ea ce ­
tim e sedition laws after 1800 until the passage of the Smith A ct in 
1940.
25
based  on c la s s  straggle and revolutionary m ass action. No evidence  
of the e ffect of the M anifesto was introduced; but the jury were in ­
structed that they could not convict un less they found that the document
advocated em ploying unlawful acts for the purpose of overthrowing
34organised governm ent. Following such instructions, the jury found
the defendant guilty*
In the United States Supreme Court, the only question was
the constitutionality of the crim inal anarchy act as construed above
by the state courts. Unlike the preceding d ec is ion s, the case  did not
com e up under the F ir s t  Amendment which r e str ic ts  only C ongress,
35but under the Fourteenth, In severa l c a se s , the Court had refrained
from  deciding whether "liberty11 protects liberty  of speech as w ell as
lib erty  of person and contract. Then in 1923 the Supreme Court
held that lib erty  to teach a foreign language in private schools was
37within the 14th Amendment. JLater, Walter Poliak, who shared in 
the oral argument for Gitlow, persuaded the Supreme Court to settle  
the issu e  as shown by its  unanimous statem ent that, "we may and do
34 268 U .S .652 (1925).
”. . . Nor shall any state deprive any person of , , . 
lib erty . • • without due p rocess of law. " (U .S . Const, Amend. 14),
36 See Shafee, F ree  Speech in the United States, p. 321; 
G ilbert v. M inn., 254 U .S . 325 (1920).
3  ̂ M eyer v. Nebraska, 262 U .S . 390 (1923),
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assum e that freedom  of speech  and of the p r e ss . . • are among the 
fundamental personal rights and ’lib erties' protected from  im pairm ent 
by the sta tes .
The m ajority of the Court, how ever, held through Mr,
Justice Sanford that the New York statute did not wrongfully im pair
G itlow’s lib erty  of speech* It ex p ress ly  rejected  the te s t  laid  down
by the Supreme Court in the Schenk ca se , declaring that the "clear
and presen t danger test"  m erely  served  to decide how far the Espionage
A ct, which dealt prim arily  with acts, should be interpreted to extend 
39*° wor<*8« Justice Sanford sa y s , "where the leg isla tive  body has
determ ined generally , in the constitutional ex erc ise  of its  d iscretion ,
that utterances of a certain  kind involve such danger of substantive
ev il that they may be punished, the question whether any sp ecific
utterance coming within the prohibited c la ss  is  lik ely , in and of itse lf
40to bring about the substantive ev il, is  not open to consid eration ."
Chafee says that Justice Sanford virtually adopts the bad^tendeney te s t , 
an E nglish  18th Century doctrine, which perm its the government to 
go outside the field  of a c ts , present or probable, into the field  of
268 U«S*652 at 666; Chafee, F res  Speech in the United 
States, p. 322.
39 268 U .S . 652 at 670.
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id ea s , and to con d em n  them  by the judgment of a judge or jury who,
. * . "consider a doctrine they d islik e  to be so liable to cause harm
41som e day that it had better be nipped in the bud*"
The principle of the Gitlow case  was applied in Whitney v. 
C alifornia, 274 U .S . 357 (1927), to sustain  a conviction under a state 
crim in al syndicalism  statute. That statute made it a felony to a s s is t  
in organizing a group assem b led  to advocate the com m ission  of crim e, 
sabotage, or unlawful acts of violence as a m eans of effecting p o liti­
ca l or industrial change. The defendant, Anita Whitney, was found 
to have a ss is te d  in organizing the Communist Labor Party of California, 
an organization which was held to be of the type covered by the Act.
The Court held the leg isla tu re  not unreasonable in believing that 
organization of such a party "involves such danger to the public peace
and the secu rity  of the state , that these acts should be penalized in
42the e x er c ise  of its  police p o w er ,"
In neither of these  la st two ca ses  did Mr. Justice H olm es 
and M r. Justice Brandeis accept the reasoning of the Court, "'The 
question,*" they said , quoting from  the Schenk case  in every  case  
is  whether the words u sed  are used in such circum stances and are  
of such a nature as to create  a c lear  and present danger that they w ill
4 1 Chafee, F ree  Speech in the United States, pp. 322*323,
42 274 U .S . 357 at 371.
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bring about the substantive e v ils  that [the state] has a right to 
4 3
p r e v e n t . O n e  author found it intriguing when Mr, Justice Sanford
inform ed Mr. Justice H olm es that the latter did not intend a te s t  of
general application, notwithstanding the clear words and sp ecific
44assurance of H olm es to the contrary.
Since the M anifesto circu lated by Gitlow "had no chance of
starting a present c o n f la g r a t io n * H o lm e s  and Brandeis d issented
from  the affirm ance of h is conviction. In Whitney v, California, they
concurred in the resu lt reached by the Court, but only because the
record  contained som e evidence that organisation of the Communist
Liabor P arty m ight further a conspiracy to com m it im m ediate seriou s
c r im e s , and the cred ib ility  of the evidence was not put in issu e  by the 
46
d c fc nds iits
Boudin says that Gitlow v. New York and Whitney v, California  
w ere "echoes'* of the "F irst Great H ysteria" which began with our 
entry into World War I, and that both Gitlow and Whitney w ere indicted  
and tried  while the h ysteria  w as at its height. Further, that the 
Supreme Court took a long tim e deciding them , probably because of
268 U .S . 652. 672-673.
44 C, J. Antieau, "The Rule of Clear and P resent Dangers 
Scope of Its A pplicability, " 48 Mich. U R . 812 (1950).
45
268 U .S . 652, 673.
46 274 U .S . 357.
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the fact that such prosecutions in peacetim e w ere a novelty in this 
country, there having been none since the prosecutions under the 
Sedition Laws of 1 7 9 8 .^
Subsequent d ecision s (up to the Dennis c a se , 1951, a 
prosecution  under the Smith A ct, which Boudin, supra, says initiated  
the "Second Great H ysteria") have added little  to the principles 
estab lish ed  in the Schenk and Gitlow groups of cases* In the only 
ca se  arisin g  under the Espionage Act decided by the Supreme Court 
during World War XI, the substantiality of the evidence was the 
cru cia l is su e . The defendant in H artzel v. U, S, ^  was a United States 
c itizen , unaffiliated with any group, who wrote three a rtic les  in  1942 
condemning our w artim e a llie s  and urging that the war be converted  
into a racia l conflict. He m ailed tracts to six-hundred people, 
including high-ranking m ilitary  o fficers . The majority of the Court
1 Louis B, Boudin, "Seditious D octrines and the *Clear and 
Present* Danger R u le ,"  38 Virginia L .R . 143, 165 (1952); in the 
Gitlow and Whitney c a se s , as w ell as in the Schenk c a se , the judges 
recognized  that state and federal governm ents can lim it speech under 
certain  conditions. H olm es and Brandeis would apply the "clear and 
present danger" tes t to the situations involved in all three c a s e s , but 
in Gitlow the Court rejected  th is rule as inapplicable where a statute 
prohibits specific  language it s e lf  (as opposed to the type of act involved  
in Schenk), since a state can "reasonably" prohibit language that might 
tend to cause overthrow of government. See Boudin, p. 149*
48 322 U .S . 680 (1943).
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held that a jury could not reasonably infer from  these facts that the
defendant had acted with a sp ecific  intent to cause insubordination in
the arm ed fo rc es .
The Court in four instan ces has review ed convictions under
statutes com parable to those in the Gitlow and Whitney c a se s . The
49ca se  of F isk e  v, Kansas involved a Kansas crim inal syndication  
statute s im ilar  to that before the court in Whitney v. C alifornia. The 
Court rev ersed  a conviction based on the evidence that the defendant 
exhibited an innocuous pream ble to the Constitution of the I* W, W. in 
so lic itin g  m em bers for that organisation. The Supreme Court 
refused  to accept th is as sufficient grounds for a conviction* and 
he'ld that utterances such a s  those made by F iske w ere allowed under
the Constitution. Chafee says* ,fln F isk e v. Kansas the Supreme Court
50for the f ir s t  tim e made freedom  of speech m ean som ething. "
The case  of Herndon v. Lowry* decided April 26, 1937* 
under Chief Justice  Hughes bears d irectly  upon the meaning of the 
c lear  and present danger doctrine, and goes far to confirm  and clarify  
it . The Gitlow exception w as not p rec ise ly  repudiated by the Court*
49 274 U .S . 380 (1927).
50 Chafee* F ree  Speech in the United S tates, p. 352; see  also  
V irginia Wood, Due P ro cess  of Law (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
U niversity  F r e e s , 1951), pp. 5 -6 ,
51 301 U .S . 242 (1937).
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but Mr. Justice R oberts, for the m ajorityp used language indicating  
an end of leg is la tiv e  suprem acy in the situation. "The power of a 
state to abridge freedom  of speech and the assem b ly  is  the exception  
rather than the r u le ," he said , "and the penalising even of utterances 
of a defined character m ust find its  justification  in a reasonable appre­
hension of danger to organized government* The judgment of the 
leg isla tu re  is  not unfettered. The lim itation upon individual liberty  must 
have appropriate relation  to the safety of the sta te . L egislation
52which goes beyond th is need v io la tes the principle of the Constitution, "
Although Mr, Justice R oberts appeared to "distinguish" the
Gitlow and Herndon statu tes, the statute involved in the Herndon case
indicated that the G eorgia L egislature considered particular language
inducing persons to join in any combined resistan ce  to the state a
danger of substantive ev il, and the rev ersa l of conviction is  said  to
53weaken the authority of the Gitlow case*
F urtherm ore, the Court in 1943 reversed  a conviction under 
a state statute w herein the leg isla ture had indicated that it considered  
too dangerous a specific  kind of language, urging d isresp ect for the 
flag; and this tim e a unanimous Supreme Court agreed that the "clear
52 301 U .S . 242 at 258.
53 Antieau, p. 814,
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and p resen t danger'1 doctrine was applicable to such a statute. ^  
Taylor was indicted and convicted under a M ississip p i statute of 
1942, the purpose of which, according to its  title  was to secure the 
peace and safety  of the United States and the State of M ississip p i 
during war and to prohibit acts detrim ental to public peace and 
safety . The section  under which the indictment was laid provided, 
among other things:
That any person  who individually, or as a member 
of any organization, a ssocia tion , or otherw ise, shall 
intentionally preach, teach, or dissem inate any teach** 
in gs, creed , theory, or set of alleged princip les . , • 
designed and calculated to encourage v io lence, sabotage, 
or d isloyalty  to the government of the United States, 
or the State of M ississip p i • , • or which reasonably  
tends to create  an attitude of stubborn refu sa l to salute, 
honor or resp ect the flag or government of the United 
S tates, or of the State of M ississip p i, shall be guilty of 
a felony and punished by im prisonm ent in the state 
penitentiary until treaty  of peace be declared by the 
United S tates, but such punishment shall not exceed  
ten years.
The evidence upon which conviction was based was that:
T aylor, in the course of interview s with severa l women, 
the sons of two of whom had been killed  in battle over*  
se a s , stated that it was wrong for our president to send 
our boys a c ro ss  in uniform to fight our enem ies; that it 
w as wrong to fight our enem ies; that these boys were 
being shot down for no purpose at all; that the two wom en's 
sons may have thought that they were doing the right thing 
to fight our en em ies, but it was wrong; that H itler would
CL A ,
Taylor v* M ississip p i, 319 U .S . 583 (1943). See 
Antieau, p. 813.
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178 # 1 Gen. Laws of M iss, at 211 (1942),
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ru le , but would not have to com e over here to rules 
that the quicker the people here quit bowing down 
and worshipping and saluting our flag and G overn­
m ent, the sooner we would have peace.
The evidence shows that Taylor a lso  distributed books and 
pam phlets which, on relig iou s grounds, advocated refu sa l to partic i­
pate in  the war and salute the flag. B ecause the statute was intended 
to be a war m easu re, the tr ia l court sentenced Taylor to prison  
during the duration of the w ar, but not to exceed  ten y ea rs. In r e ­
versin g  the conviction, the Suprem e Court in a unanimous decision  
delivered  by Mr. Justice R oberts, said:
A s applied to appellants it punishes them  although what 
they have com m unicated is  not claim ed or shown to have 
b een  done with a sin ister  purpose, to have advocated or 
incited  subversive action against the nation or state , or 
to have threatened any c lear and present danger to our 
institutions or our governm ent, What these appellants 
com m unicated w ere their b e lie fs  and opinions concerning  
dom estic m easures and trends in national and world  
a ffa irs. ^
A flag case  of a different character was that of Stromberg v.
58C alifornia, decided May 18, 1931. Yetta Strom berg, aged 19, was 
a m em ber of the Young Communist League and in charge of a camp 
for children. She was indicted under a California statute which pro­
vided:
5b
319 U .S . 583 at 588.
57 „
Ib id .. pp. 589-590.
58 283 U .S . 359 (1931).
Any person  who displays a red flag, banner or 
badge or any flag , badge, banner, or device of any 
color or form  w hatsoever in any public place or in  
any m eeting place or public assem b ly , or from  or on 
any house, building or window as a sign , sym bol or 
em blem  of opposition to organized governm ent, or as 
an aid to propaganda that i s  of a seditious character, 
is  guilty of a felony,
The proof was that under her d irection  "the children were  
taught c la s s  co n sc io u sn ess, the so lidarity  of the w orkers, and the 
theory that the w orkers of the world are of one blood and brothers 
a l l , " and that she supervised  and directed the children in raising a 
red flag , a cam p-m ade reproduction of the flag of Soviet R ussia ,
60which was a lso  the flag of the Communist P arty  in the United States. 
There was a lso  proof that "In connection with the flag -ra isin g  there 
w as a r itual at which the children stand at salute and recited  a 
pledge of allegiance 'to the w orker's red flag , and to the cause for 
which it stands; one aim  throughout our liv e s , freedom  for the working 
c la s s .
The conviction in Strom berg v. California, supra, was r e ­
v ersed  in an opinion by Chief Justice Hughes, on the ground that a 
statute fram ed in such general language and term s was obnoxious to
59 Cited at 283 U .S . 359. 361.
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the provisions of the F ir s t  end Fourteenth Am endm ents, This
c a se  did not involve the c lear  and present danger ru le , sin ce the
statute in question w as declared  unconstitutional on its  face*
A?
In De Jonge v . O regon, decided Jan, 4 , 1937, the petitioner
w as convicted of violating the "Criminal Syndicalism*1 statute of the
State of Oregon because he was a speaker at and otherw ise actively
participated in  the conduct of a m eeting ca lled  by the Communist
P a rty —the la tter  being charged with advocating doctrines prohibited
by the C rim inal Syndicalism  Act, Crim inal Syndicalism  was defined
as*th ed octrin e which advocates cr im e, physical v io lence, sabotage,
or any unlawful acts or methods as a m eans of accom plishing or
63
effecting industrial or p o litica l change or revolution, 11
The state court held that the m ere fact that the m eeting was 
ca lled  by and held under the ausp ices of the Communist Party was 
sufficient to sustain  conviction irresp ective  of what was done at the 
m eeting itse lf . This holding was rev ersed  as contravening the pro­
v is io n s of the F ir s t  Amendment, and the Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion delivered  by Hughes, a ssim ila ted  the right of a ssem b ly  into that
64of free  speech  and free  p r e ss .
62
299 U .S . 353 (1937).
63 O re. Laws 1933, c459 ##14-3110, cited in 299 U .S . 353. 
”  See Boudin, p. 169.
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In July, 1948, 12 lead ers of the Communist P arty in the 
United States w ere indicted under the consp iracy provisions of the 
Sm ith A ct of 1940. The Smith A ct, form ally  titled  the A lien R eg istra ­
tion  A ct of 1940 (54 Stat, I*. 670), contains, says Chafee, "the m ost
drastic  restr ic tio n  on freedom  of speech ever enacted in the United
65
States during peace, " The defendants were charged with a "con­
sp iracy to advocate revolution and to organise for the advocacy th e re o f." 
(See D . C. N, Y . , 1949, 9 F . R. D, 367 at 374-375, The tr ia l judge 
charged that the governm ent was trying to estab lish  one conspiracy, 
not two, with organisation a m eans to the end of advocacy* See a lso ,
18 U .S . C .,  1940, ##10 fe 1 1 ,).
A fter probably the longest crim inal tr ia l in the nation's
h istory , each of the defendants was convicted and sentenced. Judge
67
le a r n e d  Hand wrote the affirm ing opinion in the Second Circuit,
The two m ost significant questions were: What is  the proper d e lim i­
tation of freedom  of utterance? Who is  to delim it, judge or jury?
65 Chafee, F ree  Speech in the United States, p# 441. B e­
cause of the sign ificance of the Dennis case  today, the concept develop­
ing from  it  w ill be traced  here in som e detail,
66
See P etr ie , 50 Mich. L, R . , Jan. 1952, p. 452; see  New 
York T im es, Oct. 15, 1949, p. 1;8 for verd ict and id. p. 2:1 for  
biographies of defendants. A ll defendants except Thompson w ere  
sentenced to five years im prisonm ent and fined $10,000, See N. Y, 
T im es, Oct. 22, 1949, p, ls8.
67 (2nd Cir. 1950) 183 F(2d) 201.
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Except lor Justice Chase, concurring in the 2nd C ircuit, 
none of the affirm ing opinions rested  w holly on Gitlow v. New York, 
Judge Medina of the tr ia l court appeared influenced by Gitlow, but he 
charged the jury that it m ust find an intent "to achieve this goal of 
the overthrow  . . . as speedily  a s  circu m stances would perm it it to 
be a c h iev e d ," He further instructed that the statute prohibited not 
academ ic d iscu ssion  of Communist philosophy, but rather the teaching 
of such a doctrine as a rule of action and by "language reasonably  
and ordinarily  calculated to incite persons to such a c tio n .11 It 
i s  to be noted that Medina as tr ia l judge reserv ed  the question  
analogous to that of c lear  and present danger. He held, as a matter 
of law , that if  the jury found a violation of the statute as interpreted
by h im , then there "is sufficient danger of a substantive ev il. , . to
70justify  the application of the statute under the F ir s t  Amendment. " 
Whether the ev il w as overthrow or attempted overthrow, there was 
no d irect proof of an im m ediate danger to bring the situation within 
the orthodox c lear  and present danger doctrine. It seem s certain  
that the intent to cause overthrow as speed ily  as possib le does not 
sa tisfy  the alternative suggested  by H olm es: "The United States
68 9 F .R .D . 367 at 391.
69 Id.
^  Ibid. i p. 392; See P d tr ie( p. 455.
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constitutionally  may punish speech that produces or is  intended to
71
produce a c lear  and im m inent danger* "
Judge Hand faced with a grave ev il not proved to be " p resen t,11
reform ulated "clear and present danger* " The new test is  c lear and 
72probable danger, "In each case  they [the courts] must ask  whether
the gravity of the 'ev il* 1 discounted by its  im probability, justifies
such invasion o f free  speech  as is  n ecessa ry  to avoid the danger.
The factor of ixnminency is  explained only as it bears on
probability. Judge Hand appears m ore intolerant of language of incite*
ment than w ere Holme s and Brandeis by indicating it might have been
held as an orig inal question that the F ir s t  Amendment did not protect
persuasion  when it  w as inseparably confused with in stigation --
74particu larly  when applied to the Communist m enace. Judge Hand
a lso  approves the procedure of allowing the tr ia l judge to balance
the rep ress io n  with the ev il when discounted. The judge* therefore,
75defines the p erm issib le  bounds of freedom  of utterance.
The United States Supreme Court upheld by a s ix  to two vote
A£*am s c a se , 250 U .S .616 at 627, cited  and comm ented  
on by P etr ie , 50 Mich. L..R. Jan, 1952, p. 455.
72 P etr ie , 50 Mich. L ..R ., Jan. 1952, p. 456.
73 2d C ir . , 183 F . (2d) 201 at 212.
Id. i see  Hand's ea r lier  view in M asses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 
F ed . 535 (1917) "Words are not only keys of persuasion , but tr iggers of 
action, "
^  Ib id ., p. 207; See P etr ie , p. 456.
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the conviction oI the Communist lead ers. Chief Justice Vinson 
speaking for the m ajority , adopted Judge Hand1 a reform ulation.
The "clear and present danger" te s t  devised  under le s s  seriou s cir*  
cum stances w as not to encase the government in a "sem antic stra it  
ja c k e t ."
The situation with which Justice H olm es and 
Brandeis w ere concerned in Gitlow w as a com para­
tiv e ly  iso la ted  event, bearing little  relation in their  
m inds to any substantial threat to the safety of the 
com m unity, • * » They were not confronted with 
any situation com parable to the instant one - -  the 
developm ent of an apparatus designed and dedicated  
to the overthrow of the Governm ent, in the context 
of world c r is is  after c r is is .
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Burton held that 
the "clear and present danger" doctrine meant in the present context 
only that the danger to be guarded against need be probable, not that 
it  be " p resen t," and that it was a question for the tria l judge not the 
jurty to decide. Justice Vinson saids
Chief Judge L»earned Hand, writing far the m ajority  
b elow , interpreted the phrase as follow s: "In each case  
[the courts] m ust ask  whether the gravity of the " e v il ," 
discounted by its  im probability, justifies such invasion  
of free  speech  as is  n ecessa ry  to avoid the danger, "
18 F . 2d at 212, We adopt this statem ent of the rule.
As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is  as succinct 
and inclusive as any other we might devise at this tim e,
76 Dennie u. U .S . , 341, U .S . 494 (1951).
77 Ib id .. p. 510.
It takes into consideration those factors which we deem  
relevant, and re la tes  their sign ificance. More we cannot 
expect from  w ords.
J u stices  Frankfurter and Jackson, concurring in the m ajority  
opinion, b elieved  that the Schenk te s t  should not be applied at a ll.
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the resu lt of the m ajority  
opinion, and he c r it ic ised  any "absolutist" interpretation of the F ir s t  
Amendment:
. . .  The demands of free  speech in a dem ocratic society  
as w ell as the in terest in national secu rity  are better served  
by candid and inform ed weighing of the competing in terests , 
within the confines of the judicial p r o c ess , than by announcing 
dogm as too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problem s to be 
solved .
F or Justice Frankfurter, the prim ary responsib ility  for
weighing the competing in terests  in the free  speech area m ust belong
to the leg is la tu re . (See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U .S , 77 [1949] at p.
89 tracing evolution of "preferred" position of freedom  of speech).
While resp ect for the leg is la tiv e  judgment is  no longer to be stated in
the term s of Gitlow v. New York, such determ ination is  to be respected
80"unless outside the pale of fair judgm ent.*’ The "clear and present 
danger" te s t is  to be understood in the context in which it developed , 
and is  not to be made a substitute for the weighing of qualitative values.
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Justice  Frankfurter holds that the soc ia l value of the speech ought
to affect the balance and says that ’’advocacy of overthrow ranks 
81low . ” The Court, noting the possib le  danger, ought not to presum e
that the people*s e lected  rep resen tatives unconstitutionally restr icted
\
speech . ''To make valid ity of leg isla tion  depend on judicial reading  
of events s t il l  in the womb of tim e. * . is  to charge the judiciary  
with duties beyond its  equipment. ” Justice Frankfurter empha­
sized , how ever, that constitutionality is  not synonymous with w isdom  
and that he personally considered the statute to be unwise, ^
Justice Jackson a lso  concurred in the decision , but he 
exp ressed  doubt as to the e fficacy  of the statute. ’’Many fa ilu res
by fallen  governm ents a ttest that no government can long prevent
84
revolution by outlawry, " E ssen tia lly  h is position was that the 
"clear and present danger” te s t , developed as a rule of reason  to lim it 
prosecutions for tr iv ia lit ie s  under a statute aim ing at anarch ists, 
ought not to be applied to the Communist stratagem  of revo ­
lutionary techniques by a totalitarian party. The te s t  should 
be restr ic ted  to "hot-headed speech  on a stree t corner, or 
circu lation  of a few incendiary pam phlets, or parading by som e
81
Ib id ., 544-545.
82 £ b ia . . 551.
83 553,
84 Ib id ., 578,
zea lo ts behind a red flag, or refusal of a handful of school children
fie
to salute our flag* " where the e ffects of the utterance could be 
better m easured . Concluding that the Communist type of advocacy is
punishable, Justice Jackson thought h is position m ateria lly  aided by
86the fact that the conviction here was for conspiracy to advocate 
con sp irac ies not being c iv il rights.
Ju stices B lack and Douglas d issen ted , both from  the reform u­
lation of the danger te s t  and the ruling that the judge, not the jury, 
should decide. Justice Black em phasized that the indictment was for 
an agreem ent to publish ideas in the future. For him , conviction  
for consp iracy to advocate w as, no matter how worded, a "virulent"
form  of prior censorship  of speech and p r e ss . T herefore, Section 3
87of the Smith Act was thought unconstitutional on its  face. The "clear 
and present danger" te st should rem ain a minimum guarantee. He 
considered  F rankfurter's subjection of free  speech statutes to a
88"reasonableness test"  little  m ore than an admonition to C ongress.
Justice Douglas objected to outlawing speech on the b a s is ,
89
not of what was sa id , but on the intent with which it was said; and he
deplored elevating m ere speech  into seditious conduct by invoking
consp iracy law s, saying he would require p er il from  speech itse lf  
before perm itting abridgment:
The F ir s t  Amendment provides that ’C ongress shall 
make no law . * . abridging the freedom  of sp e e c h .'
The Constitution provides no exception. This does not 
m ean, how ever, that the Nation need hold its  hand until 
it is  in such weakened condition that there is  no tim e to 
protect itse lf  from  incitem ent to revolution. Seditious 
conduct can always be punished. But the command of the 
F ir s t  Amendment is  so clear that we should not allow  
C ongress to ca ll a halt to free speech , except in the e x ­
trem e case  of p er il from  the speech itse lf . , . • ^0
Ju stices B lack and Douglas w ere unwilling to accept the con­
clusion  of the other ju stices  regarding the power of the Communist 
Party in the United States, Justice Douglas said:
. , . If we are to proceed on the b asis  of judicial notice, 
it is  im possib le for me to say that the Communists in this 
country are so potent or so strateg ica lly  deployed that they 
m ust be suppressed for their speech, I could not so hold 
un less I were w illing to conclude that the activ ities in recent 
years of com m ittees of C ongress, of the Attorney G eneral, 
of labor unions, of state leg is la tu r es» and of Loyalty Boards 
were so futile as to leave the country on the edge of grave  
p er il. To b elieve that petitioners and their following are  
placed in such cr itica l positions as to endanger the Nation is  
to b elieve the incredible. It is  safe to say that the follow ers  
of the creed  of Soviet Communism are known to the F . B. I , ; 
that in case  of war with R u ssia  they w ill be picked up over­
night as w ere all prospective saboteurs at the com m encem ent 
of World War II; that the invisib le arm y of petitioners is  the 
best known, the m ost b eset, and the lea st thriving of any 
fifth column in h istory. Only those held by fear and panic 
could think otherw ise.
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The Dennis c a se  becom es somewhat of a precedent. Con­
sp iracy  to advocate, one step rem oved from  incitem ent, is  punishable. 
A lso , there is  a re-a llocatin g  of the function of the judge and jury.
The co-authors of a recent law review  artic le  say, concerning the
affect of the Dennis ca se  on the Hclear and present danger" doctrine,
92"som ething new has been added or much has been taken away, "
^  H, M, Kittle a on and J, A llen Smith, "Free S p e e c h - 1949- 
19521. " U niversity  of F lorida D .R , , V 5, No. 3, 1952, p. 249.
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B* C ases involving a conflict between the in terest in allowing  
free  exp ression  of ideas in public p laces and the in terest in 
protection of the public peace and the prim ary u ses  of
stree ts  and parks.
(1.)
(a) C ensorship and P erm its
In 1897* in D avis v. M assachusetts, 167 U .S . 43, the
Supreme Court decided that a perm it could be required for a speech
on public ground in Boston because the city , in exercisin g  power
over it s  parks, might en tire ly  prohibit the use of public property
for sp eech  making. The Boston ordinance required a perm it from
the mayor for any person  to "make any public address, discharge
any cannon or firearm , expose for sa le  any goods, * * * on public 
93grounds. " The Court agreed that the ordinance was not directed  
against free  speech  but was intended as "a proper regulation of the 
use of public grounds. In 1939, in Hague v, C. X. Q>, 307 U. S.
496 (1939), the Court reached a different conclusion and held that 
the use  of public grounds for purposes of assem b ly  was an appropriate 
one and could not be forbidden altogether. The ordinance in the Hague 
case  required a perm it for m eeting on public grounds, the perm it to 
be refused  only "for the purpose of preventing r io ts , disturbance or
93 167 U .S . 44 (1897). 
Ibid. at p. 49.
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disord erly  a s s e m b l a g e , T h e  facts of the case  indicated that the 
licen sin g  power had been ex erc ised  arb itrarily  to suppress view s  
on national a ffa irs . While the Hague case  did not hold that a c ity  may 
not subject the use of its  s tree ts  and parks to reasonable regulations,
it did hold that licen sing o ffic ia ls  cannot be given arbitrary power to
x • 96suppress free  exp ression .
There are indications in other ca ses  that it may be proper
for a m unicipality to require a perm it for the holding of a m eeting in
a public p lace if  the conditions under which such perm its could be
granted or refused  related  to the public's in terest in the use of the
97particular location and w ere set forth with sufficient defin iteness.
In the L ovell ca se  the constitutionality of an ordinance of
G riffin, G eorgia, prohibiting the distribution of advertising, and so -
called  literature of any kind, free  or sold , without prior written
98p erm ission  from  the City Manager was involved. The Supreme
Court in  a unanimous decision  held the ordinance invalid, the Chief
Justice spying:
It covers every  sort of circu lation 'either by hand 
or otherw ise , 1 There is  thus no restr iction  in its
95 307 U .S . 496 at p. 502.
96 Ib id .. p. 516.
99 Cox v . State of New H am pshire. 312 U .S . 569 (1941)! 
L o v e ll  v . City of G riffin .~303 U .S . 444 (1938).
97 See 55 Ga. App. 609 (1937).
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application with resp ect to tim e or p lace. It is  not 
lim ited  to ways which might be regarded as incon­
sisten t with the maintenance of public order or as 
involving d isord erly  conduct* the m olestation of the 
inhabitants* or the m isuse  or littering of the s tr ee ts .
The ordinance prohibits the distribution of literature  
of any kind at any time* at any place* and in any m an­
ner without a perm it from  the City M anager. 99
The Court has continued to strike down various perm it
ordinances which contain no definite standards on the ground that
100they perm it the licen sin g  authority to e x erc ise  arbitrary authority.
In Cox v . State of New Hampshire* 312 U .S . 569 (1941), 
supra, the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute requiring  
a perm it and a lic en se  fee for stree t parades. The Court upheld the 
conviction of sev era l m em bers of Jehovah's W itnesses who had not 
obtained a perm it as required, for walking c lo se  together through the 
b u sin ess d istr ic t of M anchester carrying a sign reading "Religion is  
a Snare and a Racket. " The statute had been narrowly construed by 
the state courts* and the licen se  could be refused only for "considera­
tion of tim e, place and manner so  as to conserve the public con­
ven ien ce ." *0  ̂ The statute was upheld since it was related  to public
99 303 U .S . 444 at p. 453.
tOO Schneider v . Town of Irvington, 308 U .S . 147 (1939)j 
Jam ison v. State of T exas, 318 U .S . 413 (1943), where the Court 
declared  invalid a m unicipal ordinance prohibiting the distribution  
of a ll handbills; Saia v. People of the State of New York, 334 U .S . 
558 (1948); Kunz v. New York* 340 U. S. 290 (1951); JLargent v. 
State of T exas, 3 l8  U .S . 418 (1943). “
101 312 U .S . 569 at pp. 575-576,
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in terest in the use of locations and was lim ited  with defin iteness to 
that end.
Where regulation of so licitation  has been the issu e , the 
in terest in  protecting the public from  fraud rep resen ts a substantial 
in terest opposing free  speech* In Schneider v» State of New J ersey , 
supra, the fourth ordinance considered by the Court allowed the chief
of police to refuse a perm it if  he found that the canvasser was not of
102good character or w as not working for a project free  from  fraud.
The ordinance was held invalid because under it the police chief could
make h is own d iscretion  the standard for determ ining who was of
103
"good c h a r a c ter ,11 and what projects were "free from  fraud, ** The
case  of Cantwell v, Connecticut, 310 U, S. 296, (1940), com bines
elem en ts of both freedom  of speech  and freedom  of relig ion  since it
concerns the valid ity  of a state statute requiring a perm it for relig ious
so licitation . The statute involved was invalidated because the licensing
offic ia l could determ ine what cau ses w ere " r e lig io u s ," thereby allowing
104
censorsh ip  of relig ion . F in ally , in M arsh v. State of Alabama,
326 U ,S , 501 (1946), the Court denied the right of those in charge of a 
company owned town to prohibit so licitation  on a sidewalk by Jehovah* s 
W itnesses.
102
308 U .S . 147 (1939) at p. 158.
103 n > id « » a t  p* i fe4>
104 3 i0 u>s> 296 at p> 305i
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In related  c a se s , the Supreme Court has overturned con­
v iction s under statutes requiring a perm it to speak when the refusal
to grant such perm it w as apparently because of h ostility  to the group
105seeking to hold a m eeting, and where the refusal was due to the 
fact that on previous occasion s the speaker had used language which 
m ight have been punishable as lik ely  to cause a breach of the peace*
It is  not altogether c lear  under the Kuna ca se  whether the Court would 
uphold an ordinance which e x p ress ly  perm itted refusal of a perm it 
to one who had used such objectionable language in the past*
T axes, P rivacy  and Child W elfare.
The question whether the sa le  of relig iou s literature by
Jehovah's W itnesses can be subjected to nondiacrim inatory taxes on
so lic ita tion  f ir s t  arose In Jones v* Opelika, 316 U .S . 584 (1942).
The d ec is ion  there was se t  aside in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U .S . 105 (1943), where the Court held that im position of a tax on
itinerants was im proper. L ater, a flat tax on book agents was held
to be im proper when applied to a resident who made his living selling  
107
relig iou s books. The ground for the decision  was that such
Niemotko v. State of Maryland, 340 U .S . 268 (1951).
106 Kuna v. New York. 340 U .S . 315 (1951).
107 F o ll . i t  v . Town of M cCormick. 321 U .S . 573 (1944).
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resid en t w as a purveyor of id eas, and not a m ere book seller*
Martin y . City of Struthers, 319 U* S. 141 (1943), presents  
another situation* An ordinance of the c ity  of Struthers, Ohio, pro­
hibited knocking on the door or ringing the doorbell of a resid en ce in  
order to d eliver a handbill* Prevention of crim e and assuring privacy  
w ere held insufficient to justify  the ordinance in the ca se  of handbills 
distributed on behalf of Jehovah's W itnesses*
In 1944, how ever, the Court held that the application to 
Jehovah's W itnesses of a state statute providing that no boy under
tw elve or g ir l under eighteen should se ll period icals on the stree t
109was constitutional* ?
Sanctions after the Event (Punishment for breach of the peace).
In the Cantwell c a se , previously  cited, one of the convictions 
w as for com m on-law  breach of the peace. The Court reversed  a 
Connecticut conviction for d isord erly  conduct based on the playing in 
public of a phonograph record  which attacked the Catholic Church.
The c a se  was reso lved  in favor of the defendant by inquiring whether
S ee , how ever, Breard v. City of A lexandria, 341 U .S . 
143 (1951), in which the Court upheld an ordinance of A lexandria, 
Louisiana, prohibiting door-to-door so licitation  for subscriptions to 
nationally known m agazines without the previous consent of owners 
of the residences*
Prto£e v. M assachusetts, 321 U .S . 158 (1944).
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on the facts of the c a se , there was "such c lear and present m enace
to public peace and order as to render him  liab le to conviction of the
com m on law offense in question. In Chaplinsky v, New H am pshire,
315 U .S . 568 (1942), the Court affirm ed a New Hampshire conviction
for the sam e offense based on the charge that a street speaker had
111ca lled  a policem an a "damned fasc ist"  and,a "damned racketeer. M 
The state statute had enacted the common - law doctrine of "fighting 
words" in the follow ing language: "No person shall address any 
offen sive, d er is iv e  or annoying word to any other person who is  law ­
fully  in any s tr ee t or other public p lace, nor ca ll him  by any offensive
112or d er is iv e  name . . , . " In the Chaplinsky case  the Court con­
sid ered  that the statem ent made was lik ely  to cause disorder through 
rep r isa ls  resu lting  from  it; in  the Cantwell case  the Court fe lt that 
the c ircu m stances did not justify  an inference that a breach of peace  
might resu lt.
L ater, how ever, in  F einer v. New York, 340 U .S . 315 
(1951), the Court sustained a conviction for d isorderly  conduct because  
a stree t speaker continued to address a group, which he was urging 
to attend a speech to be given by O. John Rogge of the P rogressive
110 310 U .S . 296 (1940) at p. 311.
111 315 U .S . 568 at p. 569.
112 Ib id ., at p. 569.
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P arty , after he was told by a policem an to stop. The policem an
subsequently arrested  Feiner and sought to justify  h is action on the
ground that F ein er  was in c it in g  to d isorder and that there was unrest
at the m eeting. The m ajority of the Court held that the police officer
acted only to prevent a threatened breach of the peace, and cited  the
testim ony which indicated that the speaker had urged N egroes to
113
•'rise up in arm s and fight for their r ig h ts ,11 and that at lea st one 
m em ber of the audience had made strong p rotests. Justices  
Douglas and Minton d issen ted  from  the m ajority opinion on the ground 
that the record  showed no incitem ent to d isorder and averred that the 
police should have protected the speaker from  harm  from  m em bers of 
the audience. Justice Douglas wrote as follow s s
A speaker m ay not of cou rse, incite a riot any more 
than he may invite a breach of the peace by the use of 
“fighting w ords, “ See Chaplinsky v. New H am pshire, 315 
U .S , 568, But this record  shows no such extrem e. It 
shows an unsym pathetic audience and the threat of one 
man to haul the speaker from  the stage. It is  against that 
kind of threat that speakers need police protection. If 
they do not rece iv e  it  and instead the police throw their  
weight on the side of those who would break up the m eetings, 
the police becom e the new cen sors of speech. P o lice  cen ­
sorsh ip  has all the v ices of the censorship  for c ity  halls  
which we have repeatedly struck down* . • , H d
Justice Black, who a lso  d issented from  the m ajority's
113 340 U .S . 315 at ? . 317.
114 Ib id ., at p. 331.
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conclusion , rejected  the view  that the Supreme Court w as bound by
the interpretation  of the testim ony presented by the police o ffic ia ls
and in s is ted  that the Court had a duty in breach of peace c a ses  to
115exam ine the evidence for itself*
The right to use sound trucks to effectuate speech has been  
involved in two recent cases* In Saia v* People of State of New York, 
334 U. S* 558 {1948), supra, an ordinance of L.ockport, New York, 
required a lic en se  from  the ch ief of police for use of sound am plifi­
cation d ev ices in public places* In the present c a se , a licen se  to use  
a sound truck in a park w as denied because of com plaints about the 
noise  which had resu lted  when sound am plifiers had been used  
previou sly  in  the park* Although no evidence was shown that the 
lic en se  was refused  because of the content of the sp eech es, the Court 
held the ordinance unconstitutional* It did so because the ordinance 
was construed as not to prescrib e  definite standards for the police  
ch ief to apply in passing on licen se  applications* H owever, in  
K ovacs v. Cooper, a Trenton, New Jersey , ordinance was upheld 
which allowed conviction for operation of any sound truck em itting  
"loud and raucous" noises* Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Burton 
and R eed,sustaining conviction under the ordinance,interpreted it as
115 Ib id ., at p. 322.
116 336 U .S . 77 (1949).
prohibiting only noise which was too loud# Justice# Frankfurter
and Jackson understood the ordinance to ban a ll sound trucks* and
they upheld it sin ce they w ere of the opinion that a c ity  could properly
118ban a ll sound trucks,
(d) P rivate  v s . Public P la ces
In c a se s  dealing with speech in public halls* the Supreme
Court has pointed out that no prior reg istration  of speakers may be 
119required. Where a c a se  has arisen  involving a speaker's con­
viction for inciting to riot in which the speech was given in a private
building rather than in  a public place* the Court's holding has related
120to an abstract proposition of law unrelated to the facts in the case .
In the T erm in iello  ca se  of 1949* the defendant had been convicted for 
inciting to r iot because* as a resu lt of an inflam m atory speech given  
at an indoor m eeting in Chicago* persons outside the hall had tried  
by v io len ce  to break it up. The m ajority of the Court did not decide if  
the w ords used  w ere properly punishable or whether a speaker could 
be prosecuted because of violence indulged in by h is opponents. Instead* 
the conviction was rev ersed  because the judge had instructed the jury 
that breach of the peace included speech which "stirs the public to
Ibid. , at p# 85.
118 Ib id ., at p. 97.
119 Thomas v . C ollin s. 323 U .S . 516 (1945).
T erm iniello  v. Chicago. 337 U .S . 1 (1949).
anger, inv ites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or crea tes
121a disturbance* . , * ” Justice Douglas pointed out that it w as a
proper function of free  speech  to invite dispute and that it should not
be punished 1'unless shown lik ely  to produce a clear and present danger
of a seriou s substantive ev il that r is e s  far above public inconvenience,
122annoyance or unrest* "
(2)
In looking at the resu lts  in the various ca ses  dealing with free  
speech in public places* one m ust be aware of what important in terests  
have been balanced against others in their consideration. Justice  
Frankfurter l is t s  four questions on which past decision s appear to 
have turned. They are:
(1) What is  the in terest deemed to require the regu la ­
tion of speech? The State cannot of course forbid public 
proselyting or relig iou s argument m erely  because public 
o ffic ia ls  disapprove the speaker*s views* It m ust act in  
patent good faith to maintain the public peace, to assure
the availab ility  of the str ee ts  for their prim ary purposes 
of passenger and vehicular traffic, or for equally 
indispensable ends of modern community life ,
(2) What is  the method used to achieve such ends as 
a consequence of which public speech is  constrained or 
barred? A licen sing  standard which gives an officia l 
authority to censor the content of a speech differs toto
coelo  from  one lim ited  by its  term s, or by nondiscrim inatory  
p ractice , to considerations of jub lic safety and the like.
Again, a sanction applied after the event a ssu res con sid era­
tion of the particular c ircum stances of a situation. The
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net of control m ust not be cast too broadly,
(3) What mode of speech is  regulated? A sound 
truck may be found to affect the public peace as normal 
speech  does not, A man who is  calling nam es or using  
the kind of language which would reasonably stir  another 
to v io lence does not have the sam e c la im  to protection  
as one whose speech  is  an appeal to reason.
(4) Where does the speaking which is  regulated  
take place?  Not only the general c la ss if ica tio n s- -  
s tr e e ts , parks, private build ings*-are relevant. The 
location  and size  of a park; its  custom ary use for the 
recreation a l, esth etic  and contem plative needs of a 
community; the fa c ilit ie s , other than a park or street  
corn er, read ily  available in a community for airing  
v iew s, are a ll pertinent considerations in a sse ss in g  the 
lim itations the Fourteenth Amendment puts on State 
power in a particular situation,
A recen t c a se , Pouloa v. State of New H am pshire, 97 
L  ed (advance p. 702), May 11, 1953, would seem  to require m odification  
of certa in  of the view s exp ressed  by Justice Frankfurter in (2) above 
concerning the licen sing  of sp eech es. The Poulos case  held that 
although a c ity  wrongfully refused  an application of a m em ber of 
Jehovah's W itnesses for a licen se  to conduct relig iou s se rv ic e s  in a 
public park, h is conviction for conducting the se rv ic e s  without the 
lic en se  does not violate the constitutional guaranties of freedom  of 
speech and relig ion , where the licen se  is  required by a valid enactment 
and red ress  by state judicial procedures is  available against the city  
council's wrongful refusa l of the licen se .
Niemotko v. M aryland. 340 U .S . 268 at p, 282.
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C. C ases involving * 'non-protected* * sp eech .
The Court has pointed out on sev era l occasion s that there is  
no substantial public in terest in perm itting certain  kinds of utterances, 
nam ely , "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the lib elou s, and the
insulting or 'fighting* w ord s--th ose  which by their very utterance
. . . 124in flict injury or tend to incite an im m ediate breach of the peace. "
It is  generally  supposed that prosecutions for obscenity or
lib el are outside the protection afforded by the F ir s t  Amendment and
the due p ro cess clau se of the Fourteenth. H owever, it is  the
general ru le that neither speech  nor writing can be censored in 
126advance. Publication of certa in  inform ation such as troop m ove­
m ents, m ilitary  se c r e ts  such as atom ic energy, m ay, of course, be 
127suppressed . A lso , the Court has applied to freedom  of speech
c a se s  the general princip le that no statute can be upheld which is  too
128vague in i t s  prohibitions. In W inters v. New York, 333 U .S . 507
(1948), the Court overturned a conviction of those charged with 
distribution of a m agazine under a statute which prohibited publishing 
m atter which contained "m assed accounts of bloodshed and c r im e ."
Chaplinsky v. New H am pshire, 315 U .S . 568 at p. 572.
Kittle son and Smith, p. 234.
126 $fear v> M innesota, 283 U .S . 697 (1931).
Chafee, p. 315.
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U .S . 242 (1937).
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In the M iracle cage, the Court disapproved the denial of a licen se  
on the ground that it was “sacr ileg iou s. " Then in Gelling v. T exas, 
334 U .S . 960 (1952), the Court reversed  a conviction for showing a 
picture entitled , "Pinky;" in defiance of an ordinance which perm itted  
a licen sin g  authority to ban pictures which might be "prejudicial to 
the in terests  of the comm unity. The la st three c a ses  considered
are instance in which the Court has upset convictions under "vague" 
statutes.
The question arisin g  in Beauharnais v. Illin o is, 343 U .S .
250 (1952), concerned the valid ity of a group libel law. The 
m ajority of the Court upheld a conviction under the statute, while four 
J u stices , Jackson, B lack, Douglas and Reed dissented . Justice Reed  
considered  that the law was too vague, and Justices Black and Douglas 
condemned the law as "state c en so rsh ip ." Justice Jackson condemned
Burstyn v. W ilson, 343 U .S . 495 (1952).
In 1915, the Court upheld state laws requiring the licensing  
of m otion p ictures holding that the showing of m ovies did not constitute  
speech in the true sen se . See Mutual F ilm  Corporation v. Industrial 
C om m ., 236 U .S . 230 (1915). In 1948, doubt was cast on the validity of 
that d ecision  in U .S . v. Paramount P ic tu res , In c ., 3 34 U .S . 495 (1952); 
and in 1952, the Supreme Court in the Burstyn c a se , supra, ex p ressly  
rejected  it.
*^*111. Stat. Ann. c . 38, #471 (Smith-Hurd Sup p. 1951) provides; 
"It shall be unlawful for any person . . .  to m anufacture, s e l l ,  or offer 
for sa le , advertise  or publish, present or exhibit in any public p lace. . , 
any lithograph, moving picture, play, dram a, or sketch, which . , . 
portrays depravity, crim inality , unchastity or lack of virtue of a c la ss  
of c it ize n s , of any race , co lor , creed  or relig ion  [and] which . . . 
exp oses the c itizen s . . .  to contem pt, derision , or obloquy or which 
is  productive of breach of the peace or r io t s ."
the statute only in its  application because the tr ia l court had refused  
to charge the jury that conviction depended on the ex isten ce of a clear  
and present danger from  the published m aterial involved. The ruling 
in the Beauharnais c a se  establishes* therefore* a new principle in 
lim iting  the area  of protected speech* namely* a c la s s  of non­
protected speech  consisting  of lib els  against groups.
D. C ases testing restr iction s on Picketing.
Several years ago, the Court held that peaceful picketing was
a form  of speech  protected by the constitution from  punishment by the 
132
sta tes . In the Thornhill ca se  it was sp ec ifica lly  held that a state  
could not constitutionally punish peaceful picketing when neither the 
picketing nor the manner in which it was carried  out conflicted with a 
substantial in terest. Subsequent cases* however* have sustained  
restr ic tio n s on picketing to prevent recurrence of violence; *33 to
lim it the area of picketing to the confines of the arena of industrial
disagreem ent; to prevent violations of a state's policy  against
133 136restra in ts of trade; and to prevent racia l discrim ination.
132 Thornhill v . Alabam a, 310 U .S . 88(1940).
133 Milk Wagon D rivers Union v. Meadow mo or D a ir ie s ,
I n c ., 312 U .S . 287 (1941). ~
*3^ Carpenters Joiners Union v. R itter's C afe, 315 U .S . 
722 (1942). “  ~
*35 Giboney v. Em pire Storage fc Ice C o ., 336 U .S . 490
(1949).
*36 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U .S . 460 (1950),
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In a recent V irginia c a se , the Supreme Court ruled that
a state could prohibit peaceful picketing when the purpose of the
picketing conflicted  with the sta te 's  law banning a ll form s of the
c lo sed  shop* The case  involved V irgin ia's "Right to Work Law, "
which d ec lares that a denial of work on account of m em bership or
133non-m em ber ship in a union is  contrary to public policy* The 
V irginia d ecision  continues a trend in picketing c a se s  in recent years, 
and th is trend is  com m ented on by two authors of a law review  article  
as follow s:
These observations illu strate  a trend; the Court in 
judging peaceful picketing ca ses  is  rejecting free speech  
standards* When picketing is  involved there is  no talk of 
c lear  and present danger, the hallm ark of orthodox speech  
cases* Unfortunately, too much still  rem ains of Thornhill, 
too little  c larification  of Giboney, and perhaps too little  
im plem entation of R itter 's Cafe; but, since m ost picketing 
involves a conflict between management and labor for 
econom ic benefits, Frankfurter may w ell succeed in h is  
efforts to sever this problem  from  those conflicts that are 
e ssen tia lly  concerned with the commimication of ideas for 
the benefit of public enlightenm ent.
E* C ases involving restr iction s against the P r e ss .
In 1936, the Court unanimously held void a Louisiana tax on 
advertising as being d iscrim inatory against the p ress , P rior
137 L ocal Union No. 10 United As so* of J, P . Jk S_, v, Graham, 
97 L ed (advance p, 542), March 30, 1953.
138 a .
139 K ittleson and Smith, p. 233,
140 Q rosjean v* A m erican P re ss  C o ., 297 U. S, 233 (1936),
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restra in ts  had been previously  invalidated in Near v» M innesota, supra, 
283 U .S . 69? (1931).
C ases have ar isen  in which the dissem ination  of ideas in the 
p re ss  has a lleged ly  conflicted with the protection of the integrity of 
the courts* In Pennekamp v. State of F lorida 328 U. S, 331 (1946), the 
Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a state from  
adjudging in contem pt of court the publisher of highly cr itica l comm ents 
about portions of a law suit that w ere , in effect, no longer pending*
Then in B ridges v„ C alifornia, 314 U .S . 252 (1941), the Court refused  
to susta in  convictions for publication of cr itica l statem ents in the p ress  
relating to m atters s t ill pending before a court. The Court reached  
this resu lt on the ground that the utterances did not evince a clear and 
present danger to the im partial adm inistration of ju stice . S im ilarly  
in Craig v» H arney, 331 U .S . 367 (1947), the m ajority ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected even "strong, " "intem perate, "
"unfair,# c r it ic ism  of the manner in which a lay judge was conducting 
a pending c a se . H ere again the Court saw no "clear and present 
danger" to im partial adjudication.
F . Indirect r e str ic tio n s .
(1) Government Em ployees
Under the Hatch Act of 1939, a ll persons in the executive
141 331 U .S . 367 at p. 376.
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branch of the Government* or any department or agency thereof,
except the P resident and V ice-P resid en t and certa in  " p o licy  determining"
o ffic e r s , are forbidden to "take an active part in political management
142or p o litica l cam paigns. " They are s t ill  perm itted , how ever, to
e x p ress  their opinions on a il politica l subjects and candidates. Under
the Hatch A ct of July 19, 1940, 54 S ta t ., 767-772, the above regulations
are extended to em ployees of state and loca l governm ents who are
engaged in a c tiv itie s  financed in whole or part by national funds. Both
A cts w ere upheld by the Supreme Court in 1947, the form er on the
ground that it dealt only with partisan politica l a c tiv ities , and not
with exp ression s of opinion, and on the ground that the conduct banned
by it  was "reasonably deem ed by Congress to in terfere with the
143effic ien cy  of the public service* "
Two c a se s  have involved restr iction s resulting from  form er  
P resident Truman’s loyalty  program , but were decided on the b asis  
of the due p ro cess  c lause rather than the F ir st  Amendment. In 
B ailey  v* R ichardson, 341 U.S* 918 (1951), an em ployee claim ed she 
had been denied due p rocess in being d ism issed  from  her government
142 Act of Aug. 2 , 1939, U .S . Cod®, Xit. 18, # 6 l-6 lk .
143 United Public W orker, v. M itchell. 330 U .S . 75 (1947).
344 See P resident Trum an's "Loyalty O rder"--E xecutive  
Order 9 8 3 5 --o f M arch 22, 1947.
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position  on the b asis of unsworn statem ents from  anonymous 
inform ants whom she had not been able to m eet, The Supreme 
Court w as unable to agree on a decision  and sp lit its  vote 4 to 4.
I J w
la  the second c a se , the m ajority held that due p ro cess  required  
the Attorney G eneral to give hearings to organisations listed  by him  
as su b versive .
The Court has considered a number of state and municipal
law s dealing with "subversive" em ployees* It upheld a Maryland
oath required of candidates for public office on the assurance by
M aryland's A ttorney G eneral that the law required only a statem ent
that the candidate was not engaged in an attempt to overthrow the
governm ent by force or was not knowingly a m em ber of an organisation  
146so engaged. In Adler v* Board of Education of the City of New
York, 342 U .S . 485 (1952), the Court upheld #12«a of the New York
C ivil Serv ice  Law, as im plem ented by the so -ca lled  Feinberg Law,
which disqualified from  school employm ent any person who advocates




Joint A n ti-F asc ist Comm, v, McGrath, 341 U .S . 123
(1951).
146 Gerende v. Board of Su pervisors, 341 U .S . 56 (1951),
*47 See a lso  Garner jjr, Los A ngeles, 341 U .S . 716(1951) 
for another case  concerning restra in ts on government em ployees.
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(2) Unions and E m ployers,
In 1948, the Court considered the restr ic tion  im posed by 
the T aft-H artley  law on expenditures by unions for politica l purpose®.
It held only that the law w as not intended to prevent unions from  d iscu ssion  
of p o litica l is su e s  in  their  regular publications.
149The non-Com m unist oath required by the T aft-H artley Act
w as upheld in two c a se s  on the ground that its im pact on freedom  was
slight and the danger of po litica l str ik es by Com m unist-led Unions 
150great. Ju stice  Jackson concurred and d issented each in part.
148
U .S . V. J C .L O ., 335 U .S . 106 <1948)} see  Public Law 141 
(T aft-H artley  A ct), 80th C ongress, 1st S e e s .,  1947.
#9(h) of the Labor Management R elations A ct of 1947 reads 
as follow s; "No investigation  sh all be made by the Board of any question  
affecting com m erce concerning the representation of em ployees, ra ised  
by a labor organization under subsection  (c) of th is section , no petition  
under section  9(e) (1) shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be 
issu ed  pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under su b sec­
tion (b) of section  10, un less there is  on f ile  with the Board an affidavit 
executed contem poraneously or within the preceding tw elve-m onth period  
by each officer of such labor organization and the o fficers of any national 
or international labor organization of which it is  an affiliate or constituent 
unit that he is  not a m em ber of the Communist P arty or affiliated with such 
party, and that he does not believe  in, and is  not a m em ber of or supports 
any organization that b e liev es in or teach es, the overthrow of the United 
States Government by force  or by any illeg a l or unconstitutional m ethods. 
The provisions of section  35A of the Crim inal Code shall be applicable  
in  resp ect to such affidavits. "
A m erican Communications A s s o c . , C. I. O. v, Douds, 339 
U .S . 382 (1950); Osman v. Douds, 339 U .S . 846 (1950).
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H is d issen t related  to that provision  of section  9(h) dealing with 
" b e lie f11 se t  out above. He e x p resses  h is objection to th is provision  
a s  follow s:
C ongress has, how ever, required an additional 
d isc la im er , which in m y view  does encounter serious  
constitutional objections, A  union officer m ust a lso  
sw ear that "he does not believe in . . , the overthrow  
of the United States Government by force  or by any illega l 
or unconstitutional m ethods.*'
C laim s have a lso  been made by em ployees that their freedom
of exp ression  has been restr ic ted  by action of the National Labor
152R elations Board. In two ca ses  the Court has made it c lear that 
em ployers have the right to state their position, but with other 
circu m stan ces, speech may amount to coercion of the em ployees and 
can, th erefore, be taken into consideration by the Board in determining 
whether or not an em ployer has been guilty of an unfair labor practice.
On the b a s is  of the c a ses  considered here, a few  general 
conclusions may be made concerning apparent trends in free  speech  
d ecision s during recent years. In the f ir s t  place, the variety  of 
m ajority and m inority opinions appearing in freedom  of speech ca ses
I5 i 339 U .S . 382 at p. 435.
1S 2 N .L .R ,B . v. V irginia E lec tr ic  Power C o ., 314 U .S .
469 (1941); May Stores v, N ._L. R. B . , 326 U .S . 376 (1945),
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decided sin ce 1949 shows significant d isagreem ent among the judges
a s  to what constitutes the proper rationale where liberty  of expression
is  the is su e . Indeed, during the years 1949-1952* when the Court
decided seventeen  c a se s  involving the question of free  speech* the
ju s t ic e s  w rote m ore than fifty  opinions*
H owever, desp ite the confusion to be noted in recent cases*
certain  observations can be made concerning them* One of these is
that the Court is  tending to whittle down the preferred  position which
freedom  of utterance m ay have occupied over other lib erties  prior to 
154
1947, and is  showing its  reluctance to invalidate "reasonable11
fed era l and state leg isla tion . At the sam e time* the m ajority of the
p resent court seem s to be testing  federal and state restr iction s with
155
essen tia lly  the sam e standards.
Specific observations a s to what legal princip les are to be
applied within those c la ssifica tion s of free  speech ca ses  previously set
out are  as follow s:
(1) C ases involving statutes prohibiting speech because of 
its  tendency to lead to crim e.
F or a d iscu ssion  of th is situation, see  K ittleson and 
Smith* pp. 227-228.
154 See J. Douglas* ffcst V irginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette* 319 U .S . 624* 643-644 (1943); com pare with F ein er  v. New 
York, 340 U. S. 315(1951), noting esp . J . Black dissent* p. 321.
t c c
See K ittleson and Smith* pp. 256-260 for a d iscu ssion  of
th ese  points.
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The c lear and present danger doctrine w ill be invoked in 
c a ses  w here the possib le  effect of the utterance would not substantially  
endanger the secu rity  or nation. Where there is  apprehension of 
ser iou s danger to the governm ent as a resu lt of freedom  of expression , 
such freedom  w ill be tested  by the " c lear  and probable" danger 
doctrine enunciated in the Dennis ca se .
(2) C ases involving a conflict between the Interest in
allowing free  exp ression  of ideas in public p laces and 
the in terest in  protection of the public peace and the 
prim ary use of stree ts  and parks.
(a) Statutes requiring public-convenience perm its for speeches 
in public p laces w ill be struck down if they are vaguely drawn, consti­
tute censorsh ip  or allow  the issu ing authorities arbitrary action. On 
the other hand, under the ru le of the Pouloe case , perm its to speak  
in public p laces m ay be required where none of the above objections 
are  involved; and a speaker who is  refused a perm it may be punished 
if  he speaks without one since h is rem edy for refusa l l ie s  in proper 
leg a l proceedings.
<b) In ca ses  where the freedom  to d issem inate ideas is  in  
conflict with statutes p assed  in the in terest of general privacy and the 
protection of the public against fraud, the statutes w ill be invalidated, 
particu larly  where relig iou s ideas are involved. At the same tim e, 
statutes relating to public health, as in the P rince case , w ill be 
upheld.
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(c) A s to sanctions after the event, where there is  a 
reasonable apprehension of a breach of the peace as a resu lt of a 
speech , under the rule of the F einer case , the speaker may be required  
to  cea se  h is rem arks or face  a rrest for his refusa l to do so.
In regard  to the use of sound am plifiers, if is  not yet clear  
under the Kovacs case  whether their use may he banned altogether, 
although it  m ay certa in ly  be subjected to regulation by a statute pro­
viding proper standards of control.
(d) The Court, thus far, has not considered a sufficient 
number of c a se s  involving breach of the peace convictions in private - 
hall speaking situations to provide a proper b asis for distinctions  
between them  and those dealing with convictions in public halls and 
public p la ces ,
(3) C ases involving non-protected speech,
The m ost significant developm ent in the area of non-protected  
speech  in recen t years is  the d ecision  in the Beauharnais case upholding 
a sta te 's  group lib e l statute, Thus, to that c la ss  of non-protected  
speech  which includes fighting w ords, the lewd, the profane and that 
which is  privately  libelous m ust be added group libel.
The following table, adapted from  one appearing at page 242 
in  an a r tic le , " F ree  Speech (1949-1952): Slogans v. State's R ights, M 
in  the F a ll 1952, issu e  of the U niversity of F lorida Law Review  and 




A - Nonprotected Speech
Type D efense Type
L ibel (group and Poorly-draw n A ll speech not No clear and
private), obscen* statute, prior in A , except present danger,
it ie s , fighting restra in t, arb i- picketing and (Since Dennis
w ords, trary  action. those ca ses  case perhaps
concerned p r i- no clear and
m arily  with form  "probable11
(tim e, manner, d an ger,)
place) of utter* 
ance.
(4) C ases involving peaceful picketing.
The trend of the Court in peaceful picketing ca ses  is  to reject  
fre e -sp e ec h  standards. In such c a se s , the te s t  of clear and present 
danger i s  not used, and peaceful picketing which is  thought to be contrary 
to the public policy  of a state is  prohibited. What the lim its of in ter­
feren ce  with regard to  peaceful picketing may be is  not altogether c lear.
(5) C ases involving p r e ss  restr ic tion s .
The right to publish cr itica l statem ents in the p ress  relating  
to m atters before a court w ill be protected under the rule of Craig v, 
Harney un less such publication constitutes a clear and present danger 
to the im partial adm inistration of ju stice .
(6) C ases involving indirect restr ic tion s .
There is  a growing tendency to lim it speech by indirect 
restr ic tio n s . Some of these restr iction s, such as those contained in
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the provisions of the Hatch A ct prohibiting em ployees from  engaging 
in partisan p o litics, are upheld on the ground that they promote 
effic ien cy  in the governm ent se rv ice . Other restr ic tio n s, such a® 
th ose  in the T aft-H artley A ct requiring a non-Com m unist oath, are 
upheld on the ground that they prevent great danger to the state. It 
is  noteworthy in the Douds case  that the non-Com m unist oath provisions 
of the T aft-H artley A ct w ere upheld desp ite the fact that they contained 
the requirem ent that a union officer sw ear that he does not believe
/
in  over-throw  of the government by force  or illeg a l m eans.
* * * * *
Certain sp ecific  asp ects of the opinions in free-sp eech  cases  
w ill be treated  in greater detail in  Chapters HI and XV.
CHAPTER HI 
RESTRICTIONS ON THE FORM OF EXPRESSION
On the b asis of the m aterial set forth in Chapter II, this 
chapter w ill be concerned with making certain  observations 
concerning the extent to which freedom  of expression  has been  
lim ited  with resp ect to the form  of its  e x e r c ise . In other w ords, 
the d iscu ssion  here w ill be a consideration of those restr iction s  
which have been im posed upon the speaker regarding h is choice of 
tim e , p lace, and manner or mode of utterance. Since the form  
which speech  may take is  inseparable from  the total rhetorical 
p ro cess  from  which it d er iv es, an understanding of restr ic tion s as 
to form  w ill include a determ ination of the effect of these restr ic tio n s  
on rhetorical theory. The subject-m atter in this chapter in vo lves, 
therefore , a treatm ent of certa in  of the lim itations on speech set  
out in the c a se s  included in Chapter H as they relate to sp ecific  
rhetorical p rincip les.
At the outset, it should be noted that the substance or content 
of exp ression  is  both dependent upon and at the sam e tim e may be 
somewhat determ ined by, the form  which it takes. Any d iscu ssion  
treating of lim itations on form , therefore, w ill n ecessa r ily  include
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m ateria l which is  relevant, a lso , to a d iscu ssion  of restr ic tion s as 
to substance of exp ression . In addition, lim itations on the speaker 
as to the tim e, p lace, manner or mode of h is  speech m ust he approached 
on the b a s is  of sev era l in terrelated  factors. F or exam ple, the tim e 
at which a speech  may be given may depend upon the place it is  to be 
given and the manner or mode of its  utterance. Therefore, a d iscu s­
sion  separately  of each c la s s  of restr iction  included under form  
m ust include considerations involving a ll the other c la s s e s .
Freedom  of exp ression  under the Constitution becom es a right 
only in its  practica l e x e r c ise , --T h at i s ,  there is  no meaning to the 
guarantee of free  speech  divorced from  its e x er c ise  in tim e, at a 
p lace, before one or m ore people. The state , on the other hand, 
has an in terest in p reserv ing  order, regulating its  stree ts  and parks 
for their prim ary purp oses, and protecting the rights of unwilling 
l is te n e r s . Where the priv ilege to speak has com e into conflict with 
the in terests of the state enum erated above, the Supreme Court in 
dealing with problem s of this type in recent years has laid down the 
following princip les respecting  restr iction s on the form  of 
expression:
(1) If the socia l in terest in permitting the particular mode 
of expression  is  not outweighed by the socia l in terest  
in im posing the particular restra in t, and the inhibitory  
effect resu lts  from  the very  language of the enactm ent 
rather than from  its  application to the facts , the 
regulation w ill be held to be '’invalid'’ on i ts  face.
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(2) The Court w ill reso lve  the balancing p rocess against 
the enactm ent if it  is  thought that its  presence on the 
statute books would have an intim idating effect on the 
e x e r c ise  of F ir s t  Amendment freedom s. Such an effect  
may be due either to the fact that the statute im poses
a "prior restra in t"  or that it is  "not narrow ly drawn* "
(3) The usual presum ption of constitutionality w ill not be 
accorded to statutes or ordinances restr ictin g  form  of 
exp ression , *
The princip les above (see  a lso  the questions involved in 
determ ining c a se s  dealing with free  speech in public p laces set out 
by Justice Frankfurter in the Niemotko case  and quoted in Chapter 
11 of this study) suggest the factors to be weighed in d iscu ssin g  here  
recent c a ses  dealing with restr iction s on the form  of utterance.
Attention f ir s t , how ever, to a non-A m eric an case  may 
indicate som e of the elem ents to be considered in deciding, in 
countries where freedom  of speech e x is ts , the question of the place  
where that right is  to be exercised* This ca se  is  set out by Justice  
Frankfurter in one of h is opinions as follow s:
In M*Ara v. M agistrates of Edinbugh, 1913 S, C, 1059, 
a street orator who was arrested  for speaking without a 
licen se  in the stree ts  of Edinburgh, contrary to the 
M agistrates'p roclam ation , challenged the a rrest. The Court 
of S ess io n  affirm ed a holding that M agistrates had no authority  
to issu e  the proclam ation because the Act of 1606 granting 
them  authority was in desuetude. However, in h is judgment, 
Lord Dunedin, one of the m ost trenchant minds in modern
* N otes, 49 Columbia JL. R . , 364, March, 1949*
 ̂ Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U .S , 268 at p. 282 (1951).
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h istory , dealt with the argument that there is  an absolute  
right to speak in public p laces. Although he was applying 
Scots law , not a w ritten constitution, JLord Dunedin's 
rem arks are apposite here:
"Now the right of free speech undoubtedly e x is ts ,  
and the right of free  speech is  to prom ulgate your opinions 
by sp eech  so long as you do not utter what is  treasonable  
or lib e lo u s, or make you rself obnoxious to the statutes 
that deal with blasphem y and obscenity. But the right of 
free  speech  is  a p erfectly  separate thing from  the question  
of the place where that right is  to be exercised . You may 
say  what you like provided it is  not obnoxious in the ways 
I have indicated, but that does not m ean that you may say  
it anywhere,
1 am not going to deal with what may be the case  in 
open sp aces or public p laces. It seem s to me that no 
general pronouncement upon that subject could be m ade, 
b ecau se , although for convenience sake one often speaks 
of open spaces or public plat e s ,  the truth is  that open 
spaces and public p laces differ very  much in their  
character, and before you could say whether a certain  
thing could be done in a certain  place you would have to 
know the h istory  of the particular p lace. For exam ple, 
there may be certa in  p laces which are dedicated to 
certain  u se s , . . . and things might be restrained  if  
they interfered  with the purposes of that dedication, Bach  
of those c a se s  m ust be dealt with when it a r is e s . . • •
Turning to A m erican d ec is io n s. Justice R oberts, in a con sid er-
ation of the required perm it in the Hague c a se , stated the general
princip les involved in the priv ilege of a c itizen  of the United States
to use the stree ts  and parks to comm unicate his v iew s. He wrote:
W herever the title  of streets  and parks may r e st , 
they have im m em orially  been held in trust for the use of 
the public and, tim e out of mind, have been used for 
purposes of a ssem b ly , communicating thoughts between  
c itizen s , and d iscu ssin g  public questions. Such use of
 ̂ Ibid* » at p, 283,
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the s tree ts  and public p laces h as, from  ancient tim es, 
been a part of the p r iv ileg es, im m unities, r igh ts, and 
lib er tie s  of c itizen s. The priv ilege of a c itizen  of the 
United States to use the stree ts  and parks for com m unica­
tion of v iew s on national questions m ay be regulated in  
the in terest of all; it  is  not absolute, but rela tive , and 
m ust be e x erc ised  in subordination to the general com fort 
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good 
order; but it m ust not, in  the guise of regulation, be 
abridged or denied. *
The manner in which the princip les se t out in Justice Hubert's 
opinion have been applied in later c a se s  w ill be illu strated  by a r e -  
exa mination of certain  of the c a ses  se t out in Chapter Us
1. Sanctions B efore the Event
In Niemotko v. State of M aryland, one of three important 
fre e -sp e ec h  c a se s  decided on January 15, 1951, the decision  involved  
the valid ity of the conviction of Daniel Niemotko and N eil K elley in 
the C ircuit Court of Hartford County, Maryland, for d isord erly  
conduct. Niemotko and K elley were two m em bers of the relig ious
4  Hague v. C .I .O ., 307 U .S . 496 at pp. 515-516 (1939); in  
de Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U .S . 353 (1937), the Court declared the 
right of assem b ly  a concom itant of free speech and protected under 
the due p ro cess  c lause against state interference; in Cox v, New 
H am pshire, 312 U .S . 569 (1941), the Court held that since a 
m unicipality has authority to control the use of its public stree ts  
for parades and p rocession s, it could not be denied authority to 
give consideration , without unfair discrim ination, to tim e, place  
and manner in relation to the other proper uses of the stree ts .
5 340 U .S . 268 (1951).
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group known as Jehovah’s W itnesses* They had scheduled Bible talks 
in  the public park of the c ity  of Havre de G race, Maryland; and 
although there was no ordinance prohibiting or regulating the use of 
th is  park, it  was custom ary for Individuals and organisations to obtain 
perm its from  the Park C om m issioner for its use for m eetings and 
celeb ration s. Conforming to custom , the group representing the 
defendants requested  p erm ission  of the C om m issioner for use of 
the park on four consecutive Sundays* The p erm ission  was refused* 
Learning that an E lk 's F lag day cerem ony was scheduled for the 
f ir s t  Sunday, the applicants then filed  a request with the City Council-*  
under custom  there w as a right of appeal to the City Council from  an 
action  of the Park C om m issioner*-for the following three Sundays*
The request w as denied, and thereafter , the applicants proceeded  
to hold their m eeting on the third Sunday* As soon as Niemotko 
had begun to d eliver h is rem arks to the m eeting, the police arrested  
him* On the following Sunday at a m eeting in the park, K elley was 
arrested  before he could begin h is talk* Niemotko and K elley were  
subsequently tr ied  and convicted under a Maryland d isord erly  conduct 
statute*
The facts at the tr ia l indicated that at the tim e of the a rrest  
of the defendants there was no evidence of d isorder, nor w ere there  
threats of v iolence or riot* The evidence a lso  tended to show that 
both K elley and Niemotko had conducted them selves in a peaceful
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and orderly  manner*
Justice Vinson reversed  the conviction in th e  following opinion:
This Court has many tim es exam ined the licensing  
sy stem s by which loca l bodies regulate the use of their 
parks and public places* See Kune v, People of State of 
New York, 340 U .S . 290* * *•* See a lso  Saia v. P eople  
of State of New York, 1948, 334 U .S . 558, T  ,~ .  ; Hague 
■SL* — *it’o* i 1939, 307 U .S . 496# , »1 City oj '
G riffin . 1938, 303 U .S . 444. • * . In those c a se s  this 
Court condemned statutes and ordinances which required  
that p erm its be obtained from  local o ffic ia ls as a p re­
req uisite  to the u se of public p laces, on the grounds that a 
lic en se  requirem ent constituted a prior restra in t on freedom  
of sp eech , $ r e ss  and relig ion , and. in the absence of narrowly  
drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the officia ls  
to follow , m ust be invalid. . . .  In the instant c a se  we are  
m et with no ordinance or statute regulating or prohibiting 
the use of the park; a ll that is  here is  an amorphous p r a c ­
tice , " whereby a ll authority to grant perm its for the use  
of the park is  in the Park C om m issioner and the City 
Council. No standards appear anywhere; no narrowly drawn 
lim itations; no circum scribing of this absolute power; no 
substantial in terest of the community to be served. It is  
c lear  that a ll that has been said about the invalidity of such 
l im itle ss  d iscretion  m ust be equally applicable here.
This case  points up with utm ost c larity  the w isdom  
of th is doctrine. F or the very  possib ility  of abuse, which 
those earlier  decision s feared, has occurred here. Indeed, 
rare ly  has any case  been before this Court which shows so  
c lea r ly  an unwarranted discrim ination in a refusal to issu e  
such a lic en se . Xt is  true that the City Council held a hearing 
at which it considered the application. But we have searched  
the record  in vain to d iscover any valid b asis for the refu sa l.
In fact, the Mayor testified  that the perm it would probably 
have been granted if, at the hearing, the applicants had not 
started to "berate*4 the Park C om m issioner for h is refusal 
to issu e  the perm it. The only questions asked of the 
W itnesses at the hearing pertained to their a lleged  refusal 
to salute the flag, their view s on the B ible, and other issu e s  
irrelevant to unencumbered use of the public parks* The 
conclusion is  inescapable that the use of the park was denied  
because of the City Council's d islike for or disagreem ent with
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the W itnesses or their v iew s. The right to equal protection  
of the law s, in the ex erc ise  of those freedom s of speech  
and relig ion  protected by the F ir s t  and Fourteenth Amend­
m ents, has a firm er foundation than the whim s or personal 
opinions of a loca l governing body.
In this Court, it is  argued that state and c ity  officia ls  
should have the power to exclude relig ious groups, as such, 
from  the use of the public parks. But that is  not this ca se .
F or whatever force this contention could possib ly  have is  
lo st in the light of testim ony of the Mayor at the tr ia l that 
within his m em ory perm its had always been issu ed  for 
relig iou s organisations and Sunday-school p icn ics . We 
might a lso  point out that the attempt to designate the park 
as a sanctuary for peace and quiet not only does not defeat 
th ese  appellants, whose own conduct created no disturbance, 
but th is position is  a lso  m ore than slightly  inconsistent, s in ce , 
on the f ir s t  Sunday here involved, the park was the situs for 
the F lag Day cerem ony of the Order of the E lks.
It thus becom es apparent that the lack of standards 
in the lic en se -is su in g  '’practice" renders that "practice" a 
prior restra in t in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and that the com pletely  arbitrary and discrim inatory refusal 
to grant the p erm its was a denial of equal protection. Inasmuch 
a s the b asis of the convictions w as the lack of the p erm its, and 
that lack  w as, in turn, due to the unconstitutional defects d is ­
cu ssed , the convictions m ust fa ll.
The rule to be deduced from  the c a se  above is  that statutes and 
ordinances which require that perm its be obtained from  local o fficia ls  
as a prerequ isite  to the use of public p laces for speech are invalid in  
the absence of narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for 
the o ffic ia ls to follow . A lack of standards constitutes censorship or 
a prior restra in t, and thus contravenes the F ir st and Fourteenth  
Am endm ents,
6 340 U .S . 268, 271-273 (1951).
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In Kunz v. New York,  ̂ another free speech case  decided on 
January 15* 1931, the Supreme Court was judging the validity of the 
conviction of one Carl Kunz for unlawfully conducting a relig ious
R
m eeting without a perm it In violation of a New York City ordinance.
8
A dm inistrative Code N. Y. #435—7. 0 , Ha. Public W orship. —
It shall be unlawful for any person to be concerned or instrum ental in 
collecting  or promoting any assem blage of persons for public worship 
or exhortation* or to rid icu le or denounce any form  of relig ious belief, 
serv ice  or reverence* or to preach or expound atheism  or agnosticism * 
or under any pretense therefor, in any street. A clergym an or m inister  
of any denomination, how ever, or any person responsib le to or regularly  
associa ted  with any church or incorporated m ission ary  soc iety , or 
any lay -p reach er , or lay -read er may conduct relig ious se r v ic e s , or 
any authorized representative of a duly incorporated organization  
devoted to the advancement of the princip les of atheism  or agnosticism  
m ay preach or expound such cau se , in any public place or p laces  
sp ecified  in a perm it therefor which m ay be granted and issu ed  by the 
police com m ission er. This section  shall not be construed to prevent 
any congregation of the Baptist denomination from  assem bling in a 
proper place for the purpose of perform ing the r ite s  of baptism , 
according to the cerem onies of that church. ,rb. Interference with 
stree t s e r v ic e s . - -I t  shall be unlawful for any person to disturb, 
m olest or interrupt any clergym an, m inister* m ission ary , lay-preacher  
or lay-reader* who shall be conducting relig iou s serv ices  by authority 
of a permit* issu ed  hereunder, or any m in ister or people who shall 
be perform ing the r ite  of baptism  as perm itted herein* nor sh all any 
p erson  com m it any riot or disorder in any such assem bly# **c. 
V iolations. —Any person who shall violate any provision  of this section , 
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not m ore than 
tw enty-five d o llars , or im prisonm ent of thirty days* or both, "
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This ordinance mad© it unlawful to hold public worship m ootings on 
the stree ts  without f ir s t  obtaining a perm it from  the city  police  
com m ission er . F rom  the facts of the c a se , it appeared that Kun« 
w as an ordained B aptist m in ister who did ’’Outdoor Gospel Work, ”
In 1946, he had applied for a perm it under the ordinance and received  
one good only for the calendar year in which it was issu ed , In 
Novem ber, 1946, h is perm it was revoked by the police com m issioner  
on the ground that Kuna had ridiculed and denounced other relig iou s  
b e lie fs  in h is m eetings! but although the ordinance provided penalties  
for such conduct, it  did not se t out any power of revocation , Kunz 
applied for a perm it in 1947 and again in 1948, but h is application  
w as disapproved. Then on September 11, 1948, he was arrested  
and subsequently convicted for speaking at Columbus C ircle in New 
York City without a perm it. Justice Vinson reversed  the conviction  
in  the following words:
A ppellant's conviction was thus based upon h is failure  
to p o s se ss  a perm it for 1948, We are here concerned only 
with the propriety of the action of the police com m issioner  
in refusing to issu e  that perm it. D isapproval of the 1948 
perm it application by the police com m issioner was justified  
by the New York courts on the ground that a perm it had 
p reviously  been revoked "for good reason s, *' It is  note- 
worthy that there is  no mention in the ordinance of reasons  
for which such a perm it application can be refused . This 
interpretation allow s the police com m issioner, an adm in is­
trative o ffic ia l, to ex erc ise  d iscretion  in denying subsequent 
perm it applications on the b asis  of h is interpretation, at 
that tim e, of what is  deem ed to be conduct condemned by 
the ordinance. We have here, then, an ordinance which 
g ives an adm inistrative official d iscretionary power to con­
tro l in advance the right of c itizens to speak on relig iou s
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m atters on the str ee ts  of New York, As such* the ordinance 
i s  c lea r ly  invalid as a prior restraint on the ex erc ise  of 
F ir s t  Amendment rights.
. • . Although this court has recognised  that a statute 
may be enacted which prevents serious interference with 
norm al usage of s tr ee ts  and parks* Cox v. State of New 
H am pshire, 1941, 312 U .S . 569. « * . » we have consistently  
condemned licen sing  system s which v e st  in an adm inistrative  
officia l d iscretion  to grant or withhold a perm it upon broad 
cr iter ia  unrelated to proper regulation of public p laces , . . •
The Court below has m istakenly derived support for 
its  conclusion from  the evidence produced at the tr ia l that 
appellant's re lig iou s m eetings had, in the past, caused some 
d isord er. There are appropriate public rem ed ies to protect 
the peace and order of the community if  appellant's speeches  
should resu lt in d isorder or v io lence. . . , We do not e x ­
p ress  any opinion on the propriety of punitive rem ed ies which 
the New York authorities may u tilize . We are here concerned  
with su pp ression --n ot punishment, It is  sufficient to say  
that New York cannot v e st restraining control over the right 
to speak on relig iou s subjects in an adm inistrative o fficia l 
where there are no appropriate standards to guide h is action, ^
The rule to be deduced from  the case  above is  in line with the
Niemotko c a se , supra. The holding is  that a statute may be enacted
which prevents seriou s interference with norm al usage of
str ee ts  and parks, but a statute creating a licensing system
allowing adm inistrative offic ia ls d iscretion  to grant or withhold
a perm it to use the stree ts  and parks is  invalid. The case  also
holds that an applicant's past conduct which might have been
punishable as lik ely  to cause a breach of the peace is  not sufficient
grounds for the refusal of a later request for a perm it, at lea st, in
9 340 U .S . 290, 293-295.
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the absence of an ex p ress provision  to that e ffect in the ordinance* 
Justice Jackson, v igorously  d issenting on th is latter point, w rote, 
r,Xn th is ca se  there is  no evidence of a purpose to suppress speech, 
except to keep it in bounds that w ill not upset good order* If there  
are abuses of censorsh ip  or discrim ination  in adm inistering the
ordinance, as w ell there m ay b e, they are not proved in this ca se .
»10• • e
In the recent Foulos c a se , ** the Court considered an appeal 
as to the valid ity of the conviction of a mem ber of Jehovah*s Wit­
n e sse s  for conducting relig iou s serv ices  in a public park of 
Portsm outh, New H am pshire, without a required licen se  after proper 
application for the licen se  had been refused arbitrarily  by the City 
Council* The defendant was charged and convicted of violation of 
that section  of the m unicipal ordinance set out below* Speaking 
for the Supreme Court, Justice Reed held that since the ordinance 
had been construed by the highest court of New Hampshire as leaving  
the licen sing  o ffic ia ls  no d iscretion  in granting p erm its, the req u ire­
m ent that a licen se  be obtained before conducting relig iou s cerem onies
10  Ib id ,, p. 314.
** Poulos v . New H am pshire, 73 S* Gt„ 760 (1953).
12 Ibid*» p. 762, citing: ’’Section 22* L icense Required, No 
theatrical or dramatic representation shall be perform ed or exhibited  
and no parade or p rocession  upon any public street or way, and no open 
air public m eeting upon any ground abutting thereon shall be perm itted  
u n less a licen se  therefor shall f ir s t  be obtained from  the City Council. M
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in a public park did not abridge freedom  of speech* Justice Reed  
further pointed out that w here, a s h ere , an individual had been denied  
a lic en se  arb itrarily  under a valid ordinance, he could not speak  
without the licen se  and escap e prosecution sim ply because it had been  
unreasonably withheld* A portion of the opinion of Justice Reed  
affirm ing the defendant's conviction is  set out below:
The princip les of the F ir s t  Amendment are not to be 
treated  as a prom ise that everyone with opinions or b e lie fs  
to ex p ress may gather around him  at any public place and at 
any tim e a group for d iscu ssion  or instruction. It is  a non- 
sequitur to say  that F ir s t  Amendment rights may not be 
regulate d because they hold a preferred  position in the 
hierarchy of the constitutional guarantees of the incidents 
of freedom . This Court has never so held and indeed has 
defin itely  indicated the contrary. It has indicated approval 
of reasonable nondiscrim inatory regulation by governm ental 
authority that p reserv es peace, order and tranquillity without 
deprivation of the F ir s t  Amendment guarantees of free  speech , 
p ress  and the e x er c ise  of relig ion . When considering  
sp ec ifica lly  the regulation of the use of public parks, th is  
Court has taken the sam e position, * * •
There is  no b asis for saying that freedom  and order 
are not com patible. That would be a decision  of desperation. 
Regulation and suppression  are not the sam e, either in 
purpose or resu lt, and courts of justice can te ll the d ifference. 
We m ust and do assum e that with the determ ination of the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire that the present ordinance 
en titles Jehovah's W itnesses to hold relig iou s se rv ic es  in  
Goodwin Park at reasonable hours and tim es , the Portsm outh  
Council w ill prom ptly and fa ir ly  adm inister their resp onsib ility  
in issu ing perm its on request, 1-5
Concerning the position which Poulos took that he might r isk
13 Ib id ., pp. 766-768.
84
speaking without a licen se  and defeat prosecution by showing the 
lic en se  w as arb itrarily  withheld* Justice Reed saidj
* * * to allow  applicants to proceed without the 
required perm its to run businesses* erect structures, 
purchase firearm s* transport or store exp losives or in* 
flam m atory products, hold public m eetings without prior  
safety  arrangem ents or take other unauthorized action is  
apt to cause breaches of the peace or create  public dangers* 
The valid  requirem ents of the licen se  are for the good of the 
applicants and the public* It would be unreal to say that such 
offic ia l fa ilu res to act in accordance with state law, 
red ressab le  by state judicial procedures, are state acts  
vio lative of the F ederal Constitution* D elay is  unfortunate 
but the expense and annoyance of litigation is  a price  
c itizen s m ust pay for life  in an orderly society  where the 
rights of the F ir s t  Amendment have a rea l and abiding 
meaning. * * *
The rule of the case  above would seem  to be that one who has 
been arb itrarily  denied a licen se  to speak in a public park required  
by a valid  ordinance cannot, instead of pursuing an appropriate lega l 
rem edy, violate the ordinance and be immune from  prosecution by 
showing the licen se  to have been arb itrarily  withheld* The dissenting  
opinion of Justice Douglas in the case  w ill be considered in a later  
portion of th is chapter*
Two other c a se s , which w ill be considered here together, 
focus attention on the power of a state to regulate the manner in  




York, i 5  the question presented was the valid ity of an ordinance of 
l^ockport. New York, which forbade the use of sound am plification  
d ev ices  except with the p erm ission  of the Chief of Police* In this 
c a se , the Court w as considering an appeal by a m inister of the 
Jehovah's W itnesses sect for r ev e rsa l of h is conviction of having 
violated  the ordinance* The defendant had obtained p erm ission  from  
the Chief of P o lice  to am plify lectu res on relig iou s subjects by sound 
equipment mounted on h is ca r . His lectu res w ere given at a fixed  
place in  a public park on designated Sundays, Upon expiration of 
his perm it, defendant applied for another one, but was refused on 
the ground that com plaints had been made. He n evertheless used his 
equipment on four occasion s without a perm it. For th is action, he 
w as tr ied  and convicted for violation of the ordinance.
Justice D ouglas, in reversin g  the conviction, wrote as follow s;
We hold that #3 of this ordinance is  unconstitutional on 
its  face , for it estab lish es a previous restraint on the right 
of free  sp eech  in violation of the F ir s t  Amendment which is  
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against State action.
To use a loud-speaker or am plifier nne has to get a perm it 
from  the Chief of P o lice , There are no standards prescribed  
for the ex er c ise  of h is discretion* The statute is  not narrowly  
drawn to regulate the hours or p laces of use of lou d -speakers, 
or the volum e of sound (the decibels) to which they m ust be 
adjusted, • • ,
. . . The right to be heard is placed in the uncon­
trolled  d iscretion  of the Chief of P o lice , He stands athwart
334 U .S . 558 (1948).
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the channels of com m unication as an obstruction which can 
be rem oved only after crim inal tr ia l and conviction and 
lengthy appeal* A m ore effective previous restraint is  
difficu lt to imagine* U nless we are to retreat from  the firm  
positions we have taken in the past# we must give freedom  of 
speech  in th is ca se  the sam e preferred  treatm ent that we 
gave freedom  of relig ion  in the Cantwell c a se , freedom  of the 
p r e ss  in  the G riffin c a se , and freedom  of speech and assem bly  
in  the Hague case*
17K ovacs v. Cooper involved the valid ity of an ordinance of 
ISTrenton, New J ersey . The appellant in th is case  sought to have his  
conviction se t aside for a violation of the ordinance. F rom  the evidence 
produced at the tr ia l, it  appeared that the appellant was guilty of 
operating a sound truck on a public street near the municipal building. 
He adm itted that he operated th is m echanism  for m usic and spoke into 
the am plifier; and the facts suggested  that the appellant was using the 
sound apparatus to com m ent on a labor dispute then in p rogress in
16 Ib id .. pp. 559-561.
17  336 U .S . 77 (1949).
Ib id ., c ited  by the Court at p. 77 as follow s: "4 That it 
shall be unlawful for any person , firm  or corporation, either a s prin­
c ip a l, agent or em ployee, to play, use or operate for advertising  
purposes, or for any other purpose w hatsoever, on or upon the public 
s tr e e ts , a lley s  or thoroughfares in the City of Trenton, any device  
known as a sound truck, loud speaker or sound am plifier, or radio or 
phonograph with a loud speaker or sound am plifier, or any other instru ­
ment known as a calliope or any instrum ent of any kind or character  
which em its therefrom  loud and raucous n o ises and is  attached to and 
upon any veh icle  operated or standing upon said streets  or public 
p laces aforem entioned. M
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Trenton, The opinion of Justice Reed affirm ing the conviction is  
produced in part below;
The contention that the section  is  so vague, obscure  
and indefinite as to be unenforceable m erits only a passing  
referen ce . This objection cen ters around the use of the 
words "loud and raucous, " While these are abstract words, 
they have through daily use acquired a content that conveys 
to any in terested  person a sufficiently  accurate concept of 
what is  forbidden, • •
• , • U nrestrained use throughout a m unicipality  
of a ll sound amplifying dev ices would be intolerable*
Absolute prohibition within municipal lim its of a ll sound 
am plification , even though reasonably regulated in p lace, 
tim e and volum e, is  undesirable and probably unconstitutional 
as an unreasonable interference with norm al activ itie s.
We have had recently  before us an ordinance of the 
City of Lockport, New York, prohibiting sound am plification  
whereby the sound was cast on public p laces so as to attract 
the attention of the passing public to the annoyance of those  
within the radius of the sounds. * . , This Court held the 
ordinance "unconstitutional on its face . * * because the 
quoted section  estab lished  a "previous restraint" on free  
speech  with "no standards prescribed  for the exercise"  of 
d iscretion  by the Chief of P o lice , . * , This ordinance is  
not of that character. • « *
In th is c a se , New Jersey  n ecessa r ily  has construed  
this very  ordinance as applied to sound am plification. The 
Supreme Court said  • * . ;
"The relevant provisions of the ordinance apply only  
to ( 1) veh ic les (2 ) containing an instrum ent in the nature of 
a sound am plifier or any other instrum ent em itting loud and 
raucous n o ises and (3) such vehicle operated or standing upon 
the public s tr e e ts , a lley s or thoroughfares of the city . " If 
that m eans that only am plifiers that em it, in the language of 
the ordinance, "loud and raucous noises" are barred from  the 
s tr e e ts , we have a problem  of regulation. . , •
* * *
. * . There is  no restr iction  upon the comm unication
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of id eas or d iscu ssion  o£ is su e s  by the human voice* by 
newspapers* by pamphlet®, by dodgers. We think that the 
need for reasonable protection in the hom es or bu siness  
houses from  the distracting n o ises of veh icles equipped 
with such sound amplifying d ev ices ju stifies the ordinance. ^
The apparent ruling stem m ing from  the foregoing two ca ses  
i s  that w hile c it ie s  m ay bar sound trucks with broadcasts of public 
in terest am plified to a “loud and raucous" volume* they m ay not 
require p erm ission  to be obtained for operating such sound trucks 
where no standards are prescribed  for their u se . The latter situation  
would constitute an invalid encroachm ent on freedom  of expression  
a s a prior restra in t. It is  not c lear from  these c a se s , however* 
whether absolute prohibition of a ll sound am plification within c ity  
lim its  would be constitutional. Certain of the dissenting and con ­
curring opinions in  the K ovacs case  ra ise  this issue* and it w ill be 
considered  further in this chapter.
Summary
The conclusions to be drawn from  ca ses  relating to form  
considered thus far indicate, ( 1) that it is  proper for a m unicipality  
to require a perm it for speech making in a public place if the conditions 
under which such perm its can be granted or refused relate to the 
public's in terest in the use of the particular location and are set
^  Xbfd* f at pp. 79-82.
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out with sufficient defin iten ess. Such perm its may regulate by proper 
standards the tim e, place and manner of the speech , but w ill be 
invalidated if  they perm it the licensing officia l to e x erc ise  arbitrary  
authority; (2 ) that where perm its to speak in public p laces are  
required in which none of the objections above are involved, a speaker 
who is  refused  a perm it unreasonably may be punished if  he speaks 
without one, sin ce h is rem edy for refusal l ie s  in proper legal pro­
ceed ings,
2 , Sanctions After the Event
The d iscu ssion  in the preceding section has been concerned  
p rim arily  with m unicipal perm it and licen se  requirem ents as 
affecting the tim e, place and manner of public utterance. In th is  
section  attention w ill be given to certain  restra in ts which m ay be 
applied in  connection with factors arising from  the speaking event 
itse lf . Justice Frankfurter points out that a sanction applied after  
the event "assu res consideration of the particular c ircum stances  
of a situation, What the particular circum stances of a situation  
are i s  determ ined in part by the tim e, place and manner of exp ression , 
A breach of peace and order, for exam ple, may resu lt not only from  
the words and actions of a speaker, or from  the medium he u ses to
Niemotko v, Maryland, 340 U .S , 268 at p. 282,
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convey h is utterances,, hut a lso  from  the particular reaction® of
a sp ec ific  audience at a given tim e and place*
A seriou s breach of the peace is  often threatened not by the
words of the speaker but by an audience so intolerant of h is view s
or so h ostile  to him  and h is supporter® that outbreaks of v iolence
are lik ely  to occur* Where the disturbance of public peace and order
resu lts  from  the animosity* unrest* or prem editated violence of the
audience and others, the question a r ise s  as to whether the speaker
should be punished under breach of the peace statutes or suppressed
21to conserve desirab le  conditions*
Certain c a se s  bearing on this issu e  have been treated in
Chapter II, and they w ill be review ed here in this context:
22
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, a Jehovah's W itness challenged  
his conviction for d isord erly  conduct based on the fact that he had 
played on the stree ts  of a Catholic community a phonograph record  
denouncing the Pope, the Saints and the organised Church* Justice  
R oberts rev ersed  the conviction, holding that the state has power to 
prevent or punish speech  when clear and present danger of r io t, 
d isord er, in terference with traffic upon public s tr ee ts , or other
21 For a d iscu ssion  of this point se e , C. J.A ntieau, "The Rule 
of Clear and P resen t Danger: Scope of its Applicability, " 48 Michigan 
L .R . ,  811, 834 (1950).
22 310 U .S . 296 (1940).
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im m ediate threat to public safety , peace, or order, appears, but it  
m ay not unduly suppress comm unication of v iew s, relig ious or others, 
under the gu ise of conserving desirable conditions. He held, further, 
that one m ay be guilty of breach of the peace if he com m its acts or 
m akes statem ents lik ely  to  provoke violence and disturbance of good 
order though no such event be intended; but he adds:
D ecision s to this effect are many, but . . . in p rac­
tica lly  a ll,  the provocative language which was held to amount 
to a breach of the peace consisted  of profane, indecent, or 
abusive rem arks d irected  to the person of the hearer. One who, 
in so lic itin g  contributions from  two Catholics for publication  
of relig iou s pam phlets, played a phonograph record  which 
attacked the Catholic Church and relig ion , but who, though he 
offended the lis ten ers  and aroused their anim osity, was 
guilty of no assau lt or threatening of bodily harm , or truculent 
bearing, or intentional d iscou rtesy , or personal abuse, was 
not • • * liab le to conviction of the common law offense of 
breach of the peace, ^
In Chaplinsky v* New H am pshire, ^  the appellant, a Jehovah*& 
W itness, contended that application of a R ochester, New H am pshire, 
ordinance punishing the use in a public place of words lik ely  to cause  
a breach of the peace deprived him  of freedom  of speech , p r e ss , and 
the ex er c ise  of h is relig ion . The appellant had been convicted under 
the ordinance for calling the m arshal a "damned fasc ist"  and a "damned 
rack eteer , •* Justice Murphy, upholding the conviction, pointed out 
that there are kinds of speech which have never been within the
2 3  310 U .S . 296 (1940).
2 4  315 U .S . 568 (1942).
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constitutional guarantee, nam ely, the obscene, lib elou s, profane
or "fighting w ords, *' He observed that these types of utterances , • ,
are no e sse n tia l part in any exposition of id ea s, and are of such slight
so c ia l value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from  them  is  c lea r ly  outweighed by the socia l in terest in order and 
25m orality . Justice Murphy then held that the words, used by
Chaplinsky w ere of a kind "likely to provoke the average person to
26reta lia tion  and thereby cause a breach of peace, "
In 1946, in a federal case  involving m em bers of Jehovah's
W itn esses, the Court held that threats of third party violence did
2?not justify  curtailm ent of the right to speak at public m eetings. 
A nim osity had developed toward the W itnesses because of their view s  
on w ar, and when they applied to speak in an Iowa town, fights had 
broken out, and threats of violence w ere mad© concerning the proposed  
m eeting. The Court held that under these circum stances of p re ­
m editated v io lence, the speaker could not be convicted of a breach  
of the peace or inciting thereto in his attem pts to speak.
The problem  of the h ostile  audience is  again forcib ly  presented  
in the ca se  of T erm iniello  v. Chicago, considered by the Court in
2 5  Ibid. . 572.
26  Ibid. , 574.
^  S e lle r , v. John,on. 167 F , 2d (C. C. A. , 8 th, 1947).
28 337 U .S . 1 (1949).
1949. T erm in iello , a Catholic p r iest, was found guilty of d isorderly  
conduct in violation of a  breach of the peace ordinance of Chicago and 
fined. Hi© conviction grew out of an address he delivered in  an audi­
torium  in  Chicago, under the sponsorship of the Christian Veterans 
of A m erica and Gerald JL. K„ Smith. The m eeting had been widely  
publicized , and the auditorium had an overflow crowd of over 800 
p erson s. O utside, a crowd of som e 1000 people were gathered in 
protest of the m eeting. P olicem en had been assigned  to the m eeting  
to keep order, but w ere unable to prevent severa l disturbances.
The crowd outside becam e a howling mob, and the police w ere unable 
to restra in  som e of its  m em bers from  breaking windows of the hall, 
forcing open the doors of the auditorium , and throwing bricks and 
bottles through the windows. Ter mini© llo in h is speech strongly  
condemned the crowd outside and vigorously, if not v iciously , 
cr itic ized  certa in  politica l and racia l groups.
The case  was decided in favor of T erm iniello  on the b asis  of 
a techn icality  rather than upon the constitutional protection of free  
speech. The opinions of the m ajority and m inority are revealing, 
how ever, in  the stands they take on the constitutional is  su es.
Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the Court and reversin g
29 The evidence at the tr ia l indicated that the defendant was 
under suspension by his Bishop.
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the conviction wrote}
• . . a function of free  speech under our sy stem  of 
governm ent is  to invite dispute, Xt m ay indeed b est serve  
its  high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest* 
crea tes d issa tisfaction  with conditions as they are* or even  
s t ir s  people to anger. Speech is often provocative and 
challenging. It m ay strike at prejudices and preconceptions 
and have profound unsettling e ffects  as it p r e sse s  for accep ­
tance of an idea. That is  why freedom  of speech , though not 
absolute . . .  is  n everth eless protected against censorship  
or punishm ent, u n less shown lik ely  to produce a c lear and 
p resen t danger of a seriou s substantive ev il that r is e s  far 
above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. . • « 
There is  no room  under our Constitution for a m ore  
restr ic tiv e  view . F or the alternative would lead to standardi­
sation of ideas either by leg is la tu res , courts, or dominant 
politica l or community groups.
The ordinance as construed by the tr ia l court ser iou sly  
invaded th is province. It perm itted conviction of petitioner  
if  h is speech  stirred  people to anger, invited public dispute, 
or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting  
on any of those grounds m ay not stand.
Justice Jackson's d issen t, in which Justice Burton concurred,
upheld T erm in ie llo 's  conviction on the ground that the speech was a 
provocation to im m ediate breach of the peace. One author has com ­
mented on Justice Jackson's d issen t as follow s:
Justice Jackson's d issenting opinion hinges upon the 
principle that "liberty" and "order" are equally e ssen tia l  
to dem ocratic soc iety . Apparently, If either is  to give 
ground, he would place the preference with order. T here­
fore , the d isorder among those outside the hall who could  
not p ossib ly  have heard the words of T erm iniello  are made 
the grounds for p erm issib le  punishment of the speech. To 
him , freedom  of speech m eans; "Every person may free ly  
speak, w rite , publish on a ll subjects, being responsib le
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for the abuse of that lib erty» " But the e ffects of the speech  
frequently depend ae much upon the lis ten ers  a® upon the 
words spoken. In the case  at bar the disorder aroused was 
among large numbers of people who did not hear the speech  
but who had been aroused before the speaker appeared at 
the m eeting hall. T rue, they, or som e of them , probably 
im agined co rrec tly  the general tenor of any speech made 
under the ausp ices of Gerald L* K* Smith, However, it 
seem s unusual and even dangerous to make that the te s t  of 
the p erm issib le  bounds of free  speech.
But Justice Jackson would go so far as to say that 
it  i s  the right of any A m erican c itizen  to "advocate peaceful 
adoption of fa sc ism  or com m unism , soc ia lism  or cap ita lism *" 
H is argum ent reaches rather dangerous proportions, how ever, 
when he im plies that public intolerance'm ay be the determ in­
ing factor in whether or not the speech is  constitutionally  
protected . Under this te s t , many sp eech es, such as 
Term iniello*s may be lega lly  p erm issib le  but may neverthe­
le s s  in som e surroundings be a menace to peace and order 
because the wor<U spoken are d istastefu l to som e of those  
who hear. , . •
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In F einer v. New York, the m ost recent case of the type under 
d iscu ssion , the Court considered the conviction for d isorderly  conduct 
of a young co llege  student who continued to make a street-corn er  
address publicizing a m eeting of the Young P ro g ressiv es  of A m erica  
after being told by police to d esist. F e in er fs speech was given in a 
sm all shopping area in a predominantly colored section  of Syracuse,
It was delivered  over loudspeakers mounted on a car to approxim ately  
seven ty-five  people, co lored  and white, A few m inutes after Feiner  
began his speech two police o fficers arrived and later arrested  him.
V irginia Wood, Due P ro c ess  of Law (Baton Rouges Louisiana  
State U niversity  P r e s s , 1951), pp. 26-27.
32 340 U .S . 315 (1951).
The m ajority , speaking through Chief Justice Vinson, affirm ed  
the conviction, accepting the testim ony that the police officer acted  
only to prevent a threatened breach of peace. The o fficer fa assum ption  
of a threatened breach of the peace rested  on the grounds that the 
speaker had used violent language to c r itic ize  loca l and national 
o ffic ia ls , that the speaker had urged N egroes to “r ise  up in arm s 
and fight for their r ig h ts ,M and that at lea st one member of the audience
had threatened to rem ove the speaker from  the platform . Justice
;
Vinson pointed out that a r io t constitutes an ev il which the state can
prevent and that F e in er 's  speech  created  a c lear and present danger
that a r io t m ight occur.
J u stices Douglas and Minton d issented on the ground that no
incitem ent to breach of the peace was shown in the record , and
further, that the police should have protected the speaker from  any
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threats from  the audience. Justice B lack in sisted  that the Court 
had a duty to exam ine the evidence for itse lf , but even on the b asis  
of the findings so made he would rev erse  the conviction. He wrote 
as follow s:
. . , The police of course have power to prevent 
breaches of the peace. But if , in the name of preserving  
order, they ever can interfere with a lawful public speaker, 
they f ir s t  must make a ll reasonable efforts to protect him .
H ere the policem en did not even pretend to try to protect
97
the petitioner. . ♦ »
£ $ $
In my judgment, today's holding m eans that as a 
p ractica l m atter, m inority speakers can be silen ced  in  
any city . H ereafter, desp ite the F ir s t  and Fourteenth  
Am endm ents, the policem an's club can take heavy to ll of 
a current adm inistration's public c r it ic s . C riticism  
of public o ffic ia ls  w ill be too dangerous for a ll but the 
m ost courageous. , . , whatever is  thought to be 
guaranteed in Kune and Niemotko is  taken away by what 
i s  done h ere. The three c a ses  read together mean that 
w hile previous restra in ts probably cannot be im posed on 
an unpopular speaker, the police have d iscretion  to 
s ilen ce  him  as soon as the custom ary hostility  to his 
view s develops. ^4
The c a se s  considered in this section  have involved  
the problem  of the degree to which public intolerance of a speaker 
at a certa in  tim e and place may be the deciding factor in whether 
the sp eech  is  constitutionally protected. The m ajority and m inority  
opinions of the Court from  the Cantwell holding to the F einer decision  
show a lack  of agreem ent on this is su e , particularly in the m atter of 
the extent to which the speaker h im self may contribute to the public 
unrest before being punished or restrained . The question of 
sanctions after the event as affected by the tim e, place and manner 
of utterance; together with the problem s raised  in the im m ediately  
preceding section  concerning restr iction s before the event as related  
to the form  of expression , w ill provide the basic subject m atter for 
the rhetorical analysis to follow .
34 Ib id ., pp.  327-329.
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In com m enting on restr ic tion s affecting the form  of expression  
one w riter has saidi
The concept of com m unication denotes a relationship  
betw een the speaker and one or m ore individuals* This 
relationship n ecess ita te s  regulation of their correlative  
rights and p r iv ileg es, since to give one person an unlim ited  
priv ilege  to speak would im ply the denial of a ll rights of 
others with resp ec t to such speech. C onversely, com plete  
protection of their in terests  would put the speaker at their  
mercy* The difficulty of drawing a line derives from  the 
fact that the use of language and the form  which it takes 
are not com pletely  separable. Regulation of the latter  
n e c e ssa r ily  has som e effect upon the form er. The use of 
sound-trucks to am plify the human voice cannot be in ter­
dicted without thereby lim iting the geographical area  within 
which the speaker can be heard. , . . R estrictions on 
door-to-door canvassing are restr iction s a lso  on the speaker's  
a c c e ss  to potential lis ten er s , . . .T h e s e .  « .illu stra tio n s  
em phasise the conflict between the police power of the state  
and the protection of freedom  of expression , ^5
The quotation above points up certain of the practical effects  
of restr ic tio n s on the form  of exp ression  which speakers must take into 
account in preparation for a speech. Indeed, a speaker's attem pts to 
achieve certa in  goals by appropriate considerations of the tim e, place  
and manner of h is utterance may be frustrated wholly or in part by 
those restr ic tion s lim iting h is form  of expression . M oreover, in 
preparing for a speech , the speaker w ill need to be aware of the con­
sequences which may resu lt from  or in connection with h is choice of 
the tim e, place and manner of utterance.
The rhetorical significance of these rem arks becom es obvious
35 N otes, 49 Col. L .R . 363, 364,
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in a re-exam in ation  of certa in  rhetorical princip les se t out in Chapter
I. In the f ir s t  p lace, A ristotle*s definition of rhetoric as "the d iscovery
in the particu lar case  what are the available means of persuasion"
ca rr ie s  with it the im p lic it, if  not the exp lic it idea that the speech
situation concerns it s e lf  with the speaker's range of effective choice of
subject-m atter based on such pertinent considerations as the tim e,
36place and manner of its  utterance.
This idea m anifests itse lf  fully in A risto tle 's  basic concept 
that the audience determ ines the speech 's end and object. Lim itations 
on the form  of exp ression  which interfere with the speaker's a c c e ss  
to a potential audience, whether they resu lt from  restr iction s im posed  
before or after the event, would strike at this "very core of a theory  
of rhetoric ,
The rhetorica l effect of restr iction s on the form  of utterance 
can b est be seen  by the following analysis of these restr iction s in  
connection with the five canons of rhetoric described in Chapter I,
The order of treatm ent here w ill include an an a ly sis , (1) of those  
restr ic tio n s pertaining to tim e; (2 ) to those concerned with p la ce , 
and (3 ) to those dealing with manner of expression ,
36 See L ester  Thonssen and A, Craig Beard, Speech C riti­





It has been observed in Chapter X that invention includes,
among other th ings, the efforts of the speaker to adapt h im self and
his m ateria l to the speaking situation. In fact, as Gray and Braden
point out, the study of the occasion  and the audience may be the
f ir s t  step in planning a speech; and they add that on the b asis of
what the speaker learn s about the audience and the occasion  w ill
determ ine h is  goa ls, pattern of developm ent, use of supporting m aterial
39and choice of language. H is strategy for a particular event, these
authors say , req u ires a consideration  of certain  elem ents of the
occasion , nam ely, nthe tim e of the m eeting, the assem b ly  p lace,
the prevailing custom s of the loca lity , and the purpose of the
gathering. Concerning the tim e of the m eeting, Gray and Braden
state the following:
The exact hour of your appearance [as a speaker] may  
make considerable difference in your su cc ess . What 
im m ediately  preced es and follow s your speech should a lso  
be weighed thoughtfully. But your analysis may not stop 
here; it may consider the broad h istorica l trends which 
have given r ise  to the assem b ly . , • •
3 0
G iles W, Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public Speaking: 
P rin cip les and P ractice  (New York: Harper &e B rothers, 1951) p. 109#
3 9  Ibid-
4 0  Ib id ., p. 110L
41 Ibid,
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Then the authors suggest that a study of tim e should include
such questions as (1) the h istorica l antecedents of the speech; (2)
the events surrounding it , and (3) the effect of the tim e on the speaker
and the audience - -p articu larly  with resp ect to its  e ffect on the latte r*s
42degree of sp eech  receptiv ity .
The concept of the duration of a sp eech  should be added to the
foregoing considerations of the elem ents to be studied in connection
with the tim e of a speech . This concept of duration has been pointed
up as follow s;
The speech  situation is  sev ere ly  controlled by tim e  
lim itation s. W hereas a person may e lec t to spend a full 
evening, or a week of even ings, or an entire winter reading 
a novel, he is  obliged to devote his entire attention for a 
short, continuous period to the hearing of a speech. This 
circum stance d ec is iv e ly  influences the character of oral 
d iscou rse , • • . J
An exam ination of restr ic tion s respecting the tim e of utterance 
m ust be approached, th erefore , on the b asis  of three c lassifica tion s:
(1) those concerning the hour of the event; (2) those related  to the tim e  
of the speech  in its  connection with surrounding even ts, and (3) 
those affecting the duration of a speech.
(a) R estr iction s on the hour of appearance. --I t  has been  
observed  in Chapter IX, and m ore ex p ress ly  in the preceding sections
42 Ib id ., p. 111.
43 Thonssen and Baird, p, 7.
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of this chapter, that the priv ilege of a c itisen  to speak in public parks 
and str ee ts  is  subject to regulations in the in terest of a il--th a t i s ,  
in conform ity with the general com fort, convenience, peace and order 
of society* {See Hague v» C .I* Q ., Cox v* New Ham pshire and Kunz 
v. New York, supra*) These regulations may take the form  of licen se  
or perm it req u irem en ts, which, if  they provide suitable standards to 
prevent seriou s in terference with norm al use of stree ts  and parks and 
do not v e s t  in an adm inistrative officia l d iscretion  to grant or withhold 
the perm it or lic en se  upon cr iter ia  unrelated to the proper regulation  
of public p la ces , m ust be com plied with by the speaker* Thus, the 
tim e at which a particular speech  can be given in a street or park  
m ay depend on such factors as whether the tim e conform s to the prim ary  
use of the public p lace, whether it avoids conflicts with other sp eak ers, 
and w hether, taking into account the manner of utterance, such time 
is  in keeping with the com fort and convenience of society* The speaker  
m ust, a s  an inventive function, appraise a ll these factors in planning 
for h is speech* How his task  may be further com plicated is  shown by 
a statem ent of Justice Reed* He indicates in the K ovacs case  som e of 
the problem s connected with balancing the in terests between soc iety  
and the speaker in the m atter of h is tim e of u tteran ce--esp ec ia lly , 
when that tim e i s  connected with a specia l manner of expression*  
Regarding the use of sound trucks. Justice Reed saysi
* * * A satisfactory  adjustment of the conflicting in terests
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is  difficult as those who d esire  to broadcast can hardly  
acqu iesce in a requirem ent to modulate their sounds to a 
pitch that would not r ise  above other stree t n o ises , nor would 
they deem  a restr ic tio n  to sp arsely  used loca lities  or to 
hours a lter  work and before s leep --» a y  6 to 9 p .m , -  -su ff i­
cient for the e x er c ise  of their claim ed priv ilege. M unici­
p a lities are seeking active ly  a solution. * , . ^4
A s observed e a r lie r , restr ic tion s on the priv ilege to use sound
trucks a&ect the geographic lim its  in which the speaker can be heard
and thus lim it h is potential audience. Two other ca ses  dealing with
the m atter of potential lis ten ers  to be noted here are Martin v. Struthers,
319 U .S . 141 (1943). and Jam ison v. T exas. 318 U .S . 413 (1943),
The d ec is ion s in these two c a ses  invalidated ordinances
prohibiting p ersons from  knocking on doors and ringing d oor-b ells to
sum m on occupants for the purpose of handing them  handbills or other
45
printed m ater ia ls . T hese decision s held that house to house d is tr i­
bution and so lic ita tion  could not be en tirely  forbidden, but that a 
m unicipality could punish one who rang the door-bell of a person who 
had indicated by signs or otherw ise h is unwillingness to be disturbed. 
D espite such ru lin gs, it is  reasonable to suppose that one who knocked 
on the door of a house-holder at extrem e hours of the day or night 
to p r e ss  forward h is ideas could be restrained even in the absence
44 Kovacg v . Cooper. 336 U .S . 77 at p. 77(1949).
4* s im ila r  ordinances have been upheld which apply to com -  
m ercia l m ateria ls; see  Breard v. Alexandria. 341 U .S . 623 (1951),
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of ex p ress io n s by the occupant that he was unwilling to receive  in for­
m ation at such tim es. That the speaker should consider this resu lt  
lik ely  is  indicated by the following rem arks of Justice Black:
F reedom  to distribute inform ation to every  citizen  
w herever he d es ires  to rece ive  it is  so c lea r ly  vital to the 
preservation  of a free  soc iety  that, putting aside reasonable  
police and health regulations of the tim e and manner of 
distribution, it m ust be fu lly  preserved , 46
Thus far , the d iscu ssion  Has been concerned with restr iction s
on the speaker*a hour of appearance based on reasonable and non-
arb itrarily  adm inistered regulations. In situations where the speaker
is  denied the right to speak at a certa in  tim e because of having been
refused  a perm it arbitrarily* he may not, under the rule of the Foulos
c a se , supra, go ahead and speak at that tim e: but he must f ir s t  seek
through proper lega l proceedings to have his perm it granted. F rom  a
practica l point of view , as even Justice Reed conceded in h is m ajority
opinion, the delay occasioned by the n ecessa ry  litigation would mean
that the speaker's chance of speaking at h is chosen hour, or one c lo se
to it , would be unlikely. A w areness of this practical resu lt led
Justice Douglas to characterize  the ruling of the Court in the Foulos
^  Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U .S . 105, 146-147  
(1943)--em p h a sis  supplied.
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c a se  a s  effectuating a "previous restraint"  on speech. In this connec­
tion he wrote:
• * . There is  no free speech  in the sense of the Con­
stitution when p erm ission  m ust be obtained from  an officia l 
before a speech  can be made* That is  a previous restraint 
condemned by h istory  and at war with the F ir s t  Amendment*
. . . The judiciary was not granted a priv ilege of restraint 
withheld from  other o ffic ia ls . For h istory proved that judges 
too w ere som etim es tyrants. ^
B ecau se  each speaking situation is  of a transitory nature, a 
delay in the tim e of the execution of a speech may mean that whatever 
purpose the speaker had for the event is  lo st.
In sum m ary, restr ic tion s affecting the speaker's hour of 
appearance should be considered by the speaker in the following ways:
(1) as to their general place in audience and occasion  analysis: (2) as 
to their p ossib le  effect on the number of h is potential listen ers; (3) as 
to their bearing on h is choice of m aterial for an audience, and (4) as 
to their manner of enforcem ent as it may relate to a denial of a 
sp ecific  speech situation.
(b) R estriction s related  to the tim e of the speech in its  con­
nection with surrounding even ts. - -It has been observed in ea r lier  
portions of th is study that the speaker's right to express h im self  
regarding certa in  m atters may depend on what events impinge upon 
the tim e he chooses to make his rem arks. For exam ple, in w artim e,
47 Foulos v. New H am pshire, 73 S. Ct. 760 at p. 777 (1953).
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freedom  of sp eech  may be d rastica lly  curbed, and the speaker may be 
punished for such forbidden utterances as statem ents concerning troop  
m ovem ents and m ilitary  inform ation related  to the conduct of the war 
and national security* S im ilarly , in a period of peace, there are  
certa in  tim es when the speaker may be lim ited  in the e x erc ise  of his 
right to speak* One is  concerned h ere, how ever, not with lim itations 
which m ay be d irected  at the content of a speech, but with those 
restr ic tion s im posed by loca l authorities to prevent rio ts or breaches 
of the peace* These breaches of order m ay occur when a given public 
shows a high degree of h ostility  toward the speaker at a particular  
tim e. This h ostility  m ay resu lt from  a number of factors, but it  
involves the principle of a conflict between the ethos of the speaker 
and the ideas he m ay presen t, and the sentim ent of h is surroundings 
at that tim e. What the surrounding sentim ent may be, may depend, 
of co u rse , on either im m ediate or past events.
D ecision s have been described here which show that the 
state has the power to punish or take steps of prevention when a clear  
and present danger of a breach of the peace a p p ea r s--see , for 
exam ple, the opinion of Justice Roberts in the Cantwell c a se , supra, 
page 308. Certain c a se s  have also been described which concern
E dw ardS. Corwin, The Constitution and What it Means 
Today (Princeton* Princeton U niversity P r e s s , 1948), p. 157.
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the extent to which the speaker h im self may contribute to public unrest
before being punished or restrained . The m ost recent case  on this
point, F einer v . New York, supra, seem s to indicate that sim ply the
reaction  of the audience to the speaker, apart from  the content of the
speech  or the manner of its  making, might be sufficient for the
sp eak er's suppression . Justice Vinson speaking to this point, says:
. . .  The Courts below recognized petitioner's right to  
hold a stree t m eeting at th is loca lity , to make use of loud* 
speaking equipment in giving h is speech , and to make 
derogatory rem arks concerning public o ffic ia ls and the 
A m erican Legion. . . .P etitio n er  was neither arrested  
nor convicted for the making or the content of h is speech. 
Rather it w as the reaction  which it actually engendered. ^
The speaker in preparation for a speech m ust, then, in considering the
general tim e it is  to be given, take into account surrounding conditions,
including whatever h istor ica l and im m ediate events may bear on those 
50
conditions. He m ust, by proper accom m odation of rhetorical prin* 
c ip le s , a lso  seek  to m inim ize the hostility  to h is speech; for h is right 
to speak m ay depend on the degree to which that hostility  m anifests 
its e lf  as a breach of public order.
The efforts of the speaker to adapt h im self to the speaking 
situation w ill require h is consideration of what form s of support to
49 340 U .S . at pp. 319*320.
50 The conditions under which a speech is  given may be largely  
determ ined, of co u rse , by the place of utterance; in this sense there  
are overlapping considerations as to tim e and as to p lace.
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u s e --e th ic a l, em otional or log ica l appeals* With resp ect to the 
m atter of e th os, where the speaker i® associa ted  with ideas in im ical 
to hi® hearer®, he m ay find it difficult to estab lish  enough rapport 
with hi® audience to allow  for a peaceful hearing* Indeed, in the 
P eek sk ill r io ts of 1949, sim ply the appearance of Mr, Paul Robeson
C I
in public brought on breaches of the peace. And while one may not 
be denied the right to speak sim ply because of h is past a sso c ia tio n ,52 
these a ssocia tion s m ay be so fixed in the minds of h is hearers a s to 
engender such a reaction  from  them  upon his appearance as to prevent 
his right to speak,
Chafee com m ents on this problem  as follows?
This breach of peace theory is  peculiarly  liable to abuse 
when applied against unpopular exp ression s and p ractices .
It m akes a man a crim inal sim ply because hie neighbors have 
no se lf-co n tro l and cannot refrain  from v io lence. The 
reductio ad absurdum of this theory was the im prisonm ent of 
Joseph P a lm er, one of Bronson A lcott's fe llo w -se ttler s  at 
1'Fr u it la a d s ," not because he was a com m unist, but because  
he p ersisted  in wearing such a long beard that people kept 
mobbing him , until law and order w ere maintained by shutting 
him  up, 53
5 1 For an account of th is , see  New York T im e s , Septem ber 5, 
1949, p, 1, co l, 8, p, 3 p aesim ; Henry W allace faced a sim ilar  situation  
in the South in h is presidentia l campaign of 1948,
de Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U .S . 353 (1937).
53 Zechariah Chaffe, J r .» F ree  Speech in the United States 
(Cambridge: Harvard U niversity  P r e s s , 1941), pp. 151-152.
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There are som e indications in the decision s that speakers 
who u se  log ica l or rational appeals w ill rece ive  greater protection  
of their rights to speak than those using em otional appeals. Frank­
furter sa y s , for exam ple, "A man who is  , , . using the kind of 
language which would reasonably stir  another to violence does not
have the sam e c la im  to protection as one whose speech is  an appeal 
54
to reason . " In the F einer c a se , Justice Vinson presents a sim ilar
view  as follow s: ". . . It is  one thing to say that the police cannot
be used for the suppression  of unpopular v iew s, and another to say
that, when as here the speaker p a sses  the bounds of argument or
persuasion  and undertakes incitem ent to r io t, they are pow erless to
55prevent a breach of the peace. • , . M
In the Kunz c a se , two rem arks made by Justice Jackson  
concerning the speaker's use of language have a bearing here. At 
one p lace, he says:
W ritten words are le s s  apt to incite or to provoke m ass  
action than spoken w ords, speech being the prim itive and 
direct com m unication with the em otions. Few  are the riots  
caused by publication alone, few are the mobs that have not 
had their im m ediate origin  in harangue. ^
^  Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U .S . 290 at p* 333.
55 340 U .S . 315 at p. 321.
56 340 U .S . 290 at p. 307.
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At another portion of the opinion, he states!
• . , When in a colored  neighborhood F einer urged the 
colored  people to r is e  up in arm s and fight, he was using
the rhetoric of v io len ce, . . . ^
Gray and Braden suggest that the speaker should be aware of 
the audience's state of mind and se lec t a speaking goal appropriate to 
it . Regarding a h ostile  audience, they write:
When you are faced by strong opposition, a ll you can  
hope to do in a given speech  is  to "soften up" your lis ten ers . 
With extrem e opponents, a  speech to inform , rather than to
convince may be advisable. . . . 5®
In sum m ary, the speaker should (1) study the conditions
surrounding the speaking event; (2) take proper steps to m inim ize
h ostility  to h is speech  by an appropriate use of form s of support, and
(3) understand the use of logical appeals and the inform ative speech
for h ostile  audiences.
(c) R estr iction s affecting the duration of a speech. -  -Except 
for the ordinary tim e lim itations which may govern the periods of 
use for speech of a public p lace, no specific  lim itations as to the 
duration of a speech  seem  to derive from  legal princip les. On the 
other hand, one leading free -sp eech  w riter has a sserted  that the
59F ir s t  Amendment "is not the guardian of unregulated ta lkativeness. "
57 ibid. , at p. 310, note 9.
5® Gray and Braden, p. 150,
59 Alexander Meiklejohn, F ree  Speech (New York; Harper & 
B roth ers, 1948), p. 25.
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H is im plication! m oreover, is  that there may be a reasonable lim it in 
the duration of utterance beyond which the speaker may not go and re*  
ce ive  constitutional protection.
One p ractica l situation in which the duration of a speech is  
affected by law occu rs when the speaker is  arrested  or suppressed  
before com pleting h is rem ark s. One w riter has pointed out that where 
the speaker incurs the r isk  of later apprehension for having violated  
a restr ic tio n  on the form  of exp ression , the shorter the duration of 
the proscrib ed  conduct, the le s s  likelihood there w ill be of his 
apprehension.^® In c a se s  where there may be a rrest during a speech, 
the speaker m ay w ish  to choose and organize h is m aterial to make 
b est use of his speaking tim e before he is  restrained .
2. D isposition:
(a) The hour at which a speech may be given affects the 
disposition  or organization of the speech the extent to which the 
speaker* taking into account the convenience and habits of h is auditors 
at that tim e, heightens h is organization or fore*shortens h is rem arks 
in line with such considerations,
(b) When the tim e at which a speech is  to be given presents  
the problem  of the h ostile  audience* the speaker, who would present
60 N otes, 49 Col. U R . 1002.
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h is rem arks before b is  opposition has crysta llized  to dangerous propor­
tio n s, may w ish  to use an inductive organization. The use of the 
inductive order has been described  as follow s;
• • . with the hostile  audience, it may prove w ise to rev erse  
the ord er—to present the proposition after the main points.
An inductive order g ives the speaker the opportunity to move 
from  the lea st controversia l points in the direction of the 
points of greatest d isagreem ent. , . , ^1
(c) Where the speaking situation portends a possib le  shortening 
of the duration of the speech , the speaker may w ish to heighten his 
organization and foreshorten  h is rem arks. He may w ish , a lso , to use 
in these c ircu m stances a deductive arrangem ent for his speech. Gray 
and Braden speak of this arrangem ent as follow s:
The deductive arrangem ent offers both advantages and 
disadvantages. Its ch ief a sse t  is  that it is  possib le for the 
speaker to c lar ify  h is topic early , to keep constantly re* 
minding his lis ten ers  of his proposition, and to s tr e s s  the 
log ica l relationships that ex ist between the proposition and 
the supporting points and between the supporting points them ­
se lv es .
3. E locutio (Style):
(a) Having determ ined the effect of the hour of the speech on
his auditors, the speaker may w ish  to use that type of language to
63which h is  audience would be m ost responsive at that tim e.
L  1
Gray and Braden, p. 358,
62 Ibid.
63 F or a d iscu ssion  of types of language, see Gray and Braden, 
pp. 3 9 1 - 4 6 0 .
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(b) There are indications from  the c a se s  treated in this study 
that the sp eak er’s choice of w ords, apart from  any which have been  
describ ed  as obscene, profane, libelous or"fighting words," may con­
tribute to h is being held liable for a breach of the peace attending his  
rem ark s. Justice Jackson, in a passage from  the Kunz ca se , quoted 
e a r lie r , d escr ib es such words as constituting the "rhetoric" of 
v io len ce. The speaker may w ish  to study breach of peace ca ses to 
determ ine what words w ill, under what conditions, constitute the 
language of v io lence.
(c) Where the duration of the speech may be shortened, the 
speaker may w ish  to forego certa in  sty listic  considerations, to the 
end of presenting the maxim um  amount of subject-m atter in the 
sh ortest tim e.
4. D elivery :
(a) The effect of the hour of the speech on his auditors may 
require the speaker's specia l use of vocal and bodily action to obtain 
from  h is  audience the d esired  response at that tim e. The hour of the 
speech m ay determ ine, a lso , whether the speaker can lawfully em ploy  
loud-speaker equipment to reach h is potential audience.
(b) In severa l decisions noted in this study, m em bers of the 
Court have indicated that the speaker's delivery has important bearing  
on whether or not he should be held liable for a breach of the peace.
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In the F ein er  c a se , it  appears that Justice Vinson was influenced in 
upholding the defendant*s conviction by the fact that he was speaking 
in  a "laud, high-pitched voice* " In another c a se . Justice Jackson  
pointed out:
* . * a b elligerent personality  and an aggressive  manner 
m ay kindle a fight without use of words that in cold type shock 
ue. True judgment w ill be aided by observation of the individual 
defendant, as was possib le  for this jury and tria l court but 
im p ossib le  for us. ^
(c) The rate of delivery  m ay be affected, of cou rse, by the 
duration of the speech*
The foregoing d iscu ssion  presen ts som e of the rhetorical 
im plications arisin g  from  restr ic tion s on the tim e of utterance. The 
d iscu ssion  to follow  w ill be concerned with the rhetorical im plications 
stem m ing from  restr ic tio n s on the place of utterance*
B . P lace
1* Invention:
As an elem ent in audience and occasion  an alysis, Gray and 
Braden describe the importance of the speaker's giving attention to 
the place he is  to speak* They say in this regard:
64 340 U .S . 315 at p. 317.
^  T erm iniello  v. Chicago, 337 U .S . 1 at p. 35.
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The im portance of giving careful thought to the place in  
which you are to speak cannot b© over stressed* The physical 
surroundings may be an a sse t  or a liability* * * * The size  
of the p lace, its  acoustica l prop erties, and the com fort of the 
audience m ust be carefu lly  studied by the speaker*
It becom es important to rev iew , then, what restr ic tion s may 
be im posed  on the p lace of the speech  and to determ ine what rhetorical 
im plications follow* Since the study of the place for speaking is  
p rim arily  an inventive function, m ost of the m aterial dealing with that 
subject-m atter w ill be considered  here*
In the f ir s t  p lace, although the ca ses  studied here have decreed  
that public s tr ee ts  and parks are held in tru st for the public to be used  
for purposes of a ssem b ly  and communication* they have held, a lso , 
that th ese  functions are not to in terfere ser io u sly  with the norm al 
usage of s tr ee ts  and parks* Thus, the right to speak in public p laces  
may be subject to a licen sin g  sy stem  based on statutes narrowly  
drawn, containing reasonable and definite standards for the o ffic ia ls  
to follow* What th ese  standards may be w ill depend on what constitutes 
proper regulation of the particular place in question* In determ ining  
h is right to speak at a sp ec ific  p lace, the speaker w ill need to a s c e r ­
tain for what purpose the place has been dedicated* It is  indicated  
in the Foulos c a se , for exam ple, citing Cox v. New H am pshire, 
supra, that while a city  might not prohibit relig ious m eetings in all
Gray and Braden, p. I ll*
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of its  parks, it  might take one of its  sm all parks and devote it to public
and non -relig iou s purposes under a fair  and non-discrim inatory s y s -  
67tem , This princip le could be applied to other types of speaking*
The question occu rs, of cou rse , what are the restr iction s
upon private p la ces . Chafee speaks to that question as follow s;
Indoor agitation is  usually le s s  restr ic ted  [than outdoor], 
because it  does not in terfere with the general use of public 
a r ea s . On the other hand, lis ten ers  are m ore liable to be 
excited  in a crowded room  than in the open a ir . Even w ith­
out such a danger, a c ity  m ayor is  im pelled by other reason s  
to bar certa in  m eetings in privately owned h a lls , e sp ec ia lly  
when th ese  m eetings are open to the public gratis or for a 
sm all charge. Whenever the subject announced for d iscu ssion  
is  d istastefu l to the m ayor, e . g . ,  birth control, he is  tempted  
to use every  m eans in h is power to prevent the m eeting.
How does he do so?  Often the statutes and ordinances 
m erely  provide that persons uttering obscene or seditious 
words can be punished after the speeches; and no law authorises  
the m ayor to forbid any m eeting in advance because of its 
purpose, or to punish the owner of a hall for perm itting a 
m eeting against the m ayor's orders. Yet in  actual practice  
a mayor has often ex erc ised  such a power by threatening halls  
where forbidden m eetings are held with proceedings for stru c­
tural d efects. The mayor can usually find a statute authorising  
him  to revoke the licen se  of a hall because of such defects as 
insufficient fire  ex its or too narrow sta irca ses  or im proper 
building m ater ia ls . P ast m ayors of Boston have used such a 
statute to prohibit m eetings to promote the Ku Klux Klan or 
advocate the repeal of the M assachusetts law against birth  
control. No owners of halls dared disobey the m ayor, since  
no m atter how much care had been taken in the construction  
and rep a irs of a hall, som e violation of the com plicated building 
regulations probably ex isted , for which the mayor could if  
defied revoke the owner's licen se  and deprive him of a ll  
profits from  h is investm ent for som e tim e to com e, , , .
67 73 S. Ct. 760 at p. 763, 
Chafee, pp, 525-526,
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In c a se s  and in w ritings on freedom  of expression , there are
indications that the right to e x er c ise  free  speech on a given occasion
m ay depend on whether the speech  is  to he made in a private or a public
place* In the Kuna c a se , for exam ple, Justice Jackson im plies in his
d issenting opinion that had Kuna made h is speech in a hall and not in a
public s tr e e t , he would have upheld the le tter 's  right to constitutional
protection for the sam e rem arks* R especting th is , he w rote t
* • • We would have a very  different question if  Hew York 
had presum ed to say that Kunz could not speak h is p iece in 
h is own pulpit or hall* But it has undertaken to restra in  him  
only if  he chooses to speak at street m eetings. There is  a 
world of difference* The street preacher takes advantage 
of people's presence on the stree ts  to im pose h is m essage  
upon what, in  a sen se , is  a captive audience* A m eeting  
on private property is  made up of an audience that has 
volunteered to  listen* The question, therefore, is  not 
whether New York could, if  if tried , s ilen ce  Kuna, but 
whether it  m ust place its  s tree ts  at h is serv ice  to hurl 
insu lts at the passerby. ^
In addition to this concept of the "involuntary audience, " the 
philosophy behind the distinction made between rights in a public place 
and those in a private place seem s to r e st  on the fact that a breach of 
the peace in a public place m ay get out of hand quicker and cause m ore 
damage than one in a private place* Disruption of order in a public 
place m ay tend im m ediately to disrupt normal a c tiv itie s , to interfere  
with pedestrian  and vehicular traffic , and thus, to create at an early  
stage a chaotic condition* In brief, clear and present danger to public
Kunz v. New York, 340 U .S . 290 at p. 296 <1950).
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order m ay m anifest it s e lf  m ore quickly and m ore substantially in  a
public p lace than in a private one. ^
The rh etorica l im plication  of the distinction between speech
rights in public and private p laces is  that the speaker m ay have to
adapt h im se lf and h is  m ateria l to the standards respecting each c la ss
o f p la ces . The surrounding conditions of the place itse lf  m ay tend,
of co u rse , to influence a breach of the peace: and the speaker w ill
need to know those conditions and make adjustm ents regarding his
speech  in accord with the princip les noted ea r lier  concerning the
speaker and breach of peace situations.
A unique situation is  presented in the Term fnlello case:
here,the opposition to the speech-m aking cam e not from  the audience
its e lf , but from  those in  the stree ts  outside the hall. Chief Justice
Vinson, speaking of this feature of the e a se , rem arked:
. . . C ertainly, the Court does not decide whether the 
violent opposition of those outside the hall, who did not 
hear the sp eech , could constitutionally warrant the con- 
vietion  of the petitioner in order to keep the streets  from  
becom ing ideological battle-grounds. ♦ . .
Another problem  related  to the place o f the speech has to do
with restr ic tio n s which m ay be applied to the manner in which a
speech  can be given. Since the hearers of speakers in s tree ts  and
7 n Ibid. , at pp. 300-301; see  a lso , Feiner v. New York, 340 
U .S . 315 at p. 320, note 2.
71 337 U .S . 1 at p . 8.
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public p laces m ay be com posed large ly  of Mcasu a lfl or Mspontaneous'’ 
groups, the speaker, to transform  these groups into an audience#
•'must gain a hearing, e n lis t  attention, and develop in terest in the 
subject before he can hope to present h is main thoughts* .«72 To
accom plish  th is purpose, the speaker m ay need to make u se , for exam ple, 
of sound am plifying equipment. If at the place of the speech  there  
apply restr ic tio n s  against u se  of such equipment, the speaker may 
obviously be deprived of reaching h is potential audience*
F in a lly , further mention should be made of the problem  of 
"captive audience*" This situation occurs whenever the public's right 
of privacy is  invaded by the expressions of others* The m ost notable
73ca se  bearing on th is question is  Public U tility C om m ission v* P oliak , 
decided by the Court in 1952. It arose  when the bus company in the 
D istr ic t of Columbia began to pipe m usic, announcements and occasional 
com m ercia ls into their buses. The Court of Appeals of the D istr ict  
enjoined this activ ity  on the ground that bus r id ers constitute a 
captive audience and cannot be com pelled to lis ten  to such m usic , 
announcements or com m ercia ls . The Supreme Court overruled the 
Court of A ppeals, holding that the action of the bus company did not 
su ffic ien tly  in terfere with the general public convenience, com fort
72 Gray and Braden, p* 122*
73 343 U .S . 451 (1952).
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or sa fety  of Us rider a to require protection against it* There are  
indications in the m ajority opinion of Justice Burton and in the con* 
curring opinion of Justice B lack that had public speech or propaganda 
been involved their d ecision s would have been different.
To conclude th is d isc u ss io n , th e re  a re  p re se n te d  the fallow ing 
sum m ary rem arks: ( i)  The speaker's p lans for the  p lace of h is  speech  
m ust take into account what h is rights may be w ith  re g a rd  to such p lace . 
A determ ination of h is  rights involves a  consideration of (a) the 
general c la ss if ica tio n s of the place*-park , stree t, private building;
(b) the location  and norm al usage of the street or park d esired  for 
speech; and (c) what restr ic tio n s may ex is t  as to manner o i expression .
(2) The speaker w ill need to know the d istinctions between his protection  
in private p laces and public p laces , and be able to make adjustm ents 
in h is  speaking for each c la s s  of p laces,
2, D isposition:
The p lace at which a speech  can be given w ill affect the 
organisation of the sp eech  the extent to which the total speech* of 
which the organisation is  an integral part* m ust be adapted for that 
situation. If public p laces are involved and there is  danger of 
opposition to the speech* the speaker may w ish to use the inductive 
order of presentation . This order has been described e a r lie r .
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3. E locutio:
Since the speaker's choice of words may contribute to h is  
being held resp onsib le  for d isord erly  conduct, the speaker m ay w ish  
to determ ine the standards of "lawful" language applying resp ectively  
to public and private p laces,
4 , Q eliverys
The p lace where a sp eech  can be given w ill affect the delivery  
of the sp eech  the extent to which the speaker, taking into account the 
environm ental conditions, m ust make appropriate adaptations of h is 
vocal and bodily action. F or effective presentation , the place of 
the speech  m ay require the speaker's use of loud*speaking devicess 
whatever restr ic tio n s  may apply to that place regarding use of these  
d ev ices w ill, of cou rse , affect the delivery ,
C. Manner
R egulations restr ictin g  freedom  of expression  because of the 
manner of its  e x er c ise  m ust, like those regulations concerned with 
tirw# and p lace, relate substantially to the public's in terest and be 
se t forth with sufficient defin iten ess. What p recise  ru les govern the 
regulation of the manner of expression  depend, in each c a se , on the 
particu lar method or manner of expression  under consideration.
A s Justice Clark pointed out in the Burstyn film  case:
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. • . Nor does it  follow  that motion picture© are n ec essa r ily  
subject to the p rec ise  ru les governing any other particular  
method of exp ression . Each method tend© to present its  own 
peculiar problem s. ^
The Court, in various opinions, has held that picketing, motion
p ic tu res , parades, distribution and solicitation  of relig iou s or politica l
tr a c ts , and the use of phonographs, loud*speakers and sound trucks are
all m ethods of exp ression  within the free  speech guaranty of the F ir st
and Fourteenth Am endm ents, The c a se s  in point are included in
Chapter H of th is  study. H owever, since th is inquiry is  concerned
p rim arily  with determ ining the effect of restr iction s on the m ost common
public speaking situations, only those c a ses  dealing with these types
of situations w ill be considered  h ere. It should be noted, a lso , that
radio speaking and te lev is ion  speaking are subject to specia l private
and governm ental regulations and so  do not fa ll within the scope of 
75th is study.
F or the average speaker, the m ost significant c a se s  dealing 
with restra in ts on the manner of utterance are those concerning the 
u se  of loud-speakers or sound-trucks. Justice Douglas, speaking 
for the Court in the Saia c a se , said , "Loud-speakers are today 
indispensable instrum ents of effective public speech. The sound truck
74 343 U .S . 495 at p. 503 (1952).
'  ̂ F or problem s of radio cen sorsh ip t see  Note. "Radio Cen- 
©orship and the F ed eral Communications C om m ission ," 39 Col, L* R ev, 
447 (1939); as to te lev is ion , see  Note, 35 Va. L. R ev, 1092 (l949 j.
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has becom e an accepted method of politica l campaigning. It i s  the 
way people are reached. * . * The present ordinance would be a 
dangerous weapon if it w ere allowed to get a hold on our public life .
And although he was w illing to have a c ity  prevent abuse of the u se of 
sound equipm ent by narrow ly drawn laws regulating the d ec ib els, he 
says at another points
In th is c a se  a perm it was denied because som e persons  
w ere sa id  to have found the sound annoying. In the next 
one, a  perm it m ay be denied because som e people find the 
id eas annoying. Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked as annoy­
ance at sound. ??
1. Invention:
If, in  certa in  c a se s , a s Justice Douglas su ggests, sound trucks 
m ay be the n e c essa ry  m eans to reach the people, any interdiction of 
their use would ser io u sly  in terfere with the speaker's attem pts to use  
"the available m eans of persuasion;" a lso , since the speaker's potential 
audience would be lim ited , so would be the speech 's end and object.
It is  noteworthy that although the Court in the Saia case  invalidated a 
prior restra in t on the use of sound equipment, it upheld an ordinance 
in the succeeding K ovacs case  which made unlawful the use of any 
sound am plifying device "emitting loud and raucous noises"  on the 
str ee ts  of the c ity . Both Justices Jackson and B lack who w rote,
76 333 U .S . 558 at p. 561 (1948).
77 Ibid. , p. 562.
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resp ec tiv e ly , a concurring and a dissenting opinion, agreed that such  
an ordinance could be interpreted to ban a ll sound truck© from  the city  
streets*  Justice Jackson said;
1 join the judgment sustaining the Trenton ordinance b e­
cause I b elieve that operation of m echanical sound-am plifying  
d evices conflicts with quiet enjoyment of home and park and 
with safe and leg itim ate use of stree t and m arket p lace, and 
that it is  constitutionally subject to regulation or prohibition  
by the state or m unicipal authority. No violation of the Due 
P r o c e ss  Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by reason  of 
infringem ent of free  speech a r ise s  u n less such regulation or 
prohibition undertakes to censor the contents of the broad­
casting . F reedom  of speech  for Kovacs doe© not, in my 
view , include freedom  to use sound am plifiers to drown out 
the natural speech  of o thers.
I do not agree that, if  we sustain regulation© or prohibitions 
of sound tru ck s, they m ust therefore be valid if applied to 
other m ethods of C om m unication of id eas, " The moving 
picture screen , the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the 
sound truck and the stree t corner orator have differing  
natures, va lu es, abuses and dangers. F ach  in my v iew , is  
a law  unto it s e lf , and a ll we are dealing with now is  the sound 
truck.
But 1 agree w ith Mr, Justice Black that this decision  is  
a repudiation of that in Saia v , New York, 334 0 ,  S„ 558. Like 
him , I am unable to find anything in this record to warrant a 
distinction because of 'floud and racous" tones of this m achine. 
The Saia d ecision  struck down a m ore moderate ex er c ise  of 
the sta te 's  police power than the one now sustained, Trenton, 
as the ordinance reads to m e, unconditionally ban© all sound 
trucks from  the c ity  s tr ee ts , , , ,
Justice B lack wrote;
. . . And it is  an obvious fact that public speaking today 
without sound am plifiers is  a wholly inadequate way to reach
78 336 U .S . 77 at pp. 97-98 (1949)
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the people on a large sc a le , . . . I would agree without 
reservation  to the sentim ent that "unrestrained use throughout 
a m unicipality of a ll sound amplifying dev ices would he in ­
to lerab le , " , * . A c ity  ordinance that reasonably re str ic ts  
the volum e of sound, or the hours during which an am plifier  
may he used , does not, in my mind, infringe the constitu­
tionally  protected  area  of free  speech. It is  because this 
ordinance does none of these things, but is  instead an abso­
lute prohibition of a ll u ses of an am plifier on any of the 
str ee ts  of Trenton at any tim e that X m ust d issen t, ^
With regard to the effect of the Kovacs decision  and Justice
R eed 's attempt to lim it the scope of the action taken by the m ajority,
one w riter  has made the following observations
. , . They found in favor of the ordinance one other 
elem en t, nam ely, the use of loud-speakers was not banned 
from  the parks or open spaces off the s tr ee ts . Justice Reed 
does not attem pt to recon cile  this holding with the rtiling of 
the Schneider case  that "one is  not to have the ex er c ise  of 
h is lib erty  of exp ression  in appropriate p laces abridged on 
the plea that it m ay be ex erc ised  e ls e w h e r e .11 The m ere  
fact that the would-be speakers w ere perm itted to use other 
property in the town did not make the ordinance forbidding 
the use of the str ee ts  m ore valid , for the stree ts  are c u s ­
tom ary p laces for such a c tiv itie s , ^
Admitting that the K ovacs decision  allow s c it ie s  to ban a ll
sound-trucks and sound am plifying equipment, future speakers may 
have to devise  other m eans for reaching people on a large sca le .
2. D isposition , E locution and D elivery .
R estr iction s prohibiting the use of eound-trucka for speech
79 Ibid. , pp. 103-104
80 Wood, p. 78.
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would affect the organisation and style  of a speech only so far as its  
tran sfer  from  one m edium  to another would show a need for m odifica­
tion of sty le  or structure* Such prohibitions would obviously bear 
on the d elivery  of a speech* and the interdiction on sound-trucks or 
other loud-speaking equipment would rem ove effective reinforcem ent 
for the natural voice*
This chapter has treated  in the fram ework of a rhetorical 
an alysis those restr ic tio n s on speech  which are concerned with the 
tim e, place and manner of utterance* Chapter IV* following* w ill 
include a d iscu ssion  of the rhetorical im plications contained in 
lim itations which m ay be applied to the content of exp ression --!*  e . » 
to the words* or the ideas of the speaker* Before proceeding to the 
subject-m atter of Chapter IV* however* the following b rief sum m ary  
of the princip les just treated is  presented:
1, It has been determ ined that the speaker m ust take into 
consideration the follow ing restr iction s in connection with hie choice  
of the time* place and manner of h is speech* - -
A. R estr iction s "Before the Event11:
1* R egulations on the form  of expression  in public 
p laces by way of perm it or licen se  requirem ents. - -  Statutes may 
be e n a c te d  which prevent seriou s interference with normal usage of
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str e e ts  and parks, but a statute creating a licensing system  allowing  
adm inistrative o ffic ia ls d iscretion  to grant or withhold a perm it 
unrelated to proper regulation of public p laces w ill be invalidated as 
a prior restra in t. Where there is  a valid enactm ent, how ever, the 
speaker m ust obtain the required perm it before speaking, and w ill 
be punished for h is failure to do so even if such perm it was arb itrarily  
withheld from  him ,
2, G eneral police-pow er ordinances im posed on the 
form  of exp ression , - -  H ere, for exam ple, regulation of the manner 
of exp ression  by ordinances banning sound-trucks em itting "loud and 
raucous" n o ises  w ill be upheld. There is  som e indication that 
ordinances w ill be upheld which ban the use of a ll sound-trucks,
B , R estr iction s "After the Event*1 a
It has been pointed out that the speaker m ay be punished 
or restra ined  from  speaking if  h is speech  g ives r ise  to a breach of the 
peace. In th is situation the words or the ideas of the speaker may  
not be involved, and the c lear and present danger test w ill be used .
It is  indicated that the place of speaking-* private or public-* is  
im portant in making the test,
II, It has been observed that the restr iction s noted above 
affect the sp e a k e r s  purpose, choice and adaptation of h is m ateria l, 
and that they may affect the organization, style and delivery  of h is  
rem ark s. The sp ecific  application of rhetorical princip les to these  
restr ic tio n s has been previously  set out in detail.
CHAPTER IV
RESTRICTIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE OF EXPRESSION
This chapter concerns itse lf  with a d iscu ssion  of the rhetorical 
im plications contained in lim itations which may he applied to the 
substance of expression* Sp ecifica lly , it w ill deal with two c la s se s  
of r estr ic tio n s , those concerned with what is  generally  ca lled  "non* 
protected" sp eech , and those concerned with the free  expression  of 
id eas. An understanding of the sou rces of these two c la s s e s  of re* 
sfriction s may be facilitated  by including here the following quotation:
While freedom  of exp ression  is  e ssen tia l to the s u c c e s s ­
ful functioning of a dem ocratic society , the consequences of 
exp ression  m ay include m ore than the free interchange of 
ideas* Some of these consequences may be so  harmful to 
leg itim ate in terests  of the state that its right to prevent the 
causative conduct should not be defeated m erely  because such  
conduct happens to be verbal. * * *
When words are used to conspire toward or incite to the 
com m ission  of a cr im e, or to deprive another of h is property  
unlawfully, or to be insulting or obscene, the absence of a 
soc ia l in terest in perm itting such expression  may cause it  
to be regarded as not coming within the protection of the 
F ir s t  Amendment at all* The resu lt reached does not, how* 
ever , depend upon such an an a lysis , since the nature and 
proxim ity of the threatened consequence in these ca ses would 
c lea r ly  outweigh the socia l in terest in perm itting the par­
ticular type of expression .
A m ore difficult problem  a r ise s  when the policy of p r e ­
venting so c ia lly  unde sir  able conduct conflicts with the 
important soc ia l in terest in free expression  of the m ost
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varied politica l id eo log ies. Since it is  restr iction  of this  
type of exp ression  that ha® been involved in leg isla tion  
directed against "subversive" m ovem ents, the constitutional 
problem s im plic it in  such leg isla tion  m erit exam ination. *
A, N on p rotected  Speech
Concerning speech  which may be regarded as not coming 
within the protection of the Constitution at a ll, Justice Murphy* s view s 
in Chaplinsky v. New Ham pshire provide the c la ss ic  statements
There are certa in  w ell-defined and narrowly lim ited  
c la s s e s  of speech , the prevention and punishment of which 
have never been thought to ra ise  any constitutional prob­
lem . These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the 
lib elou s, and the insulting or "fighting words'*--those which 
by their very  utterance in flict injury or tend to incite to an 
im m ediate breach of the peace. It has been w ell observed  
that such utterances are no essen tia l part of any exposition  
of id eas, and are of such slight socia l value as a step to 
truth that any benefit that may be derived from  them  is  
c lea r ly  outweighed by the soc ia l in terest in order and 
m orality . "Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in 
any proper sen se  comm unication of inform ation or opinion 
safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a 
crim inal act would ra ise  no question under that instrum ent. " 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U .S . 296, 309-310. ^
As observed in Chapter I of this study, lib el, as a type of non­
protected exp ression , includes today, under the recent Beauh.arn.ais 
d ecision , group-libel as w ell as private libel. Both of these form s  
of lib el w ill be considered in the d iscussion  to follow which treats
1 N otes, 49 Col. U R . 363, 365-366 (1949).
2 315 U .S . 568, 571-572 (1942).
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the various c la s s e s  of speech  set out by Justice Murphy above,
1, The Lewd, the Obscene and the Profane,
In 1916, Dean Roacoe Pound w rote, "Th© Constitution does
not protect the c itisen  in publishing im m oral or indecent m atter, nor
3
guarantee such publication against prohibition by the leg isla tu re. " 
Publication here em braces vocal exp ression , and Dean Pound*e ob ser­
vation has been follow ed in general by the Court-. This has been  
illu strated  in Chaplinsky v. New Ham pshire and Cantwell v , Connecti­
cut, supra. On the other hand, even in those c a se s  in which the speech  
is  not 1'substantially within the ambit of constitutional protection, the 
Court m ay demand that governing bodies seeking to regulate sp eech  do
so through statu tes, regu lations, or custom s that are ar tis tica lly
4
drawn or enunciated, "
Several c a se s  w ere described in Chapter I in which statutes 
of the type in question w ere invalidated because of vagueness and their  
tendency to allow  arbitrary action constituting a prior restraint on 
speech . Among these w ere , the Winters ca se , in which the Court o ver­
ruled a conviction for distribution of m atter containing "m assed accounts
 ̂ R oscoe Pound, “Equitable R elief Against Defam ation, " 29 
Harvard JL.R, 640 (1916),
4 Henry M, K ittleson and J. A llen Smith, "Free Speech (1949- 
1952); Slogans v. States' R ights,"  5 U. of F la , D .R , 227, 240 (1952).
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5of crim e and bloodshed;11 the ca se  of G elling v, Texas* in which the
Court upset a conviction for defying an ordinance which allowed a
licen sin g  authority to prohibit p ictures which m ight be ‘‘prejudicial to
6the in terests  of the community s'1 and in the Burstyn film  case* the 
Court disapproved the denial of a licen se  for the p icture, The M iracle , 
on the ground that it was " sacrileg iou s,
Justice Clark, delivering the opinion of the Court in the 
Burstyn c a se , wrotej
New York's highest court say® there is  "nothing m y ste r i­
ou s11 about the statutory provision  applied in th is cases M£t 
is  sim ply  this: that no relig ion , as that word is  understood  
by the ordinary reasonable person, shall be treated  with con­
tem pt, m ockery, scorn and rid icule • * » » M This is  far 
from  the kind of narrow exception to freedom  of exp ression  
which a state may carve out to sa tisfy  the adverse demands 
of other in terests  of soc iety . In seeking to apply the broad 
and a ll- in c lu s iv e  definition of "sacrilegious" given by the 
New York cou rts, the cen sor is  set adrift upon a boundless 
sea  amid a m yriad of conflicting currents of relig iou s v iew s, 
with no charts but those provided by the m ost vocal and pow er­
ful orthodoxies. New York cannot v est such unlim ited r e ­
straining control over motion pictures in a cen sor, Cf, Kunz 
v. New York* 340 U ,S . 290 (1951), Under such a standard 
the m ost carefu l and tolerant censor would find it v irtually  
im possib le to avoid favoring one relig ion  over another, and 
he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the exp ression  
of unpopular sentim ents sacred  to a relig ious m inority. Appli­
cation of the "sacrilegious" te s t, in these or other re sp ec ts , 
might ra ise  substantial questions under the F ir s t  Am endment's 
guaranty of separate church and state with freedom  of worship
5 W inters v. New York. 333 U .S . 507 (1948).
6 343 U .S . 960 (1952).
7 343 U .S . 495 (1952).
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for all* H owever, from  the standpoint of freedom  of speech  
and the p r e ss , it  is  enough to point out that the state has no 
leg itim ate in terest in protecting any or a ll relig ions from  
view s d istastefu l to them  which is  sufficient to justify prior 
restra in ts upon the exp ression  of those views* It i s  not the 
bu sin ess of government in our nation to suppress rea l or 
im agined attacks upon a particular relig ious doctrine, whether 
they appear in publications, speeches* or motion pictures.**
F rom  the opinions in the Burstyn c a se , it would appear that the
Supreme Court repudiates the idea of fixed standards of profane or
sacrileg iou s speech . It i s  c lea r , therefore, that what m ay be profane
words constituting non-protected speech is  not p rec ise ly  determ ined.
K ittleson and Sm ith, com m enting on the effect of the Burstyn decision ,
w rite:
Unlike lib e l, sacrileg iou s speech is  protected speech , 
to be lim ited , if  at a ll, by the c lear  and present danger 
rule* This spring the Court reversed  itse lf  to declare that, 
sin ce m ovies constitute a great medium of com m unication, 
their display to the public demands the fundamental p rotec­
tion accorded older form s of speech* By im plication, it  
suggests that obscene film s w ill receive  no protection at 
all* The rationale a lso  perm its the conclusion that libelous 
film s or "fighting words" film s are unprotected form s of 
com m unication.
A s indicated in the above quotation, the Burstyn d< c is io n  
appears to make sacrileg iou s speech  protected and, therefore, lim ited  
only by the c lear  and present danger rule* On the other hand,
® 343 U .S . 495, 500 (1952); the Court of Appeals a lso  gave 
"sacrilegious"  the following meaning; "the act of violating or pro­
faning anything sacred . " See 303 N* Y. 242, 255; see  a lso  Justice  
F r a n k fu r te r ’s  concurring opinion in the principal ca se .
 ̂ K ittleson and Smith, p* 240*
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obscene sp eech --lik e  the other var ieties of exp ression  described a s
sp eech  not constitutionally p ro tec ted --is  not punished by applying the
traditional c lear  and present danger test* It is  punished because
such utterances are considered to constitute no e ssen tia l part of any
11
exposition  of ideas and are no soc ia l value as a step toward truth*
In rem arking on the law affecting obscene and profane speech , Chafee 
has said:
* * • The purpose of the law is  to protect readers [and 
h earers] from  the ser iou s shock to their sensib ilities*
This is  an im m ediate injury which takes place the moment 
that indecent language is  seen  or heard. It is  the sam e 
explanation a s that com m only given for laws against pro­
fanity. Profane and g r o ss ly  indecent m atter does not form  
an essen tia l part of an exposition of id eas, and it has a 
very  slight so c ia l value as a step toward truth. Those are  
the in terests  which we norm ally consider in advocating 
freedom  of speech* but they play practica lly  no part h ere. 
They are c lea r ly  outweighed by the socia l in terest in the 
peace of mind of those who hear and se e . Words of this 
type offer little  opportunity for the usual p rocess of counter­
argument* The harm  is  done as soon as they are com m uni­
cated or is  liable to follow  alm ost im m ediately In the form  
of reta lia tory  violence* The words are crim in al, not 
because of the ideas they communicate or their liab ility  to 
produce future im m oral ac ts , but because they are rea lly  
like acts in causing im m ediate d isagreeable consequences 
to the five se n se s . The man who u ses foul talk in a s tr e e t­
car is  as much of a nuisance as the man who sm okes there.
It is  possib le  that this explanation su ffices for som e 
obscenity  c a se s  . • • .H ow ever, this argument w ill not 
work for a ll obscenity situations, esp ecia lly  not for those
^  See Beauharnais v , Illin o is, 343 U .S . 250 (1952)
11 See 315 U .S . 568, 571-572 (1942).
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which ra ise  the m ost controversy. The objection which the 
Watch and Ward Society m akes to many of the books it w ishes  
to suppress is  not that these book© offend readers but that they  
delight them  , . . , The true fear of the censor is  that the 
ideas se t forth w ill in the long run undermine our present 
system  of m arriage and m orality, , , . *2
One author su ggests that profane and obscene speech  should
be judged by the clear and present danger doctrine to be applied under
breach of the peace sta tu tes. H is contention is  that while there is
no so c ia l value in these types of ex p ress io n s, there is danger in
condoning convictions because a judge can see  no soc ia l utility  in the 
13c om munication.
The rhetorical im plications contained in lim itations on obscene  
and profane speech  appear as follow s:
(X) F rom  the standpoint of invention, the speaker to escape  
punishment m ust avoid the use of profane and obscene speech.
D ifficulty a r is e s  here sin ce there are no fixed standards to judge what 
constitutes th ese  types of speech , particu larly where sacrileg iou s or 
profane utterances are in question. It is  settled  law , how ever, that 
statutes punishing obscene or profane speech  w ill be invalidated if  
they are vague, constitute a prior restra in t or allow for arbitrary  
action by enforcing authorities,
12 Zechariah. Chafee, J r . , Government and M ass Communica* 
tiong (Chicago: The U niversity of Chicago P r e ss , 194*4 Volume I at 
pp. 56-57.
13 Chester Antieau, "The Rule of Clear and P resent Dangers 
Scope of its  A p p licab ility ,11 48 Mich, JL, R ev, 811, 834 (1950),
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(2) Obscene and profane speech is  punished* it is  said , because  
it  does not form  an essen tia l part of an exposition of ideas and has alight 
so c ia l value as a step toward truth* Judgment of the socia l utility  of 
a particular com m unication would have to take into account the context 
in which it was given including such factors of meaning as style and 
delivery . It is  said , a lso , that obscene and profane words are crim inal 
because they cause offense to the h earer 's  sensib ilities*  Although it 
has been pointed out that such a rationale w ill not fit all c a se s ,  
determ ination of crim inality  even on this b asis  would need to take into 
account in what manner and under what circum stances the questioned  
utterances w ere given,
2, Private and Group Libel*
The d iscu ssion  to follow w ill deal with restr iction s relating  
to defam atory com m unications. Defam ation has been defined as  
follow s: "A comm unication is  defam atory if  it  tends so to harm the 
reputation of another as to lower him  in the estim ation of the community 
or to deter third persons from  associating  or dealing with him , M̂  
Although c a ses  dealing with defamatory comm unications 
ordinarily speak of lib el as non-protected speech, oral expression  of 
defam atory rem arks is  included, a lso , within this c la ssifica tion .
^  3 R estatem ent of T orts» sec , 559*
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An under standing of how this occurs may be facilitated  by the following  
definitions s
Libel i s  the principal branch of the law of defamation*
The other branch is  slander* Whereas in lib el the derogatory  
statem ents are printed or otherw ise perm anent, in slander  
they take a tran sitory  form  and usually con sist of spoken 
words or insulting gestures* The responsib ility  for slander  
is  m ore lim ited  than for libel* Ordinary lib el is  actionable 
if  the com m unication is  defam atory--tends to harm  the plain­
tiff, even if  he cannot show that it has actually done so as 
yet* In an action of slander, on the other hand, the plaintiff 
m ust prove actual harm  to him  ( e .g . ,  the lo ss  of a job), un less  
the com m unication is  of a particularly damaging character  
such as a charge of crim e or of conduct and qualities incom ­
patible with the proper ex erc ise  of h is bu siness or profession* 
For exam ple, it is  not safe to say in conversation that a m ilk - 
dealer w aters h is m ilki but you can accuse him  of cheating at 
golf with impunity so long as you do not cause him som e  
sp ec ific  lo ss  like his expulsion from  the club or making his 
fiancee scornfully break off the engagement* Yet if you 
w rite in a letter  that he cheats at golf, you may have to pay 
him  substantial dam ages although nothing happens thereafter . ^
For purposes of this d iscu ssio n lib el and slander w ill be used  
interchangeably, but it should be understood from  the quotation above 
that resp onsib ility  for oral defam ation may be m ore lim ited  under c e r ­
tain circum stances than responsib ility  for written rem arks of a 
sim ilar  nature. It should be pointed out h ere, a lso , that many courts 
have held that radio and phonograph defamation are form s of libels the 
reason s for these holdings seem  to r est on the fact that radio broad­
casting reaches many lis ten ers and phonograph records are of permanent
15 Chafee, Government and M ass Communications, pp. 77-
78.
13 7
n a tu r e .^
Defam ation m ay resu lt in both c iv il and crim inal actions.
If a lib e l is  outrageousv the defendant may be prosecuted and im«
prisoned in addition to paying damages in a c iv il action* P rosecutions
17for crim inal lib el are rare* On the other hand* c iv il actions
against defendants accused of defamation are rather common* But
even in  these actions the only rem edy for lib el recognized by law
IBis  an action for dam ages triable by a jury. In other words* an 
action for lib el m ay be maintained only to recover after the publication  
of defam atory m aterial* and an action w ill not lie  to enjoint such publi­
cation.
Since the law  of defamation invclves com plex legaJ issu es*  a 
fu ll d iscu ssion  of it here would require a m ore extended treatm ent 
than can be afforded in this study. For that reason* only certain
19general observations relating to the law of libel w ill be included here.
In general* there are four defenses to actions for defamations (1)
Truth. —"At common law the truth of a defam atory statem ent is  a
Ibid* * P* 79.
17 Ib id ., p. 115.
18 P>id « » P* 8 8 *
^  F or a sum m ary of the law of libel and alander aee, 
R estatem ent of Torta, s e c s , 558-623.
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com plete defense. In many states* how ever, statute® or constitutions
provide that truth is  a defense u n less the m atter was published ‘from
2o
m aliciou s m otives*. "
(2) F air Comment. - -  "C riticism  of so much of another's ac tiv itie s as
are m atters of public concern is  priv ileged  if  the c r it ic ism , although
defam atory, (a) is  upon a true . , . statem ent of fact , . . and (b)
rep resen ts the actual opinion of the c r it ic , and (c) is  not made so le ly
21for the purpose of causing harm  to the other*"
(3) A statem ent of fa c ts--h o n estly  and reasonably believed --in volv in g
22an important in terest of the one receiving the information; and (4)
23A fair and accurate report of a public proceeding.
With resp ect to (2) above, the following rem arks bear on fair
com m ent of candidates for office and public officers;
The public conduct of every  public officer and candidate 
for office is  always a m atter of public concern in the 
community in which he holds or seek s office* The area of 
priv ileged  com m ent is  not confined to such community, how­
ev er , if the public conduct of the officer is  of m ore than local 
in terest, If c r it ic ism  of a public officer or candidate is  a
20 Chafee, Government and M ass Comm unications, p, 80,
21 R estatem ent of T orts, sec , 606 (1),
22 Chafee, Government and M ass Communications, p. 81
23 Restatem ent of T orts, sec , 621, Comment c .
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m eans of attacking a politica l system  of which he is  a part, 
or if  the c r it ic ism  for any reason  affects a public policy  
of w idespread in terest, the area of comment may be e x ­
tended as far as the in terest is  fe lt. Thus, the conduct of 
a judicial or executive officer who has participated in or 
fa iled  to prevent a g ro ss  m iscarriage of justice may be 
cr it ic ised  outside the community in which he holds office.
The concern which a ll c itizen s have in the proper 
conduct of public a ffa irs by public o fficia ls requires that 
they have a wide freedom  to d iscu ss among them selves  
the public conduct of their o fficers and the qualifications 
of those who seek  public office. Those who hold such 
offices and those who offer th em selves as candidates th ere­
for, by so doing subject their public acts to honest cr itic ism  
even though it be extravagant and unjustified, „ . . ^
Regarding the dam ages which a plaintiff may receive  in a 
c iv il action for defam ation, one w riter has given the following sum ­
marys
D am ages w ill depend upon plaintiff's su ccess  in  proving 
the nature and extent of the harm  done him  and the intent of 
the defendant. In judging and fixing dam ages, the court w ill 
cstnsider carefully! (a) the content of the publication; (b) 
the circu m stances in which it was uttered; (c) the soc ia l 
status of the plaintiff; (d) the area , extent, and duration of 
the defamation; (e) the perform ance of a public apology or 
retraction  by the defendant; (£) h is motives (g) his b e lie f in  
the truth of what he said; and (h) proof of possib le  future 
harm  to the plaintiff*
The courts w ill com pensate for mental suffering caused  
by the injury, in addition to lo ss  suffered in character and 
reputation. A guilty defendant is  liable at lea st for nominal 
dam ages. Such an award is  made where the injury is  
sligh t, or where the poor reputation of the plaintiff perm its  
reasonable inference that he suffered no substantial hurt. 
G eneral dam ages are awarded where significant and
24 R estatem ent of T orts, se c . 607, Comments b and c.
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m easurable harm  has been done. Special damages lor  mental 
suffering, in  such c a se , m ay a lso  be awarded, 25
Thus far th is d iscu ssion  has been concerned prim arily  with
c iv il actions which m ay be brought against persons for their defamation
of individuals or sm all groups of people* With resp ect to defamation
of a large co llec tiv ity , there has not been to date a single case in which
a person  has been held c iv illy  responsib le for the defamation of a large
grou p .26 In the Beauharnais caee  (See Chapter II) how ever, the
defendants w ere held crim in ally  responsib le for the defamation of a large  
27c la s s  of people, and so this ca se  d eserves attention h ere. Two 
authors, com m enting on the Beauharnais decision , provide the following 
analysis:
Beauharnais v , Illin o is is  an outstanding exam ple of the 
use of these words [of Justice Murphy in the Chaplinaky case] 
to estab lish  a new and controlling principle in delineating the 
area of protected speech* The case sustains the constitu­
tionality  of group-libel statu tes, which are attem pts by le g is ­
latures to control tirades against groups, c la s s e s ,  re lig io n s, 
r a c e s , and so c ie tie s  that if made against individuals would 
be libelous and punishable. Ordinary lib e l, of cou rse, pro­
tec ts  only the individual* Competent scholars who have in ­
quired into the m erits of these statutes generally  doubt their  
w isdom , . . .  To our present inquiry, how ever, Beauharnais 
is  important because of the general d iscu ssion  and developm ent 
of the problem  of speech found in the five opinions filed  in the 
case*
^  George P . R ice , J r . , "Defamation by S lan d er," QJS, XXXIX 
(Feb* 1953), 75-78,
^  Tanenhaus, "Group JLibel," 35 Cornell L. Q. 261, 266 (1950), 
^  Beauharnais v. I llin o is, 343 U. S. 250 (1952),
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The m ajority « * . re lied  oik the Murphy quotation and 
sustained the statute; "Libellous utterances, not being within 
the area  of constitutionally protected speech , it  is  un necessary, 
either for us or for the State courts, to consider the is su e s  be* 
hind the phrase 'clear and present danger*1 Certainly no one 
would conterd that obscene speech, for exam ple, m ay be pun* 
ish ed  only upon a showing of such circum stances* L ibel, as 
we have seen , is  in the sam e class* " Not all of the ju stices , 
how ever, w ere content to re ly  on this young doctrine of non­
protected speech* Mr* Justice Jackson found that he was able 
to reach  the sam e resu lt through applying the traditional clear  
and p resen t danger test; and, although in the particular case  
he found that Illin o is had provided inadequate defenses for p er ­
sons accused  of violating the statute, he envisioned that state  
governm ent could protect groups under statutes that broadened 
the defense* H is reasoning, of cou rse, would n ecessita te  r e ­
versin g  each conviction lacking full evidence that the words used  
by the offender created  a c lear  and present danger of injuring 
groups. With the m ajority of the Court the showing of injury 
i s  not a n ecessa ry  elem ent.
Ju stices B lack and Douglas arrived at an opposite con­
clusion* They pointed out that group lib el has never been  
within the scope of prohibited speech as m easured by the F ir st  
Amendment; they relied  on those c a se s  that apply the guarantees 
of the F ir s t  Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment; and 
they concluded that the conviction, which appeared to them  to 
be a denial of the right to  petition rather than a problem  in  
group lib e l, ought to be reversed* They have r&affirmed their  
b elie f in unfettered speech  except under the m ost com pelling  
circum stances* ^
Justice B lack deplored the expansion of the law of crim inal 
lib el in the Beauharnais c a se , and he considered it to be an unwarranted 
invasion of the right to d iscu ss m atters of public concern* Commenting 
on the ultim ate effect of the m ajority decision , he wrote;
U n less I m isread  h istory  the m ajority is  giving lib el a
^  K ittleson and Smith, pp. 234-235.
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m ore expansive scope and m ore respectable status than it was 
ever accorded even in the Star Chamber, For here it is  held  
to be punishable to give publicity to any picture, moving p ic ­
tu re, play, drama or Sketch, or any printed matter which a 
judge m ay find unduly offensive to any race , co lor , creed  or 
re lig ion . In other w ords, in arguing for or against the enact­
ment of law s that m ay differently affect huge groups, it is  
now v ery  dangerous indeed to say som ething cr itica l of one of 
the groups. And any “person, firm  or corporation11 can be 
tried  for th is crime* “P erson , firm  or corporation" certain ly  
includes a book publisher, newspaper, radio or te lev is ion  
station , candidate or even a preacher* ^
A com m unication is  defam atory, then, not only if it  harm s
the reputation of another individual, but, a lso , if  it harm s the reputation
of a r a ce , c la s s  or creed* The m atter of private and group lib el is
further com plicated by the fact that what m ay damage the reputation of
an individual or a c la s s  in  one community may not do so in another 
29
p lace. Thus, the speaker or w riter m ay be liab le for h is rem arks 
depending on where he m akes them*
The rhetorica l im plications contained in the restr iction s arising  
from  defam atory com m unications would seem  to be:
(1) The speaker in com posing h is rem arks to exp ress h is ideas 
w ill need to avoid defam atory material* Such a task is  m anifestly  d iffi­
cult since it  req u ires a knowledge of the com plex law of defam atory
28 343 U .S . 250, 273 (1952).
In illustrating the meaning of #559 the R estatem ent of Torts 
su ggests: "2, A w rites in  a letter  to B that C is  a m em ber of the Ku 
Klux Klan, B liv e s  in a community in which a substantial number of the 
c itizen s regard this organization as a discreditable one, A has defamed 
C* "
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com m unications as applied to both groups and individuals. The 
sp eak er9s liab ility  lor  h is rem arks m ay depend upon the place where 
uttered; the speaker w ill need, therefore, to have an understanding 
oI the com m unity where he is  to speak.
(2) Zt is  obvious that the judgment of the defam atory character  
of a particu lar com m unication would have to take into account the con­
text in  which it  was given including such factors of meaning as sty le  
and delivery* ^
3. ''Fighting Word."
In the Chapliasky c a se , supra, d iscu ssed  a lso  in Chapters II
and HI, the conviction of the defendant was upheld because the Court
found that the epithets ("damned fascist*1 and "damned racketeer")
used by Chaplinsky w ere of a kind "likely to provoke the average person
31to reta liation  and thereby cause a breach of the p ea ce .11 F rom  this 
ca se  to the presen t day, the m em bers of the Supreme Court seem  to
agree that a speaker m ay not invite a breach of the peace by the use
32of fighting w ords. That there may be disagreem ent in a particular  
ca se  as to whether the speaker used "fighting words" is  shown by
^  In connection with th is point see ju stice  Jackson*s rem ark  
in the Kunz c a se , infra.
31 315 U. S. 568, 574; it was intim ated here that the c lear  and 
present danger te s t  need not be applied to prosecution for the use of "fighting 
words"; see  Antieau, supra, p. 834.
^  S ee , for exam ple, Justice Douglas*?: d issent in F e in e r v .
New 'fork , 3*10 U . o .  ^1951).
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the fallow ing rem arks of Justice Jacksons
The ways in  which mob violence m ay be worked up are  
subtle and various* R arely  w ill a speaker d irectly  urge a 
crowd to lay  hands on a v ictim  or c la s s  of victim s* An 
effective  and safer way is  to incite mob action while p re ­
tending to deplore it , after the c la s s ic  exam ple of Antony, 
and th is was not lo st on Term iniello* And whether one 
m ay be the cause of mob vio lence by h is own personification  
or advocacy of ideas which a crowd already fears and h ates, 
is  not so lved  m erely  by going through a transcrip t of the 
speech  to pick out "fighting w ords. " The m ost insulting  
words can be neutralised  if  the speaker w ill sm ile  when he 
says them , but a b elligerent personality  and an a ggress ive  
manner m ay kindle a fight without use of words that in cold  
type shock us. True judgment w ill be aided by observation  
of the individual defendant, as was possib le  for th is jury and 
tr ia l court but im possib le for us* 33
In Kuna v* New York, Justice Jackson wrote;
There [in  the Chaplinsky case] held to be "insulting 
or 'fighting* words" w ere calling ons a "God damned racketeer"  
and a "damned F ascist*  " Equally inciting and m ore c lea r ly  
"fighting w o r d s ," when thrown at Catholics and Jews who are 
rightfully on the s tree ts  of New York, are statem ents that 
"The Pope is  the anti-C hrist" and the Jews are "Christ - 
k ille r s ,"  T hese ter se  epithets com e down to our generation  
weighted with hatreds accumulated through centuries of 
bloodshed* They are recognized words of art in the p ro fes­
sion  of defamation* They are not the kind of insult that men 
bandy and laugh off when the sp ir its  are high and the flagons 
are low. They are not in that c la s s  of epithets whose litera l 
sting w ill be drawn if  the speaker sm iles  when he u ses them * 
They are a lw ays, and in every  context, insults which do not 
spring from  reason  and can be answered by none* , . • 3̂ '"'
To Justice Jackson, at lea st, there are two c la s se s  of
33 T erm iniello  v. Chicago, 337 U .S . 1, 35 (1949).
3* 340 U .S . 290, 298-299 (1950); em phasis supplied.
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"fighting words " --th ose  which can be neutralized by the speaker's  
manner of d e livery , and those which are always insults regard less  
of the circu m stan ces under which delivered . The speaker to avoid 
punishm ent for breach of the peace would need to understand both 
c la s s e s  of "fighting w o r d s ," and he would w ish  to exclude from  his  
sp eech  rem arks of the latter type and include those of the form er kind 
only when em ploying those princip les of delivery  which would make 
them  n on -offen sive. ^
P rotected sp eech
This section  deals with the problem  of the conflict between  
the policy  of preventing so c ia lly  undesirable conduct on the one hand, 
and the so c ia l in terest in promoting the free  exp ression  of ideas on 
the other. More sp ec ifica lly , it  w ill be concerned with the rh etori­
ca l im plications contained in the interpretations of law s designed to 
prevent, principally , seditious utterance. The h istory  of ca ses  
involving leg isla tion  in this fie ld  has been covered in som e detail 
in  Chapter II, and the princip les treated there w ill be re-applied  in 
th is d iscu ssion .
It was pointed out in Chapter H that decisions of the Supreme
34 For a d iscu ssion  of the use of "emotional" words* see  
G. vV. Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public Speakings P rincip les and 
P ractice  (New York: Harper & B rothers, 1951), pp. 405-407,
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Court in  c a se s  arisin g  under the Espionage Act of 19IT estab lish ed  the
p erm issib le  bounds of sed itious utterance* The m ost important
principle em erging from  c a se s  tried  under the 1917 Act was Justice
H olm es's form ulation of the "clear and present danger" test as an
analogue to the doctrine of crim inal so licitation  and attempts* This
princip le, f ir s t  enunciated in  the Schenck c a s e ^  and supported by
Ju stices H olm es and Brandeis in  later c a se s , received  practical
acceptance by the Court in the Herndon case in 1937* ^  One w riter
has pointed outs "Under this te s t  constitutional protection was afforded
not only to c r it ic ism  of governm ent, but even to incitem ent to unlawful
action up to a certa in  point* The rationale was that the best hope for
37truth l ie s  in the free  combat of ideas* "
In 1951, how ever, the Court In Dennis v« United States rede* 
fined the p erm issib le  bounds of seditious utterance and accepted Judge 
Hand's reform ulation of the H olm es te st . The new tes t was to be 
" d ea r  and probable" d a n g e r * I n  this d iscu ssion , two main questions 
which w ill be considered  are: (1) What is  the meaning of clear and 
p resent danger as opposed to c lear  and probable dangers (2) What 
has the Court said  are the ch aracter istics of a speech that constitute
35 249 U .S .  47  (1919).
36 301 U .S .  242 (1937).
3  ̂ C om m ent a, 50 M ich. L .R .  4 92 . 453 (1952).
38 341 U .S .  4 9 4  (1951).
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either a c lear  and presen t, or a clear and probable danger.
It w ill be reca lled  that the H olm es te s t  was f ir s t  stated as
follow s:
The question in every  case  is  whether the words used  
are used in such circum stance s and are of such a nature 
as to create  a c lear  and present danger that they w ill bring 
about the substantive ev ils  that Congress has a right to 
prevent* It is  a question of proxim ity and degree*
In h is d issen t in the Abram s case* Justice H olm es explained
"present" as follow s:
Only the em ergency that m akes if im m ediately dangerous 
to leave the correction  of ev il counsels to tim e warrants 
making any exception to the sweeping command, "Congress 
shall make no law abridging the freedom  of speech*
Justice Brandeis further c la r ifie s  the Idea of "present" in
h is d issen t in  the Whitney case:
Those who won our independence by revolution w ere not 
cow ards. They did not fear political change* They did not 
exalt order at the cost of liberty* To courageous* se lf -  
reliant men* with confidence in the power of free and fea r ­
le s s  reasoning applied through the p r o c esses  of popular 
government* no danger flowing from  speech can be deem ed  
c lear  and presen t, un less the incidence of the ev il appre­
hended is  so  im m inent that it may befall before there is  
opportunity for full d iscu ssion . If there be tim e to expose  
through d iscu ssion  the falsehood and fallacies* to avert 
the ev il by the p r o c esse s  of education, the rem edy to be ap­
plied is  m ore speech , not enforced silence* Only an e m e r ­
gency can justify  rep ression . Such must be the rule if  
authority is  to be reconciled  with freedom . Such, in m y  
opinion, is  the command of the Constitution. It is* th ere­
fore* always open to A m ericans to challenge a law
39 Schenck v. United S tates, 249 U .S . 47 (1919).
40 Abram* v . United S tates, 250 U .S . 616 (1919).
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abridging free  speech and assem b ly  by showing that there  
was no em ergency justifying it*
He adds that even im m inent danger does not justify  an inter*
feren ce with speech  u n less the ev il apprehended is  a seriou s one,
that i s ,  a "clear" one* He says:
Prohibition of free  speech and assem b ly  Is a m easure  
so  stringent that it would be inappropriate as the m eans for 
averting a re la tive ly  tr iv ia l harm  to society* ^
H o lm es'c la ss ic  statem ent illustrating c lear and present danger
is: "The m ost stringent protection of free  speech  would not protect a
43man in fa lse ly  shouting fire  in a theater and causing a panic*"
Chafee says that the e ssen tia l features of the c lear and present
danger te s t  a re , "(1) a substantial ev il (2) c lo se ly  connected with the
44utterance in question* "
In the Dennis c a se , the Court applied a c lear and probable
danger te s t  in convicting defendants under the Smith Act of 1940, The
Court through Chief Justice Vinson said:
Chief Judge Learned Hand, writing for the m ajority  
below , interpreted the phrase as follow s: "In each case  
[courts] m ust ask whether the gravity of the 'ev il, * dis*  
counted by its  im probability, justifies such invasion of 
free  speech  as is  n ecessa ry  to avoid the danger. " , * .
We adopt this statem ent of the rule* As articulated by
41 Whitney v. California. 274 U .S . 357 (1927).
42 Ibid.
4 3 249 U .S . 47 (1919).
44 Chaiee, Government and M ass Communications, p. 59.
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Chief Judge Hand, it is  as succinct and inclusive as any other 
we might devise  at th is tim e. It takes into consideration  
those factors which we deem  relevant, and rela tes their  
sign ifican ces. More we cannot expect from  w ords, 4 ^
Chafee, in  drawing the distinction between clear and present
and c lea r  andjrobable, says that the Holme® test requires a c lo se
chronological connection between the ev il and the utterance, while in
the probable te s t , the elem ent of c lo se  connection between the utterance
46and ev il i s  causal rather than chronological.
Applying th is d istinction  rhetorica lly , it would appear that
c lear  and presen t m eans that the speaker's words should not provoke
im m ediately  an overt, ser io u sly  ev il response; and under the clear
and probable ru le , the sp eak er's words should not provoke a ser iou sly
ev il resp onse which w ill probably becom e overt.
R eference is  made here to the chart se t out in Chapter Z
which l is t s  five types of sp eech es in a consideration of their general
47ends and resp onse ch a ra cter istics , Attention w ill be given here to 
what the Court has said  to be ch aracteristic  of a speech  that constitutes 
c lear  and present or clear and probable danger in connection with the 
chart referred  to above.
Beginning with Justice H olm es, the following quotation from
45 341 U .S . 494 at p. 510 (1951).
Chafee, Government and M ass Communications, p. 59.
This chart is  a reproduction of that contained in the fo llow ­
ing text: G iles W, Gray and Waldo W. Braden, Public Speaking: 
P rin cip les and P ra c tice , supra, at p, 242.
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Abram* ca se  i s  an elaboration of the principle of clear and present 
danger f ir s t  se t out in Schenck v , United S tates3
P ersecu tion  for the exp ression  of opinions seem s to me 
p erfectly  log ica l. If you have no doubt of your p rem ises or 
your power to want a certain  resu lt with all your heart you 
naturally exp ress your w ish es in law and sweep away a ll 
opposition, , , , But when m en have rea lized  that tim e has 
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even  
m ore than they believe the very  foundation of their own con­
duct that the ultim ate good desired  is  better reached by free  
trade in id ea s--th a t the b est te s t  of truth is  the power of the 
thought to get it s e lf  accepted in the com petition of the m arket, 
and that truth is  the only ground upon which their w ishes  
sa fe ly  can be carried  out. That at any rate is  the theory of 
our Constitution, It is  an experim ent, as a ll life  is  an ex ­
perim ent, E very  year if not every  day w© have to wager 
our salvation upon som e prophecy based upon im perfect 
knowledge. While that experim ent i s  part of our system  I 
think that we should be eternally  vigilant against attem pts to 
check the exp ression  of opinions that we loathe and believe  
to be fraught with death, un less they so im m inently threaten  
im m ediate in terference with the lawful and p ressin g  purposes 
of the law that an im m ediate check is  required to save the 
country, . • , Of course I am speaking only of exp ression s  
of opinion and exhortations, which were a ll that w ere uttered  
h ere, but I regret that I cannot put into m ore im p ressive  words 
m y b e lie f that in their conviction upon this indictm ent the 
defendants w ere deprived of their rights under the Constitution 
of the United S tates, 48
The "free trade in ideas" philosophy shown above which b e lieves
in the power of truth to get its e lf  accepted in the "com petition of the
market" appears to be a m odern counterpart of the A ristotelian  idea
49that "things true and just tend to prevail over opposites, "
48 250 U .S , 616, 630 (1919),
g e e , JLane Cooper, translator, The Rhetoric of A ristotle  
(New York: D, Appleton and Company, 1932), p, 5,
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Justice H olm es seem s to weaken his position of defending the 
right to unfettered d iscu ssion  when he says that he is  speaking only  
of exp ress ion s of opinion and exhortations. In any event, h is rem arks 
in  the Gitlow c a se , infra, seem  to allow for stronger types of 
u tteran ces. Another asp ect of the H olm es opinion in the Abram s case  
is  that now the question in every  case  is  whether the words used are 
of such a nature as to crea te , or are intended to create a clear and 
present danger. With regard to intent, H olm es says!
When words are used exactly , a deed is  not done with 
intent to produce a consequence un less that consequence is  
the aim  of the d eed -su n less the aim  to produce it is  the 
proxim ate m otive of the sp ecific  act, • • .
Justice  H olm es, joined by Justice B randeis, filed  a d issen t
in the Gitlow ca se  in which he stated the following doctrines
If what I think is  the correct te st  to be applied, it is  
m anifest that there was no present danger of an attempt to 
overthrow the government by force on the part of the ad­
m ittedly sm all m inority who shared the defendant's v iew s.
It was said that th is m anifesto was m ore than a theory, 
that it w as an incitem ent, E very idea is  an incitem ent.
It o ffers its e lf  for b elief and if believed  is  acted upon 
u n less som e other b e lie f outweighs it or som e failure of 
energy s tif le s  the movem ent at birth. The only difference  
between the exp ression  of opinion and an incitem ent in the 
narrow er sen se  is  the speak er's enthusiasm  for the resu lt. 
Eloquence m ay set fire  to reason . But whatever may be 
thought of the d iscou rse  before us it had no chanbe of 
starting a present conflagration. If in the long run the 
b elie fs  exp ressed  in the proletarian dictatorship are d e s ­
tined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the
50 250 U .S . 616, 627 (1919).
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com m unity, the only meaning of free  speech id that they should 
be given their chance to have their way. 51
One w riter , commenting on the exp ression  of rhetorical theory  
in  the quotation above says:
What Mr. H olm es here says about opinions and in c ite ­
m ents and their relations to one another may be challenged  
in  many w ays. Surely, opinions are often very enthusiastic. 
And, further, incitem ents may be tentative and tepid and 
lacking in eloquence. Nor , . . can it be valid ly  said that 
every  idea i s ,  lega lly , an incitem ent. , .
A s observed e a r lie r , the H olm es te s t  for seditious utterance 
d erives from  the crim inal law which norm ally punishes speech  
attempting or so lic itin g  cr im e. With reference to seditious speech, 
it i s  a m atter of degree whether the words used incite to the com ­
m issio n  of a crim e against the state and can, therefore, be subjected  
to punishm ent. The line between speech and action --th a t i s ,  the line 
between sp eech  and crim inal action --b ecom es, then, an important 
consideration . One w riter has made the. following observation:
Speech, then m ay be action, Mr. H olm es te lls  u s . And 
action which is  crim inal may be forbidden and punished.
But what i s  the relevance of those facts for our problem  of 
separating, in princip le, speech  which may be abridged 
from  speech  which may not be abridged? D oes it mean  
that whenever speech is  an act, it has, therefore no c la im  
to the freedom  guaranteed by the F ir s t  Amendment? That
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U .S . 652, 673 (1925).
^  Alexander M eiklejohn, F ree  Speech (New Yorks Harper 
& B roth ers, 1948), p. 45*
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suggestion  is  c lea r ly  absurd. The c itizen  who votes "Aye" 
or "No" on an issu e  of public policy has acted, . . . The 
distinction  between speech -actions and speech-thoughts Is 
not, then, the distinction which we need for the proper in ter­
pretation of the F ir s t  Amendment# The fire-shouting i l lu s ­
tration given by Mr# H olm es te lls  us of one type of action, 
v is# , crim inal action# which is  not protected by the principle  
of the freedom  of speech# It does not follow , however that 
all sp eech -acts are to be denied the freedom  guaranteed by 
that principle# ^
Judge Hand, who form ulated the c lear and probable te s t  adopted
by Chief Ju stice  Vinson in the Dennis c a se , w as, like Holmes# concerned
with w ords which lead to crim in al action# He said  in a 1917 case:
One m ay not counsel or advise others to violate the law  
as it  stands# Words are not only the keys of persuasion# 
but the tr iggers of action, and those which have no purport 
but to counsel the violation of law cannot by any latitude of 
interpretation be a part of that public opinion which is  the 
final source of governm ent in a dem ocratic state# ^
D ifficu lty arises#  of course# in determ ining whether the words 
actually  used in a speech  are flthe keys of persuasion" or are "triggers"  
of crim inal action# This problem  is  further com plicated by the fact 
that, action may be caused either d irectly  or ind irectly  by a speech# Con­
cerning indirect causation, Wharton, writing on the refusal of the com ­
mon law to estab lish  any rule of indirect causation with resp ect to 
utterances# said:
For we would be forced to admit# if we hold that
53 Ib id ., 42-43.
^  Mas sea Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F.  535, 540 (S. D. 
N. Y ., 19X7). “
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so lic ita tion s to crim inality  are generally  indictable, that the 
propagandists, even in conversation , of agrarian or com ­
m unistic th eories are liab le to crim inal prosecutions; and 
hence the n ecessa ry  freedom  of speech and of the p ress  would 
be greatly  infringed. It would be hard, a lso , we m ust agree , 
if  we m aintain such general resp onsib ility , to defend in p ro se ­
cutions for so liciting  cr im e, the publishers of Byron's Don 
Juan, or R ousseau 's E m ile , or of G oethe's E lective  A ffin ities. 
Dord C h esterfield , in  h is le tters to h is son, d irectly  advised  
the latter to form  ill ic it  connections with m arried women; JLord 
C hesterfie ld , on the reasoning here contested , would be 
indictable for so lic ita tion  to adultery. Undoubtedly, when such 
so lic ita tion s are so  publicly and indecently made as to produce 
public scandal, they are indictable as nuisances or as lib e ls . 
But to  make bare so licitation s or allurem ents indictable as 
attem pts, not only unduly and perilously  extends the scope of 
penal adjudication, but forces on the courts psychological 
questions which they are incom petent to decide, and a branch  
of b u sin ess which would make them despots of every in te llect  
in the land. ^5
If it is  assum ed that indirect causation w ill not be punished, 
then the c lear  and presen t danger doctrine would seem  to m ean that 
words w ill be punished only if  they cause d irectly  an im m ediate  
crim inal action; and the c lear  and probable danger doctrine would appear 
to m ean that utterances w ill be punished only if they cause d irectly  a 
probable crim in a l action. Judge Hand observed in the M asses P ub lish­
ing c a se , how ever, that in determ ining whether there is  incitem ent to 
crim e one m ust look not only at the words them selves but a lso  at the 
surrounding circu m stances which might give the words special 
meaning to their h ea rers. He pointed out, for exam ple, that Mark 
Antony's funeral oration actually incited to violence while it ex p ress ly
^  Wharton, Crim inal Daw (2nd e d .), vol I, #179.
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d isaffirm ed it, ^
Speaking of Judge Hand's position on th is point* Chafee says;
In the past the A m erican law has shown little  se n s itiv e ­
n ess  to revolutionary utterances in tim e of peace* and has 
w ise ly  treated  m ost fuim inations against the soc ia l fabric  
like a potshot at a man ten m iles away. H owever, as Judge 
Hand pointed out, a ll vigorous c r itic ism  of the form  of 
government or the economic system  or particular laws may 
by arousing passion  or engendering conviction of the iniquity 
of existin g  conditions lead ind irectly  to vio lence, Even an 
ardent oration urging the repeal of a statute may lead  
h earers to disobey it. We are always tempted to apprehend 
such resu lts  from  opinions to which we are opposed. It is  
easy  to believe that doctrines very  different from  our own 
are so objectionable that they could on lycom e into operation  
through fo rce , so that their advocates m ust n ecessa r ily  
favor crim inal a c ts . The difference between the expression  
of rad ical view s and d irect provocation to revolution is  only 
a d ifference of d egree , but it  is  a difference which the normal 
crim in al law regards as all-im portant, 37
The m em bers of the Supreme Court, in deciding in individual 
c a se s  whether the defendant was guilty of "direct provocation to 
revolution" or only of exp ressin g  radical v iew s, have presented a 
number of in teresting  viewpoints concerning the relationship between  
the methods of the speaker and h is goa ls. Some of th ese , the m ost 
im portant of which appear in the Dennis decision , w ill be set out below, 
M usser v , Utah, though not a sedition c a se , deals with in c ite ­
ment to cr im e, and the m inority opinion of Justice Rutledge is  revealing  
56 244 F . 535 (S .D .N . Y. , 1917).
Zechariah Chafee, F ree  Speech in the United States 
(Cambridge; Harvard U niversity P r e s s , 1941), pp7 l 53-1547'""
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for its  v iew s on punishable speech* In the M usser case* the appellants
had been convicted for violation of a Utah statute which prohibited con-
■piracy to com m it acts injurious to public morals* They had been
charged with conspiring to counsel, advice and practice polygam ous
58or plural m arriage* In the lower court, the defendants were held to  
be guilty  if  they conspired to advocate the aforem entioned a c ts , and a 
line w as drawn between d iscu ssion  and advocacy* Justice Rutledge, 
disapproving advocacy as a standard of guilt, wrote;
At the very  lea st the line m ust be drawn between advocacy  
and incitem ent, and even the sta te 's power to punish incitem ent 
m ay vary with the nature of the speech , whether persuasive or 
co erc iv e , the nature of the wrong induced, whether violent or 
m erely  offensive to the m ores, and the degree of probability  
that the substantive ev il w ill actually result* * * , ^
The inference from  the rem arks above would seem  to be that
advocacy and persuasion  are not the sam e, and that the la tter , although
it m ay incite to cr im e , should not be punished by the state. C oercive
sp eech , on the other hand, unlike persuasive speech , should be punished*
In a labor case  in  1941, Justice Frankfurter contended that
picketing as a form  of free  speech  could be restr icted  to a narrow scope
and even be enjoined within a context of v io lence. His position was that
freedom  of speech  protected "rational m odes" of comm unication and
that "utterances in a context of violence can lo se  their sign ificance as
^  M usser v* Utah, 33 U .S . 95 (1948); Justice Jackson wrote the 
m ajority opinion and remanded the verd ict, though not on the grounds 
urged by Justice Rutledge*
59 Ib id ., at p. 101.
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60an appeal to r e a s o n ,11 and thus, their constitutional protection*
There is  som e h isto r ica l b a s is  for F rankfurter^  arguing that speech
advocating v io len ce , unlike speech which seek s to convince, is  not
protected* It can be pointed out, for exam ple, that Justice H olm es
spoke of a free  trade in ideas; free  com petition of ideas in the m arket
m ay im ply that each idea should survive by its  own rational appeal*
In any c a se , the Court has determ ined in recent years that only
“rational modes*1 of picketing w ill be protected*
In the T erm in iello  c a se . Justice D ouglas, delivering the
opinion of the Court, struck down an Illin o is statute which prohibited
sp eech  which "s t ir s  the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about
a condition of unrest or crea tes a disturbance* * * *r'6* He contended
that sp eech  is  often provocative and challenging and m ay b est serve  its
purpose when creating d issa tisfaction  with conditions as they are or
62inducing people to unrest or anger* Justice. Jackson, on the other
hand, maintained that while nearly all subjects w ere lega lly  arguable,
63their advocacy could not be allowed at a ll tim es and in a ll m anners.
In A m erican Communications A ssociation , C#J*Q. v, Douds,
60 Milk Wafton D rivers Union v* Meadowmoor D a ir ie s , 312 
U .S . 287, 293 (1941), ~
6* T erm iniello  v* City of Chicago, 337 U .S . 1, 4 (1949).
^  Ibid*, p. 2; see  Thomas v. C ollins, 323 U.S* 516, 530,
535 (1944), where it was said that “speech persuading to action** is  
protected by the Constitution.
63 Ibid*, pp. 32*33.
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Chief Justice Vina on, in  upholding the non-Com m unist affidavit
p rovisions of the T aft-H artley law, wrotes
[The Board]* • * points out that such str ik es are called  by 
persons who, so C ongress has found, have the w ill and 
power to do so without advocacy or persuasion  that seek s  
acceptance in the com petition of the market* Speech may  
be fought with speech* F alsehoods and fa llac ies must be 
exposed , not su pp ressed , un less there is  not sufficient 
tim e to avert the ev il consequences of noxious doctrine 
by argum ent and education* That is  the command of the 
F ir s t  Amendment* ^
Mr* V inson's view  of the command of the F ir s t  Amendment in 
th is c a se  w ill be exam ined in connection with h is statem ents on advocacy  
in  the Dennis c a se , infra* Two other ca ses  to be noted here before a 
d iscu ssion  of the Communist consp iracy decision s are H arisiades v* 
Shaughnessy and B urstyn v* W ilson* In the form er c a se . Justice Jackson, 
in  the context of deporting a resident alien  because of form er m em ber­
ship in the Comm unist P arty , made the following rem arks about the 
guarantees of the F ir s t  Amendment:
The F ir s t  Amendment is  invoked as a barrier against 
this enactment* The c la im  is  that in joining an organization  
advocating overthrow of government by force and vio lence  
the a lien  has m erely  ex erc ised  freedom s of speech, p ress  
and assem b ly  which that Amendment guarantees to him*
The assum ption is  that the F ir st Amendment allows 
C ongress to make no distinction between advocating 
change in  the existing order by lawful e lective  p ro cesses  
and advocating change by force and violence, that freedom  
for the one includes freedom  for the other, and that when 
teaching of violence is  denied so is  freedom  of speech.
64 339 U .S . 846, 849 (1950).
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Our Constitution sought to leave bo excuse lor violent 
attack on the statue quo by providing a lega l alternative«•* 
attack by ballot* To arm  a ll men lor  orderly change* the 
Constitution put in their hands a right to influence the 
e lectora te  by press* speech  and assem bly* This m eans 
freedom  to advocate or promote Communism by m eans of 
the ballot box* but it does not include the practice of in* 
citem ent of violence*
True* it often is  difficult to determ ine whether ambiguous 
speech  is  advocacy o f po litica l methods or subtly shades into 
a m ethodical but prudent incitem ent to violence- Communist 
governm ents avoid the inquiry by suppressing everything die*  
tasteful* Some would have us avoid the difficulty by going to 
the opposite extrem e of perm itting incitem ent to violent 
overthrow at lea st u n less it seem s certain  to succeed immed* 
lately* We apprehend that the Constitution enjoins upon us 
the du|£# however difficult* of distinguishing between the two*
* • •
In the Burstyn ease* Justice Clark illu stra tes the difficulty of 
determ ining the e ffect of any particular kind of speech by remarking* 
"As w as sa id  in  W inters v . New York* 333 U .S . 507, 510 (1948)3 'The 
line between the inform ing and the entertaining is  too e lu sive  for the 
protection of that basic  right [a free  press]* Everyone is  fam iliar  
w ith instances of propaganda through fiction. What is  one m an's 
amusement* teaches another's doctrine* ”
It appears from  the c a se s  cited above that there is  som e 
disagreem ent among the m em bers of the Court concerning what type 
of sp eech  w ill be protected as not being an im m ediate or probable 
threat to existing law* In the Abrams case* Justice H olm es intim ates
65 342 0 .8 ,  580, 891-S92 (L95Z).
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that only exp ression s of opinion or exhortations w ill be protected, 
or at le a s t , only those sp eech es characterised  as offering a "free 
trade in ideas* " Further, the elem ent of the speaker's intent may 
determ ine whether the words used create a clear and present danger*
In the G itlow  c a se , on the other hand, H olm es considers every idea  
an incitem ent and sta tes that the only difference between the expression  
of opinion and an incitem ent is  the speaker's enthusiasm  for the 
result* Thus, it iB a m atter of degree whether the words used incite  
to the com m ission  of a crim e and can, therefore, be prevented*
Judge Hand said in 191? that words are both "keys of 
persuasion '1 and "triggers" of action, and in determ ining whether 
there is  incitem ent to cr im e , one m ust look not only at the words 
th em se lv es, but a lso  at the surrounding circum stances which give 
the words sp ec ia l meaning to their h earers. Thus, a cerem onial 
sp eech  m ay incite v io lence while ex p ress ly  discountenancing it.
A lso , a persuasive speech  urging the repeal of a statute may lead  
h earers to disobey it, and the question of whether the speech is  
a d irect or ind irect provocation to violation of the law becom es 
an important consideration.
Justice Rutledge said in 1948 that the line must b© drawn 
between advocacy and incitem ent, and that the sta te 's power to 
punish incitem ent might vary with the nature of the speech, 
whether persuasive or coercive . Justice Frankfurter, on the other
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hand, would protect only rational m odes of speech , since each idea  
should survive in  the com petition of the m arket by its  appeal to reason* 
Justice Douglas would protect speech that invites dispute 
and brings about a condition of unrest or crea tes a disturbance*
He affirm s the statem ent in Thomas v« Collins that "speech persuading 
to action is  protected by the Constitution* " Chief Justice Vinson, 
in the Oouda c a se , appears to approve advocacy or persuasion which 
seek s acceptance in the com petition of the market* His opinion in 
the Dennis c a se , in fra , seem s to make advocacy punishable and 
d iscu ssion  immune when m ore advocates than one are involved*
Justice Jackson says the Court m ust perform  the difficult 
task  of drawing a line between advocacy of political methods and 
prudent incitem ent to violence* F in ally , Justice Clark illu stra tes  
the problem  of determ ining the effect of any particular kind of speech  
by quoting, "What is  one m an's am usem ent, teaches another's 
doctrine*"
The d isagreem ent among the m em bers of the Court respecting  
what types of speeches are to be protected reaches a clim ax in the
« c a se . The conflicting view s in that decision  w ill be exam ined
here*
L eaders of the Communist Party were convicted of violating  
the Smith Act on October 14, 1949* Their conviction was affirm ed  
by the Supreme Court in the Dennis case on June 4, 1951, upholding
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the constitutionality of the Smith Act of 1940, This Act m akes it 
unlawful to conspire to advocate the bringing about of violent over­
throw of the governm ent and to organize a group so to teach. Chief 
Justice Vinson wrote the m ajority opinion for h im self and Justices  
Burton, Minton and Reed, Justices Jackson and Frankfurter * wrote 
concurring opinions, and Ju stices B lack and Douglas d issented . Justice  
Clark did not participate in the ca se .
The m ajority of the Court held that while d iscu ssion  of violent 
overthrow m ay not be prohibited, conspiracy to advocate such o ver­
throw can be constitutionally prevented. Chief Justice Vinson a sser ts:
The yery  language of the Smith Act negates the in ter­
pretation which petitioners would have u® im pose on that Act,
It is  d irected at advocacy, not d iscu ssion . Thus the tr ia l 
judge properly charged the jury that they could not convict 
if  they found that petitioners did "no m ore than pursue p eace­
ful studies and d iscu ssion s or teaching and advocacy in the 
rea lm  of id ea s. " He further charged that it was not unlawful 
"to conduct in an A m erican co llege  and university a course  
explaining the philosophical theories set forth in the books 
which have been placed in evidence, " . • . Congress did 
not intend to eradicate the free d iscu ssion  of political 
th eo r ies , to destroy the traditional rights of A m ericans to 
d iscu ss  and evaluate ideas without fear of governm ental 
sanction. Rather Congress was concerned with the very  kind 
of activitg^in which the evidence showed these petitioners  
engaged.
Speaking of the distinction between d iscu ssion  and advocacy, 
Justice Frankfurter said:
66 Dennis v. United States, 341 U .S . 494, 502 (1951),
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• * * Xt is  true that there is  no divining rod by which we m ay 
locate advocacy. . „ . But there is  underlying validity in the 
distinction  between advocacy and the interchange of ideas, 
and we do not d iscard  a useful tool because it may be m is ­
used. . . . The object of the conspiracy before us i s  clear  
enough that the chance of error in saying that the defendants 
conspired to advocate rather than to express ideas is  slight. ^
Ju stice  Jackson m aintains that no one has the right “ to work
up a public d esire  and w ill to do what it is  a crim e to attempt, though
it is  not alw ays easy  to decide what is  teaching or advocacy in the
sen se  of incitem ent rather than in the sense of exposition or explana- 
68tion. M The m ajority of the Court finds that the distinction between
d iscu ssion  and advocacy l ie s  in the intent with which a statem ent is
made: n . . . there is  a line beyond which [those who would advocate
constitutionally prohibited conduct] may not g o --a  line which they, in
fu ll knowledge of what they intend and the circum stances in which their
activ ity  takes p lace, w ill w ell appreciate and understand. n
Speaking on the m atter of intent, Justice Douglas said:
. . . The A ct, as construed, requires the elem ent of in ten t-- 
that those who teach the creed  believe in it* The crim e then 
depends not on what is  taught but on who the teacher is . That 
is  to make freedom  of speech turn not on what is  said, but on 
the intent with which it is  said. Once we start down that road M
. i   *7 Q
we enter territory  dangerous to the lib erties of every citizen .
^7 jPbid*# at pp. 545*546. 
68 Ib id ., at p. 572.
^  Ib id ., at 516.
70 Ib id ., at p. 583.
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Writing on the meaning of the decision  in the Dennis case, 
one group has made the following analysis:
The decision  of the Supreme Court upholding the Smith 
A ct of 1940 appears to m ean that C ongress m ay constitutionally:
1. Prohibit a number of persons (but not an individual),
2. from  advocating (but not d iscussing),
3. under certain  circum stances (but not under a ll c ir ­
cum stances),
4 . violent overthrow of the government (but not 
n e c essa r ily  any other end).
In term s of the prosecution of the Com m unists, which is  
the particular issu e  in 1952, it seem s that one person can ex ­
p r e ss  Communist b e lie fs  about the overthrow of government by 
v io len ce, and severa l persons may m eet, to d iscu ss these  
b e lie fs . H owever, severa l persons may not m eet to conspire  
to advocate a b e lie f in the desirab ility  of violent overthrow of 
the governm ent under circum stances deem ed dangerous by the 
courts, even if this advocacy does not point toward im m ediate  
overt a c ts .
Two authors have attacked the holding in the Dennis case  on the 
m atter of intent; they write:
The line between one who speaks with intent to convince 
and one who speaks with intent to override those who are not 
convinced is , at beet, unclear. Freedom  of speech is  too 
precious . . .  to perm it a court or jury to speculate on the 
subtle d ifferences in m otivation that such a te s t  would require. ^
71 The Smith Act and the Supreme Court: An A m erican Civil 
.Liberties Union A nalysis, Opinion and Statement of P o licy  (New York: 
A m erican  C ivil L iberties Uninn, 1952), p. 5.
72 John A. Gorfinkel and Julian Mack II, ' “Dennis v. United 
States and the Clear and P resen t Danger Rule, M 39 Cal. L . Rev. 475, 
490.
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Concerning the distinction between d iscu ssion  and advocacy,
they say:
E very d iscu ssion , unless it be so ster ile  as to be 
m ean ingless, is  to som e degree advocacy, be it advocacy 
for or advocacy against the idea d iscu ssed , * , . The 
extent to which speech may be a philosophical statem ent of 
a proposition, rather than a spur to action, can be d eter­
m ined only by careful appraisal of such m atters as tim e and 
place, tone of voice or manner of speech, tem per and mood 
of audience,
A sum m ary of the rhetorical theory contained in the cases  
d iscu ssed  above requires consideration of an analysis such as the one 
in  the Gray and Braden speaking chart, previously referred  to, which 
is  se t forth in Chapter I. It has been pointed out that the clear and 
presen t danger doctrine m eans that the speaker's words should not 
provoke, im m ediately, an overt, seriou sly  evil response; and it has 
been observed that under the clear and probable danger rule the 
speaker's words should not provoke a ser iou sly  ev il response which 
w ill probably becom e overt. R eferring to the analysis in the chart 
under consideration, the actuating speech is  characterized  as follows:
(1} general end--action; (?.) kind of resp on se--overt; (3) w hen--im m ed­
iate or delayed. It would seem  to follow , then, that where seditious 
m atter is  involved, the speaker's utterances in an actuating 
speech  w ill be protected under the clear and present danger test only 
if the actuating speech is the kind which induces a delayed, overt
73 Ib id .. 494.
166
resp onse in contrast to an im m ediate, overt resp onse. Under the 
c lear  and probable danger te s t , how ever, the sp eak er^  utterances 
in an actuating speech would not be protected whether inducing an 
im m ediate or delayed resp onse. It would seem  to follow a lso  that 
the speaker could use any of the other methods listed  for obtaining 
h is g o a l s v iz . t the m ethods of the inform ing, entertaining, stim u­
lating and convincing speech**and his rem arks, though sed itious, 
would be protected .
P rior  to 1951, the Court, operating under the clear and 
p resent danger ru le , seem ed disposed to protect advocacy or p er­
suasion when it fe ll short of coercion  or incitem ent. It could be 
said , perhaps, that incitem ent or coercion characterizes that type 
of actuating speech  which provokes an im m ediate and overt response. 
The m inority, on the other hand, favored protection only for rational 
form s of com m unication, and it would appear under this philosophy 
that only non-actuating speeches would be protected. After 1951, the 
Court, under the c lear  and probable danger ru le, draws a line between 
advocacy and d iscu ssion , and prohibits a number of persons from  
advocating, but not from  d iscu ssin g , violent overthrow of the govern­
m ent. T herefore, when a number of persons are involved, the Supreme 
Court of today had adopted the previous m inority position that only non­
actuating speeches are to be protected. There are at lea st som e indi­
cations that the Court may apply this concept to an individual speaker
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when the proper case  is  presented.
Notwithstanding the rem arks above, the m em bers of the Court 
look not only at the word© th em selves or to the type of speech in­
volved, but a lso  at the surrounding circumstance® which give the 
words and the speech sp ecia l meaning to their h earers. Any speech, 
it is  im plied, whether entertaining, inform ing, stim ulating, con- 
vine in g or actuating may, under certain  circum stances, give r ise  
to an ev il which the state has a right to prevent. Under the rule of 
the Dennis case , the intent of the speaker becom es an important 
consideration in determ ining the end of the speech and, therefore, its  
right to constitutional protection.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
T his study has sought to answer the following questions:
1. What trends may be observed in decisions of the Supreme Court 
of the United States to date concerning the types of restr iction s  
which m ay be valid ly invoked as lim itations on freedom  of ex ­
p ression ?
2. What are the sp ecific  rhetorical im plications contained within 
these d ec is ion s?
3. What d isagreem ent e x is ts , if any, between the Supreme Court's 
understanding and exp ression  of rhetorical theory and that prom ul­
gated by the m em bers of the speech profession?
With reference to question one above, the present inquiry 
appears to warrant the following conclusions:
a. In ca ses involving statutes prohibiting speech because of 
its  tendency to lead to crim e, the " clear  and present danger" doctrine  
w ill be invoked except where the possib le effect of the utterance would 
substantially endanger the security  of the state or nation. Where 
seriou s danger to the government is  apprehended as a resu lt of 




b. In ca ses  concerned with a conflict between the in terest  
in  allowing free  exp ression  and the in terest in protecting public 
peace and in the prim ary use of streets and parks* statutes requiring  
public*convenience perm its for speeches in public p laces w ill be in­
validated if they are vaguely drawn* constitute censorship or allow the 
issu ing  authorities arbitrary action. On the other hand* perm its to 
speak in  public p laces m ay be required where none of the above objec­
tions are  involved; and a speaker who is  refused a perm it may be 
punished for speaking without one since h is rem edy for the refusal lie s  
in proper lega l proceedings.
Where freedom  to d issem inate ideas com es in conflict with 
statutes passed  to protect an invasion of privacy* the statutes w ill be 
invalidated* particu larly where relig iou s ideas are involved. Statutes 
promoting the public's health, however, w ill be upheld.
Where there is  a reasonable apprehension of a riot or a breach  
of the peace a s the resu lt of a speech, the speaker may be required to 
cea se  h is rem arks or face a rrest for refusing to do so.
The speaker's use of sound am plifying equipment may be regu­
lated by a statute providing proper standards of control, and may, p er ­
haps, be prohibited altogether.
c. In ca ses involving non-protected speech, the m ost significant 
developm ent in recent years is  the Court's upholding of a state statute 
making it crim inal to lib el a large group. Group lib el m ust be added,
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then, to the c la ss  of non*protected speech which includes profane and 
obscene words, "fighting w ords1* and ordinary lib el.
d. The trend of the Court in  peaceful picketing ca ses is  to 
re jec t fre e -sp e ec h  standards and to prohibit peaceful picketing when 
contrary to the public policy of a state. In these ca ses  the "clear and 
p resen t danger" te s t is  not used.
e. The right to m ake critica l statem ents relating to m atters 
before a court w ill be protected un less such utterances constitute a 
" c lea r  and present danger*' to the im partial adm inistration of ju stice.
f. There is  a trend toward lim iting speech by indirect 
restr ic tio n s . T hese restr iction s may be upheld on the ground that they 
prom ote effic iency  in the government serv ice  or that they prevent great 
danger to the state. The Court has made it clear that em ployers have 
the right to state their positions, but with other circum stances, speech  
m ay amount to coercion  of the em ployees and can, therefore, be con­
sidered by the National Labor R elations Board in determ ining whether 
an em ployer has been guilty of an unfair labor practice.
With reference to question two above, the rhetorical im plica- 
tions of the ca ses  d iscu ssed  in th is study seem  to be:
a. A speaker's attem pts to achieve certain  goals by appropriate 
considerations of the tim e, place and manner of utterance may be fr u s­
trated wholly or in part by restr iction s lim iting his form  of expression . 
T hese restr iction s may affect the speaker's choice and adaptation of
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h is m ateria l, and they m ay a lsp  affect the organisation, style and 
d elivery  of h is remarks*
(1) R estriction s as to tim e affecting the hour of appearance 
should be considered by the speaker in connection with his analysis  
of the audience and the occasion . Such restr iction s may affect the 
number of h is potential lis ten er s , influence h is choice of m aterial for 
h is audience and m ay resu lt in a denial of a perm it to speak. Concern­
ing restr ic tio n s related  to the tim e of the speech as affected by su r­
rounding circu m stances, the speaker should (a) study the conditions 
impinging upon the speaking event; (b) take proper steps to m inim ize  
h ostility  to his rem arks by the appropriate use of form s of support, and 
(c) understand the use of log ica l appeals and the inform ative speech for 
h ostile  audiences* No sp ecific  restr iction s appear to affect the dura­
tion of a speech, but there is  som e indication that there may be a 
reasonable lim it on the duration of utterance beyond which the speaker can 
not go and rece iv e  constitutional protection.
(2) The speaker's plans for the place of hi© speech m ust take 
into account what h is rights may be with regard to that p lace, A deter­
m ination of such rights involves a consideration of (a) the general 
c la ssifica tion s of the p lace--p ark , street, private building; (b) the 
location and norm al usage of the place desired  for the speech, and (c) 
what restr iction s may ex ist at the place regarding the manner of 
utterance. The speaker w ill need to know the distinction© between the
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protection afforded Me rem arks in private p laces and in public places* 
and he should be able to make adjustments in h is sty le , language and 
d elivery  for each c la ss  of p laces,
(3) Regulations lim iting the manner of utterance affect the 
sp eak er's potential audience and, thus, the end and object of his  
rem ark s.
b. T here are two c la s se s  of restr iction s im posed upon the 
substance of expression , those dealing with non-protected speech  
and those dealing with the free  expression  of ideas.
(1) N on-protected speech includes ''fighting words, M the 
obscene, the profane and the libelous (group or private libel). The 
speaker m ay not lawfully use profane or obscene speech and he w ill 
be punished for it u n less the statute punishing such speech is  vague 
or constitutes a prior restra in t. The speaker's liab ility  for defamatory 
rem arks may depend upon the place where they are uttered; the speaker 
w ill need to have an understanding, therefore, of the community where 
he is  to speak. Judgment of the defamatory character of a particular  
comm unication m ust take into account the context in which it is  given, 
including such factors of meaning as style and delivery. There would 
appear to be two c la s se s  of "fighting words, " those which can be 
neutralized by the speaker's manner of delivery, and those which 
are always insults regard less of the circum stances under which d e­
livered . The latter c la ss  of words are always non-protected, while
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the form er c la ss  m ay be protected depending on how they are delivered  
by the speaker.
(2) Prior to 1951, the Court applied the clear and present 
danger te s t  to seditious utterances. It seem ed disposed to protect 
advocacy or persuasion  when it fe ll  short of incitem ent or coercion. 
Incitem ent or coercion  appear to characterize that type of actuating 
speech  which provokes an im m ediate and overt response. After 1951, 
the Court, under the " c lear  and probable danger'1 test, draws a line 
betw een advocacy and d iscu ssion , and prohibits a number of persons 
from  advocating, but not from  d iscu ssin g , violent overthrow of the 
governm ent. T herefore, when a number of persons are involved, the 
Court adopt8 the position  that only non-actuating speeches are to be 
protected. It appears that the Court may apply this concept to the 
individual speaker when a proper case  i s  presented . The m em bers 
of the Court look, how ever, not only at the words of the speaker or 
the type of speech involved, but a lso  at the surrounding circum stances 
which give the words and speech specia l meaning to their h earers.
The intent of the speaker becom es an important consideration in 
determ ining the end of the speech and, therefore, its  right to consti­
tutional protection.
With reference to question three above, the present study 
appears to warrant the following conclusions:
R eg a rd in g  rhetorical theory, the Supreme Court seem s to
understand that the nature of a speech is  determ ined not only by the 
ideas presented, but a lso  by the language, the delivery  and the intent 
of the speaker* Certain words have been referred  to as constituting 
the "rhetoric  of violence* " The Court ha© a lso  indicated that the 
m eaning of a speaker's rem arks may be determ ined by his delivery, 
including such factors a s gesture, voice and manner. In addition, 
the Court w ill judge the end of a speech by the intent of the speaker 
and by the surrounding circum stances which may give the words a 
sp ec ia l meaning. In general, the Court seem s to rank logical appeals 
on a higher sca le  of values than em otional appeals.
.Like the m em bers of the speech profession , the Court is  
in terested  in the speaker's goa ls. With reference to the methods by 
which the speaker ach ieves hie goals, the Court has described them  
variou sly  as persuasion , incitem ent, exposition, exhortation, coercion, 
advocacy and d iscu ssion . And although there is  disagreem ent among 
the m em bers of the Court concerning the application of these nam es, 
they seem  reasonably agreed respecting the rhetorical princip les in ­
volved in obtaining a sp ecific  audience response. T hese rhetorical 
princip les are, in the main, those promulgated by the m em bers of the 
speech  profession .
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